Dynamic Semiotics or the Case for Actantial Case

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In this paper we shall attempt to sketch two theoretical approaches that view signification in terms of the constraints imposed on the structure of language by the essentially dynamic and constantly transforming nature of the world. These are : (1) the semiotic theory of René Thom based on the concept of morphogenesis, and (2) the *karaka* theory of the Sanskrit grammarians, particularly that of Bhartrhari (7th Century A.D.). By highlighting these approaches we are suggesting that semiosis can be seen as a matter of reflecting/revealing the infinite dynamism of the world by means of a finite variety of basic sentence structures. And, at the same time, we are pointing to the inadequacy of the static semiotic paradigms.

Ferdinand de Saussure : Discrete Signs

We shall start with a reference to F. de Saussure who proposed a notion of sign as an inseparable bipartite entity constituted of the signifier and the signified. Saussure saw the *langue* (language system) as made up of discrete signifying units or signs defined in terms of their relations and mutual differences, and which enter into acceptable combinations in language use *(parole)*. While the sound-form and the thought, mediated by language, are continuous and 'nebulous' in nature, language in itself is constituted of discrete signs. Saussure excludes from the realm of language the undivided streams both of thought and of sound-form. Important to this conception of language was the dicretization of both the signifiers and signifieds and the modes of reconstitution of the formal and semantic continuity by means of syntagmatic combinations. Syntagmatic and associative/paradigmatic relations "are two forms of our mental activity, both (of which) are indispensable to the life of our languages" [Saussure, 1974 (1916), p. 123].

We notice that Saussure is upholding the widely held belief that language is a rule based system of discrete symbolic units and their combinatorial behavior. Thus, even while insisting on the complete autonomy of language Saussure readily accepts the view that "language, in a manner of speaking, is a type of algebra consisting solely of complex terms" [Saussure, 1974 (1916), p. 122].

As regards the nature of the combinations of signs, Saussure appears to be far less committed. The temporal order of the spoken language imposes on it a character of linearity, and this necessitates the sign units to be "linked together." Syntagms are "combinations supported by linearity" [Saussure, 1974 (1916), p. 123]. Here, indeed there is a paradox that Saussure himself reveals to us : while syntagms are combinatorial constructs defined by reciprocal occurrence, "the sentence is the ideal type of syntagm" [Saussure, 1974 (1916), p. 124]. However, the latter belongs to *speaking* and not to the *language system*. Thus, at the level of combinatorics Saussure perceives a continuum of more or less constructional rigidity, the least rigid syntagmatic unit being the sentence, which indeed is not a unit of the language system, but of speaking. Saussure's solution is as follows :

> "(...) in the syntagm there is no clear-cut boundary between the language fact, which is sign of the collective usage, and the fact that belongs to speaking and depends on individual freedom. In a number of instances it is hard to class a combination of units because both forces have combined in producing it, and have combined in indeterminable proportions" [Saussure, 1974 (1916), p. 124].

Just as he has an excellent sense of the sign as the basic, independent unit of language, Saussure is also conscious of the coexistence of signs in a totality :

> "Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others (...)" [Saussure 1974 (1916), p. 114].

A language-totality is thus the sum of all its sign-units, and their relations, both syntagmatic and paradigmatic.

Perhaps, by overstating the autonomy of the language structure, Saussure remains insensitive to the specific structuring of the sentence, both at the syntactic and semantic levels. While concentrating on a description of the individual signs and the language-totality, Saussure appears to have paid less attention to the syntactico-semantic constitution of the sentence. The notion of sentence, we know, has been central for linguistics of the classical period, both in European and Indian traditions. In Europe — for those who insisted on its centrality — the sentence had been seen as the *minimal unit of expression of a complete thought*,

containing the subject and the predicate components. In India, there were profound and meaningful debates between scholars who held that sentence conveyed undivided meaning *(akhanda-pakshavada)* and those who held that sentence meaning is a result of the combinatorics of word-meanings *(padavada)*. Bhartrhari, we know, was a firm adherent of the former position.

