

**Matthew Sharpe**

**Deakin University, Australia**

**Of Idols and Tribes, Forests and Trees:**

**Consideration on Thomas Sheehan's charges concerning**

**Emmanuel Faye's work on Heidegger and National Socialism**

**Abstract**

Part 1 introduces Sheehan's 2015 polemic against Faye's 2005 book, *Heidegger, l'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie: Autour des séminaires inédits de 1933-1935*. Part 2 introduces the problem with Sheehan's call to dismiss the book out of court: he simply does not consider the central seven out of nine of Sheehan's chapters, those on the National Socialist speeches, lectures, and subtitled seminars. Part 3 reveals four illustrative instances of what Sheehan's criticism of Faye conceals, namely Faye's disclosures concerning the most militant lectures and seminars published only after 1998. Part 4 more adequately reconstructs Faye's itinerary, its strengths and limitations, and shows how several of Sheehan's particular charges against him are overwrought. Then, Part 5 addresses Sheehan's 2016 reply to Pégny, Rastier, Fritsche et al, noting that it too fails to address the core claims of Faye's book. An Appendix on Heidegger's letter concerning the Jewish NeoKantian *Hönigswald* follows, illustrating the complete imbrication of Heidegger's philosophical thought with National Socialist prejudices.

**Key words**

Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger, Nazism, idols of the tribe, Francis Bacon, psychodynamics, tragedy

1. *Introduction: Thomas Sheehan writes on Emmanuel Faye in 2015*
2. *Pathways and question marks: from Sheehan's trees to Faye's black forest*
3. *In the forest clearing, remembering the ones who are drowned*
4. *What do Diagoras' drowned, Heidegger's Nazi courses, ask of scholarly readers?*
5. *Of tragedy or farce: in (Aeschylean) response to Sheehan's 2016 contribution*

*Appendix: the question concerning Hönigswald*

Can anyone expect that he should be made to confess, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? ... All the arguments that can be used will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster.”

John Locke, *Essay on Human Understanding*, IV.xx.11

### 1. Introduction: Thomas Sheehan writes on Emmanuel Faye in 2015

As someone who has taught Martin Heidegger’s philosophy on and off for nearly two decades, Thomas Sheehan is one of the three or four English language authors to whose works I have continually referred my students. Sheehan’s essays and work *Heidegger: the Man and the Thinker* serve the laudable goal of trying to make Heidegger’s formidably difficult, often-gnomically closed texts open to generations of students brought up in contemporary liberal-democratic societies, most of whom know little of their intellectual, cultural and political context and heritage.<sup>1</sup>

Nor has Sheehan, unlike many Heideggerians, stood back from confronting the amply-attested, troubling realities of Martin Heidegger’s militantly anti-liberal, anti-modernist politics. Unlike many other Heideggerian commentators, Sheehan has never denied the clear and continuing link the man himself thought tied his “way of thinking” together with National Socialism as a salvific Germanist regime, at least insofar as what Heidegger deemed the latter’s “inner truth and greatness” was concerned—that is, its task “to assist humanity in attaining for the first time an adequate relation (*zureichendes Verhältnis*) to the essence of technicity.” In a 1988 article to which Sheehan directs his readers while introducing his 2015 response in *Philosophy Today* to Emmanuel Faye’s book on this subject, Sheehan showed himself sufficiently liberal-minded to read, and accept the measured accuracy of far-Right German historian Ernst Nolte’s assessment of Heidegger as a “normal Nazi.”<sup>2</sup>

All of these facts make Thomas Sheehan’s 2015 polemic against Emmanuel Faye’s *Martin Heidegger, The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, “Emmanuel Faye, the Introduction of Fraud

---

1 Thomas Sheehan, “Introduction: Heidegger, the Object and the Fulfilment”, vii-xii; Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger: the Early years”, pp. 1-20; in Thomas Sheehan ed. ed., *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*,

2 All of this, moreover, Sheehan did in the context of a fair-minded review of Victor Farias’ 1987 *Heidegger and Nazism*: a work pilloried by many another Heidegger student or advocate in France and globally. Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger and the Nazis” *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXXV, No. 10 (June 16, 1988), pp. 38-47.

into Philosophy?” both the more surprising, and the more worthy of serious attention.<sup>3</sup> So what is the form of this polemic?

