

ABSTRACTS

Semantics, ontology and truth

Per Aage BRANDT

Meaning and ontology

67-74

This article discusses first the relations between ontology and methodology and the distribution of these aspects of scientific disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in an objectivity articulated in regions. It proposes an analysis of this articulation in embedding areas, *physis* embodying *polis*, which, in its turn, embeds *semiosis*. Semiosis is in itself ordered by an embedding relation between the area of schematic meaning (embedded) and discursive meaning (embedding). The conceptual versions of subjectivity run from schematic meaning to political, whereas the conceptual versions of objectivity run from physical meaning to discursive. Subjectivity can be studied as objectified discursively and politically, in the zone that separates pure schematism and pure physics. An ontology along these lines would have implications for the interconnexions of pragmatic and cognitive meaning.

Barbara CASSIN

What does "to mean something" mean ?

75-91

From Parmenides to Gorgias and from Gorgias to Aristotle, the author shows how the discourse's semantic statute establishes itself and how the now Aristotelian ontology supposes a new determination of essence and truth.

Francis JACQUES

Giving back its reference to the literary text

93-124

Describing reference as the possibility of referring to the world in and through the discourse, the process of literary referenciation is explored in figural discourses and fictional texts. This study is based on the idea that the literary language borrows its capacity to situate, build and seize reference objects from the natural language —and denies the formalist-structuralist

hypothesis. The notion of "possible world" (modal semantics) clears up the relationships between the literature and the world : in the literary text, reality begins with possibility and it is the place where reference is initiated but not concluded. In that way, reference would be "suspensive".

Denis MIEVILLE

S. Lesniewski or a way of considering ontology

19-35

We would like very modestly to introduce some of the works of the Polish logician and philosopher Lesniewski. We will try to characterize the main components of his theories and insist on one of his basic concept, i. e. the collective class. We are convinced that a reflexion on ontology should not be carried out without an examination of the theory of the whole and the parts in which consists the Lesniewski's mereology, nor should it ignore the terms permitting a calculus of names. Our purpose is not to make a thorough analysis of Lesniewski's theory but simply to introduce a rich and stimulating thought.

Frédéric NEF

Semantics and ontology

7-17

Ontology must be and can be reduced to a theory of objects. This theory encompasses all sorts of objects : mathematical entities, physical things, fictional characters correlated to intentional acts. The author discusses some difficulties of this theory, especially the adequation between the philosophical motivation and the construction of a formal frame. The conclusion is that we are faced with the following choice : either to embrace the mereological formalism or to conserve set theoretical foundations and, in that case, give up the properties.

Jacques POULAIN

The metapsychological Metaphysics of pragmatics and the Ontology of Judgment

37-65

Peirce pretended to be able to fix our belief in the existence of ultimate logical interpretants by means of his anticartesian argument, but he was actually unable to present in this manner a true metaphysical description of what is presupposed by our use of signs. His descriptions are going on to express a kind of metapsychological description of what is happening to a cartesian consciousness accompanying our use of signs. The inheritors of the peircian anticartesian argument, Rorty, Putnam and Davidson are also obliged too to assume metaphysical beliefs concerning our cartesian and metapsychological use of signs. One becomes free from these metaphysicual beliefs concerning our metapsychological use of signs if and only if one is able to substitute to these metaphysical beliefs, a true ontological description of our use of judgment and if we are able to ground it on the law of truth. This law is the following : one cannot think any proposition, i. e. use it, without assuming that this proposition is true.