Though the understanding of language structure in terms of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations is extremely useful, it is still important to perceive the hierarchical organization of the language units, which the generative grammar of Chomsky can best capture. Language is a system where the multiple levels of organization of form and meaning are masked by a surface linearity. Sentence is not only the highest level of this hierarchy, but also, in relation to thought, the bounding structural unit. (Beyond the sentence, of course, there is the textual level which may also have its hierarchical organization, for instance, of the narrative units.) Etymologically speaking, a 'sentence' expresses what is felt or thought ('sentir'). In the Aristotelian conception, language is a mode of representing or imitating reality (mimesis), involving the use of a subject-predicate structure. Other modes of representation such as painting, music or drama do not have this particular structure, and hence cannot be evaluated in relation to the truth or the falsity of the representation.

Lucien Tesnière : The Actantial Paradigm

While this unit-to-unit correspondence between language and the world has been the main parameter of truth in the Greek tradition, we can also speak of a figure-like adequation of language in relation to reality. Thus, in addition to the logical/propositional value of the sentence implicit in the former, philosophers and linguists have considered sentence as a mode of reflecting events in the world in a somewhat pictorial manner.

Lucien Tesnière, for instance, has proposed such a view in his *Éléments d'une syntaxe structurale* [Tesnière, 1959]. The so-called 'dependency' grammar of Tesnière is based on an implicit notion of 'action' which was well known to the Indian grammarians. For Tesnière, the meaningfulness of a sentence was due to the central organizing role of the predicate verb which represented an action, and functioned as the highest syntactic node of the sentence. The verb is the complete and the independent term of a sentence. Dependent on the verb are the 'actants' which are the participants in the action (this dependency relation is to be diagrammatically represented by means of a tree-structure or 'stemma'). Tesnière viewed the sentence as representing a 'little drama' *(petit drame)* wherein the predicate represents an action (in the theatrical sense), or even a process, and the dependents of the predicate are the principal elements in

the action. Since Tesnière is distancing himself from a logical conception of grammar he is eschewing the "subject-verb-object-indirect object" type of propositional structure ; he is opting for a rather theatrical conception where the nominal elements are initially non-heterogeneous actants in participating in a process, but appearing in their functionally specialized roles as subject, object and indirect object in the context of the sentence-structure. Tesnière defines actants as "beings or things which in some capacity and in whatsoever manner, even in the capacity of mere onlookers and in the most passive manner participates in a process" [Tesnière, 1959, p. 102].

While actants are one type of dependents of the predicate (they designate characters in a anthropomorphic sense), the other type called the circumstants designate situations. According to Tesnière there can be a maximum of only three actants in a sentence while the circumstants may be several. The following example may be provide an illustration :

— Sentence :

"Mohan bought an electronic camera for his son yesterday".

— Stemmatic representation :



Here, A1 (= 'Mohan') is the Subject, A2 (= 'Camera') is the Object of the transitive verb or the Agent of the passive verb, A3 (= 'son') is the Beneficiary, and (C = 'yesterday') is the Circumstant.

Tesnière's dependency grammar is a kind of case-grammar that shows the semantic roles of sentence constituents. We may note that he had also introduced the notion of "valency" to denote the number of actants carried by a verb. Thus the valency could be zero ('rain'), one ('cry'), two ('hit') or three ('give'). (We shall note in passing that Tesnière's actantial paradigm has been adopted by A. J. Greimas in developing his semio-narrative grammar).

Despite their apparent similarity, Tesnière's stemma is different in content from Chomsky's tree-diagram. While in the latter, the connections between the nodes have no theoretical value, in the former these connections are perceived in an organic way, that is, as the connections between the participants in an action. The stemmas are the diagrammatic representation of a holistic image of the meaning of the sentence

conceived as action. They are suggestive of the sentence-meaning as some sort of dynamic gestalts.

Tesnière, we notice, is stressing on the notion of a semantic continuum which is unknown to Saussure :

> "Every word which forms part of a sentence ceases itself to be isolated as in a dictionary. Between it and its neighbors, the mind perceives connections whose ensemble forms the framework of the sentence. (...) These connections are indicated by nothing" [Tesnière, 1959, p. 11].

For example in the sentence, "Mohan speaks," there are three elements : (1) Mohan (2) speak and (3) the connection which unites the two first elements, and without which they would not form a sentence. Not to account for the connections "is to ignore the essential, which is the syntactic link." "The connection is indispensable for the expression of thought. Without connection, we will not be able to express any thought, and we will only be utter a succession of images and indices, isolated from each other, and without any link between them" [Tesnière, 1959, p. 12]. On the importance of connections for Tesnière, Jean Petitot remarks :

> "(...) a sentence is above all a system of connections which being 'incorporeal' (non sensible) can only be grasped by the 'mind'. These structural connections, oriented and hierarchised, are not of logical essence, but constitute an 'organic and vital' principle of organization (...)" [Petitot, 1985, p. 45].