Sheehan’s article, as he reminds us in the conclusion, is headed by a titular question, not a proposition: “Emmanuel Faye, The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?”. And Sheehan will finally, as he concludes, “leave it to the reader to decide. Ignorance? Fraud? Perhaps a bit of both?”. Nevertheless, this generously liberal “letting be” at article’s end comes far too late. For meanwhile, the body of Sheehan’s 34-page piece has ran far ahead of this eleventh-hour *politesse*. Sheehan’s arguments and rhetoric have more than answered his title’s rhetorical question, decisively, in the affirmative. “Perhaps (following the Library of Congress’s cataloguing system) Faye’s own book could be relocated at HV6691.F353, where some might argue it would better fit,” Sheehan cannot help inserting in a footnote early in the piece, before his evidences for his extraordinary dismissal have been marshalled. For readers who cannot guess, looking up this call number yields: “HV 6691-HV 6699–Fraud.”<sup>4</sup>

So “Emmanuel Faye, The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?” aims at forever establishing nothing less than the title’s rhetorically posed proposition about Faye’s book. Sheehan’s piece suggests an eviction of Emmanuel Faye’s 2005 (2009 translation) *Heidegger: L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie* from the halls of philosophical thought.<sup>5</sup> According to the Sheehan of 2015—this fateful year following the release of Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* or *Black Books* which seem so abundantly to confirm the very bases of Faye’s claims—*Heidegger: L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie* needs to be called out as a species of “conjuring,” if not a malevolent scam.

So just how ample are the evidences Sheehan adduces to make his case for the philosophical prosecution of Faye’s book as the legally-condemnable category of “fraud”? (We will soon enough, in **2**, come to their content.)

There are in Faye’s study too many evidences of fraudulent or flawed argumentation for Sheehan to cite them all, he tells us. For one thing (and this is Sheehan’s most extensive concern), Faye’s 500-page book gives an “embarrassing fly-by treatment” of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, despite the importance of the magician of Messkirch’s acknowledged *magnum opus*.<sup>6</sup> As Sheehan asks us to see things, however, we need not single out this case alone. The issue is that *L’introduction* is *everywhere* characterised by a *modus operandi* “of wrenching things out of context and wrapping them in bizarre interpretations.”<sup>7</sup> Sheehan’s scorn accordingly only grows as he proceeds through dismantling what are, by the end, some nine cases of Faye’s allegedly indefensible scholarship, translation and argumentation.<sup>8</sup> “Does Faye think that if he and his

3 Thomas Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye, the Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?” *Philosophy Today*, Volume 59, Issue 3 (Summer 2015), 367-400.

4 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 300, n. 7; see eg www-site <http://law-library.rutgers.edu/criminal-justice-pathfinder-legal-materials>, last accessed August 2015.

5 In this way, the student matches Faye’s polemical suggestion in his book (to which we will return) about the master or teacher himself. I will cite the English-translation Emmanuel Faye, *Martin Heidegger: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy*, trans. Michael B. Smith, Foreword by Tom Rockmore (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009).

6 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 379.

7 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 374.

8 To list these: i. claims about Heidegger’s alleged clandestine political activities in the 1920s; ii. Faye’s interpretation of Heidegger’s saying “I am not a philosopher” in a 1921 letter to Löwith; iii. claims about Heidegger’s debts to Ludwig Clauß in the 1925 Kassel lectures concerning *Umwelt*; iv. The question of

acolytes [for Sheehan’s Faye has ‘acolytes’] repeat the same misreadings enough times, *someone* might come to believe them?,” Sheehan asks.<sup>9</sup> If Faye did proceed with the deliberate “deviousness” he attributes to Heidegger (by implication unjustly), he does such a terrible job that no “scholar” trained in the modern liberal humanities *could* believe him. That said, “the evidence of [Faye’s] recurrent distortions is so overwhelming that it’s hard to imagine he didn’t know what he was doing ...”<sup>10</sup>

If the founding modern, British philosopher Francis Bacon was not a figure hardly ever named in Heidegger circles, we might thus say that Emmanuel Faye’s 2005 work as Thomas Sheehan sees it in 2015 is a prize exemplar of what this founder of modern intellectual culture called a “science as you like it”.<sup>11</sup> Faye, as Sheehan thus tells us, “already knows the outcome he wants—‘*Being and Time* is a Nazi text’ [as, for Faye, all of Heidegger’s works are]—and he tortures the evidence to fit that prior conclusion.”<sup>12</sup> This is why the question mark in Sheehan’s title (“Emmanuel Faye, the Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?”) amounts by the end to something of a fig leaf covering an otherwise categorically damning offensive. The work of refuting this “effort to trash Heidegger without managing to understand him” is frankly “tedious”.<sup>13</sup> The rhetorical packaging of the piece, its opening page presenting the contents of a dossier with numbered subheadings (“1. Emmanuel Faye Visits Stanford University; 2. Emmanuel Faye in New York”, etc.), says it all, even or especially for the cursory undecided, novice or already-decided reader.<sup>14</sup> Sheehan’s 2015 dismissal of Faye is a work of public duty. It is more like the legal prosecution of a petty offender than the philosophical examination of the work of a fellow inquirer.