They constitute the 'vital' organic principle of the linguistic 'energeia' in the sense of Humboldt (see [Petitot, 1989, p. 182]).

While introducing that actantial perspective and the notion of structural connections, Tesnière seems to be arguing for the semantic continuum. Of course, he explicitly, supported a organicist and holist conception of the sentence. The advantage of such a position is that it permits us to think of structural space where the actants are related to each other via the activity referred to by the verb. Among other scholars who have maintained similar views is the Russian linguist, S. Katznelson who, while noting the fragmentary nature of words as against the holistic character of sentence observes that it is the "grammatical elements (...) (that) reestablish the living links which full words tend to lose when they are withdrawn from the images of coherent events" (Katznelson, 1975, p. 102).

René Thom : Catastrophe Theory

Tesnière's fundamental ideas of actant and valency as well as the organicist perspective has much influenced the semiotic/semantic thinking

of mathematician René Thom known for his Catastrophic Theory. The central role assigned to the verb is also a common factor between the systems of ideas of Tesnière and Thom.

Thom's natural/realist philosophy is governed by the two central principles of structural stability and morphogenesis. The importance of Catastrophe Theory to Linguistics and Semiotics comes from the fact that it is most directly concerned with structures.

The theory has essentially to do with the effect of local (quantitative, micro) variations on the global (qualitative, macro) structure. Catastrophe theory involves the description of the (sudden, abrupt) discontinuities induced by the continuous local perturbations of a system. As per Thom's theorem :

> "The number of qualitatively different configurations of discontinuities that can occur depends not on the number of state variables, which is generally very large, but on the control variables, which is generally very small. In particular, if the number of control variables is not greater than four, then there are only seven types of catastrophes, and in none of these more than two state variables are involved" [Saunders, 1980, p. 3].

The seven elementary catastrophes are : Fold, Cusp, Swallowtail, Butterfly, Elliptic Umbilic, Hyperbolic Umbilic and Parabolic Umbilic ; these have their corresponding topologies.

It is indeed possible to note the striking parallel between the elementary catastrophes and the cases found in the classical languages. We may perhaps speak of the evolution of sentence structures (that is, their morphogenesis) parallel to and part of the morphogenesis of natural forms.

Following the German biologist, Jacob von Uexküll, Thom believes that basic concepts originate as a function of the biological self-regulation involving the prey, the predator, and (sexual) partner. The more complex concepts are built upon these :

> "The logos of living beings has served as the universal model for the formation of concepts".

These biologically founded and linguistically valid concepts play the role of actants in the interactions represented by the verb. The verb is an organizing centre, i.e., the event that distributes the actantial places. Verbs are identified by their own structural stability as events. They have as their source and model the simulation of elementary actantial interactions realizable in space-time. Perceptually, these interactions are constrained by the four dimensions of space-time.

Thom has identified 18 such 'morphologies' of interaction, referred to as 'archetypal morphologies' by himself, and as 'semantic archetypes' by [Wildgen, 1982] (see [Thom, 1980 (1974), p. 213] for the list of archetypal morphologies).

It is possible to describe the morphogenesis of sentence-structures by projecting the actants on a substratum space, and by assuming their

'inflections' according to the increasing in the number of actants and the evolution of interactions in time. A zero-valent verb will occupy the entirety of the perceptual space. A uni-valent verb evokes the possibility of an action continuous in time. A bi-valent verb will involve interactions, and its graph will show a discontinuity (at a zone of interaction) between its earlier and later parts of the event described in time. Thom's example of such a verb is 'capture' whose actantial graph is :



where S1 and S2 are the actants and O the point of interaction.

Bhartrhari : Karaka Theory

The actantial perspective which was unknown to Saussure, and which occupies a prominent position in the linguistic thinking of Tesnière and Thom (and also Greimas), was of preeminent importance to the Indian grammarians. The key Sanskrit term for what seems like a parallel idea is *'karaka'* (doer or actor), which has been part of the Indian grammatical vocabulary for centuries.

The *karakas* are recognized by most scholars as basic semantic notions that in fact pivot sentence constructions. They are similar to the case roles/relations proposed in the case grammars. But *karakas* are much more than these, and their crucial role as a common substratum of ontology, cognition, and grammar can be understood only if we regard them as a manner of classifying 'actions' in the real world.

It may not be however inappropriate to suggest that the *karaka* notions are conceived as properties of the world corresponding to, though independent of their grammatical/morphological manifestations. Panini himself was probably merely projecting the *karaka*s (literally, 'a factor of action') from morphological occurrences in the form of cases to a set of possible actions in the world. This point has been most aptly made by a recent commentator :

> "If the notion of *karaka*s was perhaps derived from an observation of Sanskrit cases, Panini had raised them above the level of case values and made them intermediaries between reality and the grammatical categories. Their importance, often misunderstood, goes far beyond the syntax of cases ; next to the roots, they are the prime moving factors of the whole grammar" [Scharfe, 1977, p. 95].

Panini identifies six *karaka*s corresponding to six cases, viz., the nominative, accusative, dative, instrumental, locative, and ablative. Possessive and vocative are conspicuous by their absence in Panini's

grammar. This is how Panini defines the six *karakas (Asthadhyayi,* I. 4. 24-54) :

1. *Apadana* (lit. 'take off') : "(that which is) firm when departure (takes place)." This is the equivalent of the *ablative* notion which signifies a stationary object from which a movement proceeds.

2. *Sampradana* ('bestowal') : "he whom one aims at with the object". This is equivalent to the *dative* notion which signifies a recipient in an act of giving or similar acts.

3. *Karana* ('instrument') "that which effects most". This is equivalent to the *instrumental* notion.

4. *Adhikarana* ('location') : or "substratum". This is equivalent to the *locative* notion.

5. *Karman* ('deed'/'object') : "what the agent seeks most to attain". This is equivalent to the *accusative* notion.

6. *Karta* ('agent') : "he/that which is independent in action". This is equivalent to the case of the subject or the *nominative* notion (on the basis of [Scharfe, 1977, p. 94]).

In his *Mahabhashya,* Patanjali defines *karakas* in relation to the notion of *kriya,* or action. Action is the 'distinctive mode of action of the accessories'. He also held that : (1) the root can be defined as something which expresses *kriya,* (2) *kriya* is different from all the accessories which play a part, direct or indirect, in its accomplishment, and (3) the action is not *pratyaksha* (perceptible), it can only be inferred.

That verbs primarily convey 'action' is an idea that goes back to Yaska's etymological studies called the *Niruktas*. In his words : *bhavapradhanam akhyatam,* "an action or process is the main meaning of a verb" (see [Subramania Iyer, 1969, p. 202]).

Bhartrhari discusses various possible definitions of 'action', but what he prefers is the following :

> "Whenever something, finished or unfinished is presented as something to be accomplished (i.e., *sadhya*), then it is called 'action' because of its having acquired the form of sequence" (III. 8. 1).

In addition, he stands by Patanjali's definition as per which "action is the distinctive mode of behaviour of the accessories", and appears to be rejecting another view as per which "action is that moment immediately after which the result is produced" (e.g., in 'cooking' there is a critical moment that separates the cooked state from the raw state, of rice).

The fact that action is something which has the form of 'parts arranged in sequence' would entail that it cannot be directly perceived. It can only be *inferred* by the mind. The relevant statements in *Vakyapadiya* on this are the following :

> "What is called action is a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with the parts which are subordinated to it (i.e., the whole)" (III. 8. 4).
>
> "The parts which occur in a sequence and are partly existent and partly not so cannot enter into contact with the senses like the eyes whose objects are always the existent" (III. 8. 6).

Thus the action of 'cooking' can be seen to involve a number of subordinate actions. One may however question, if 'cooking' consists of the whole sequence of parts of actions perceived as whole or only the moment of transformation of the raw rice into cooked (soft) state. Bhartrhari seems to prefer the former position.

Bhartrhari's philosophy of grammar is accompanied by a corresponding ontology describing the universe in terms of objects, forces or powers *(shakti)* and the interactions between the objects.