---

destiny or collective *Schicksal* in *Being and Time* section 74; v. the issue of how to translate *Boden* and *Bodenlosigkeit* in *Being and Time*, as “soil” or “ground” or even “reasonable foundation” (Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 383); vi. (in the context of v.), Heidegger’s debt to the anti-Semitic author Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, whose notion of “*Bodenlosigkeit*” Heidegger cites in *Being and Time*, section 77 (Sheehan does not deny Yorck’s anti-Semitism, but stresses that what is cited by the philosopher is not a directly anti-Semitic passage, at Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 384); vii. Faye’s interpretation of a comment by Heidegger in *Identity and Difference* reflecting on his speaking of *Ereignis* indirectly in the 1946 “Letter on Humanism”; vii. Faye’s translation of *Deckname* as “*mot couvert*” from a mid-1943 letter by Heidegger to the National Socialist historian Kurt Bauch; viii. Faye’s reading of the alleged “Seyn” in illegitimately-added quotation marks in a quote of Heidegger’s concerning Hölderlin; ix. Faye’s alleged misleading paraphrase or translation of a key sentence from the 1966 Heidegger *Der Spiegel* interview. Although space prevents covering each of these claims, I will address viii. (what I will argue is Sheehan’s most badly flawed claim) in **3** below; then i., iii. and ix. in **4**, and iv. in a lengthy note, note 29 below.

<sup>9</sup>Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 396. In passing, Sheehan also comments disparagingly—indeed, in a definitively dismissive manner—concerning the results of work on Heidegger’s political philosophy by other scholars guided by Faye’s fundamental orientations.

<sup>10</sup>Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 396.

<sup>11</sup> Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Book I, Chapter 49.

<sup>12</sup> Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 383.

<sup>13</sup> Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 372: “(The footnotes, tedious as they may seem, are crucial to the argument)”, Sheehan specifies.

<sup>14</sup> Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 367.

## 2. Pathways and question marks: through Sheehan’s trees, back to Faye’s black forest

In what follows, I restrict myself to commenting on the scholarly aspects of Sheehan’s article, and how they touch on issues to do with how to interpret Heidegger the philosopher in the era of the *Black Books*. I want to critically evaluate the adequacy or justice of Sheehan’s piece as a critique of Faye’s 500 page work: a book which, as its subtitle announces, is built around Heidegger’s 1933-1935 seminars and lectures. I will argue that, in fact, Sheehan’s polemic is radically unjust, and can only appear to work (as we will see) by highlighting several, often-disputable, alleged flaws in Faye’s opening and closing chapters, while completely ignoring the central subject matter of this book, which concerns Heidegger’s 1933-36 lectures and seminars.

One thing that we can learn from Sheehan’s 2015 criticisms of Faye—and that Faye might well have learnt from previous broadsides against him—is the wisdom of the old adage: *be careful about what you write in the opening and closing parts of your books*. Sidonie Kellerer, one of the scholars Sheehan dismisses *en passant* as a Faye “acolyte”<sup>15</sup>, has commented critically in a 2014 reflection on the German reception of Faye’s book about what a “free kick” Faye’s famous conclusion (that Heidegger’s books should no longer be considered philosophy at all) has ironically proven to be for Heidegger’s defenders.<sup>16</sup> “Uselessly provocative and counterproductive”, Kellerer comments, this single polemical thrust has allowed the preceding 100s of pages of evidence and argument to be dismissed as partisan, out of court. Heideggerians convinced in advance that the great thinker was neither a National Socialist nor an anti-Semite, or that these commitments (however regrettable) were unconnected with, or do not negatively colour, his contemplative thought-paths, have cited this provocative conclusion as reason not to read Faye’s works at all, long before Sheehan’s 2015 denunciation of the French author.<sup>17</sup>

Take for instance Alain Badiou, never a retiring flower, and a thinker with clear aspirations to inherit Heidegger’s mantle and something of his “grand style”, if not his direct legacy. In 2014, responding to the appearance of Emmanuel Faye’s edited collection *Heidegger: Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*, Badiou publically denounced all those associated with the project as “moral