The essence of the universe is understood as comprising infinite powers distributed in an infinite number of objects. Due to the powers the objects are constantly changing and are in mutual interaction with other objects, resulting in their eternal mutation. The universe is thus in a constant and perpetual state of change. Yaska had identified six basic types of transformations, namely *birth, existence, change, increase, decrease, and death.* Actions and processes in the world result from the changes and interactions of objects. Moreover, objects themselves are the (temporarily stable) state *(siddha)* produced by the actions and processes *(sadhya)*. The objects which are distributed in space *(dik)* are themselves participants in further actions and processes. In addition to spatial location, the objects have other powers resting in them, which may be the result of past actions, and which are involved in the subsequent actions. *Sadhana* is Bhartrhari's term for these powers.

Sentences are the linguistic mode of capturing certain particularized actions abstracted from the eternal play of forces in the universe. A sentence represents a "complex meaning (we may say, a dynamic gestalt) in which some action or process is the central element and concrete objects which cooperate in accomplishing the process are the elements associated with it" [Subramania Iyer, 1969, p. 285].

Thought the powers vested in the objects may be of an infinite variety, from the linguistic point of view (that is, in language) they are *classified* into six different kinds of capacities in which an object can participate in an action represented by the sentences. *Karakas* are the names for these limited number of capacities. The six *karakas* identified in the Sanskrit grammar are *karma, karana, karta, adhikarana, apadana,* and *sampradana* ; in addition there is a sundry *karaka* category referred to as *sesa.*

The main feature of Bhartrhari's ideas is the constancy of and the omnipresence of transformations in the universe. Both word and the world are the result of manifest transformations and/or apparent differentiations

of a cosmic unity, which takes the name of *sabdabrahma*. (Brahman, or the Ultimate reality is of the nature of the word, i.e., *sabdatattva)*. From a eternal point of view these transformations/differentiations are unreal and illusory. Time, as one of the properties of the unchanging cosmic unity, is the material force which produces these transformations, which are in turn perceived and cognized as activities of particular things. The *sabdabrahma* is initially differentiated into its mental and material media, and the time-force *(kalashakti)* affects both these aspects.

In Bhartrhari's view, only the sentence can completely express 'reality', and not the word which may denote objects. Moreover, "reality is expressible only in the form 'it exists' which means that a word in order to express a reality has to be compounded with a verb, namely 'exists' ".

Therefore, "a verb has to be part of a sentence (...). If the verb is mentioned as expressing an action to be conveyed, nouns are required to effect the action" [Bhartrhari, 1971 trad., xxxiii]. The verb constitutes the essential and minimal content of a sentence [Bhartrhari, 1971 trad., xxxiv].

Sentence-meanings which are primarily in the nature of an action are also relative to the speaking subject :

> "The grammarian makes a distinction between word-meanings which mention an object, and the meaning of the sentence which is primarily an action, effected by men through objects" [Bhartrhari, 1971 trad., xxxiii].

For the grammarian, reality is understood only through speech (language) and it is understood only in the form it is presented by speech (word/language). *But language cannot describe the intrinsic nature of things, although we know things only in the form in which words describe them* [Bhartrhari, 1971 trad., xxxiii].

Bhartrhari rejects the existence of meanings of individual words. Individual word-meaning is an illusion, according to him. Only the undifferentiated sentence-meaning is real. The sentence-meaning is not a concatenation of word-meanings as argued by the Mimamsaka philosophers, but to be understood in terms of a complex cognition. Bhartrhari compares this complex cognition with that of the cognition of a picture (*citrajnana*) :

> "A cognition which embraces many objects at the same time is a complex cognition. As a cognition, it is one but because of the many objects which figure in it, one sees plurality in it, though it is indivisible" [Subramania Iyer, 1969, p. 186-187].

The relationship between sentence-meaning and word-meaning is compared to the relationship between a holistic picture and its component parts. Just as a unified perception of composite (picture) can be analyzed (into the preoccupation of component parts) depending upon which part is required to be perceived so likewise is the understanding of the meaning of the sentence and "just as a single homogeneous picture is described

through various features as being blue (green, etc.) as a result of its being perceived in different ways, similarly the sentence which is single and does not possess expectancy is described in terms of words which possess mutual expectancy" [Bhartrhari, 1971 trad., p. 38].

We shall summarize Bhartrhari's views on the sentence and its meaning in the following manner. The sentence represents/reveals at least a fragment of the eternal activity in the universe, presented from the point of view of the speaker. The verb highlights the specific character of this activity, expressed in terms of the accessories/means and their qualities. When a thing is expressed as something to be accomplished, it is *sadhya*, but when it is expressed as accomplished, it is *siddha*. The means involved in the accomplishment of an action are the *sadhana*s. The recognition of the sentence-meaning takes place by way of the *vakya sphota* implying a somewhat gestalt-like comprehension.

Subramania Iyer points out that :

> "The complete meaning expressed by a sentence is a complex thing in which some process of action occupies the central position and is associated with its accessories and their qualifications, all amalgamated into an indivisible whole" [Subramania Iyer, 1969, p. 200].

And :

> "(...) the indivisible sentence is the unit of communication and its meaning is understood in a flash *(pratibha)*. This meaning is also something indivisible, a complex cognition in which the central element is an action or process with its accessories closely associated with it" [Subramania Iyer, 1969, p. 201].

Bhartrhari's conception of the case relations *(karakas)* can be understood in the following terms. A sentence represents/reveals the accomplishment of an action. 'Means'/accessory *(sadhana)* is the power *(shakti)* of a thing to accomplish actions *(Vakyapadiyam,* III. 7. 1). The difference in the powers of objects is relative to the form that speakers (subjectively) impose on them (III. 7. 6). Each object that is involved in any action in any and at any time is seen as having a particular means or power for that time (III. 7. 12). The particular help rendered to the action is expressed by the case-markers (III. 7. 13). *Karaka* (literally, 'doer' or even an 'actant' in the sense of Tesnière) is that which helps in the accomplishment of an action by assuming different forms (thus karaka is different from both *hetu* (cause) and *lakshana* (sign) which are relatively more world-based). It is said that in any one object, there can be six different powers that lead to action. These powers are universal, and though they appear to be unlimited, can only be six in number (III. 7. 35-36). These six powers correspond to the six *karakas*.

Karta (agent) is the basis of all the varied activities (because power is one, nut appears to be divided into six kinds according to circumstances).

There are six more 'karakas' including sesa, or the 'rest'. These are : *karma, karana, adhikarana, sampradana, apadana and sesa* (which includes *sambodhana)* (III. 7. 37-44).

The object *(karma)* 'that which is most desired to be attained' is of three kinds : product *(nirvartya)* : {He made jar out of mud} ; modification/conversion *(vikarya)* : {He converted wood into ashes} ; and destination *(prapya)* : {He saw a tree (here the object doesn't change) } (III. 7. 47-51).

Whenever, after the activity of something, the action is meant to be conveyed as accomplished, then that thing is said to be the instrument *(karana)* (III. 7. 90). Thus, the instrument is a more immediate participant in an action than the agent itself.

The factor in the act of which is sought to be reached by the thing given is called *sampradana* when he does not prohibit the giver, or request him, or gives his consent (III. 7. 129).

A starting point *(apadana)* is of 3 kinds : that in relation to which a movement is mentioned ; that in relation to which the verb expresses the movement only partly ; and that in relation to which some movement is required (III. 7. 136).

That which helps in the accomplishment of the action by holding it indirectly through the agent is called *adhikarana* (abode). The contact is the same whether the abode be sesame seed, the sky or mat, etc. But the service rendered differs according to as the objects are in contact through *samyoga* (conjunction) or through *samvaya* (inherence) (III. 7. 148-149).

In addition to the six *karaka*s listed above there is discussion of a possible set of cases under the name of *sesa* (the rest or the extras). *Sesa* does not represent a *karaka* relation but may involve or be preceded by one of the *karaka* relations. Under this category, Bhartrhari discusses the possessive case, where the relation of possession is supposed to be preceded by some sort of action, e.g., 'king's man' implies an action on the part of the king which has led to the establishment of a master-servant relationship. Further, in expressions like 'branch of the tree' and 'father's son', the relations like the part and whole, and procreator and offspring are "the results of previous actions not mentioned in the sentences, actions in which these objects were accessories. That previous status lingers somewhat in the present status and that is why the present status is looked upon as a kind of karaka, though its relation with the action expressed in the sentence is rather remote" [Subramania Iyer, 1969, p. 325].

Sambodhana or vocative is discussed separately. Merely turning the attention of somebody already there towards oneself has been declared to be the nature of the vocative case *(sambodhana)*. It is indeed, one whose attention has been attracted that is employed in some action (III. 7. 163).

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