---

15 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 396. Sidonie Kellerer is one contributor to the collection Emmanuel Faye dir., *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2014): Sidonie Kellerer, “Le maquillage d’un texte: à propos d’une conférence de Martin Heidegger de 1938”, 97-140. See Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 383 for Sheehan’s assessment of this collection, which he argues “largely” falls down on the basis of what he argues to be a misunderstanding of *Boden* in Heidegger as always “sol” or soil, as in the Nazi “blubo”, and as such operating in close semantic proximity to this key National Socialist term. As we will argue throughout, and especially in 4, this judgment of Sheehan’s (even if categorically true concerning “Boden”, which we can concede here, since it is outside of our scope (but see Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye,” pp. 383-386) involves an insupportable over-generalisation of a collection of articles spanning into Gadamer’s work, the 1933-’35 lecture series, and (in Kellerer’s piece) issues surrounding the removal of passages, without critical comment, from Heidegger’s 1938 “Age of the World Picture” in its publication after the war. These articles have nothing to do with whether “Boden” in 1920s and ’30s Germany was best translatable, or legible, as “reasonable grounds”, rather than the “soil” of the *Völkisch* thinkers.

16 Sidonie Kellerer, “Envoûtement : Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande,” *Sens Public: Revue internationale*

*International Web Journal*, Article publié en ligne : 2014/05, at www-site [http://www.sens-public.org/article.php?id\\_article=1069](http://www.sens-public.org/article.php?id_article=1069), last accessed August 2015: 4. .

17 It would, in fact, be interesting to know how many people working in this field have read Faye’s book, but impossible to discover.

hermeneutists” or “inquisitors”. The work of these politically correct anti-philosophers, this thinker tells his public, “shames” French philosophy. It should not be tolerated at all, “and it won’t be”.<sup>18</sup> Yet Badiou admits in the first line of his “Open Letter” that he never has, nor ever will, actually *read* the book in question.<sup>19</sup> This kind of cavalier hermeneutic stance, by implication, does not shame philosophy, but promotes the discipline founded as we know it by the Athenian Socrates in the marketplace of competing opinions.

As we have said, Thomas Sheehan has (at least until his 2015 intervention on Faye) never come anywhere near this kind of wholly defensive, unscholarly response to the growing scholarship on Heidegger and Nazism. His opening paragraph in his 2015 piece on Faye, in this vein, crisply underlines what people who *have* read Emmanuel Faye, and before him Thomas Sheehan, Victor Farias, Charles Bambach, Tom Rockmore and Hugo Ott, have indeed “long ... known”:

Martin Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks* (*Gesamtausgabe* 94–97, with more to come) confirm what has long been known: that this ‘greatest philosopher of the twentieth century’ was an unabashed anti-Semite. He was also a strong supporter of Hitler and the Nazis from 1930 through at least 1934, and a convinced fascist long after he took distance from the Party. If anything, the *Black Notebooks* reveal how Heidegger tried to launder his anti-Semitism through his idiosyncratic ‘history of being,’ his devolutionary narrative about Western civilization that ends by claiming that ‘machination’—the terrible state of the world today—is amply instantiated in world Jewry ...<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, Sheehan then straightaway hones in on Faye’s ill-famed polemical conclusion according to which, as Sheehan parses it, Heidegger’s work is “nothing but a sometimes clandestine, sometimes blatant insinuation of Nazism into twentieth-century philosophy.”<sup>21</sup> “What follows in no way attempts to whitewash Heidegger or deny the obvious,” Sheehan reassures us.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, our opening questions to him, given his longstanding opposition to the “denialist” positions concerning Heidegger and Nazism<sup>23</sup>, must remain these: if his piece is

---

18 Alain Badiou, “Lettre d’Alain Badiou à propos d’une recension autour de Faye/Heidegger sur Actus Philosophia”, at www-site <http://strassdelaphilosophie.blogspot.fr/2014/04/lettre-dalain-badiou-propos-dune.html>, last accessed August 2015; and François Rastier, “Philosophie et exterminations — en réponse à Alain Badiou”, *L’Obs Bibliobs*,

at www-site <http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/essais/20140428.OBS5423/philosophie-et-exterminations-en-reponse-a-alain-badiou.html>, last accessed August 2015.

19 Badiou, «je n’ai pas lu, et ne lirai pas, cet ensemble.» Badiou, “Lettre d’Alain Badiou à propos d’une recension autour de Faye/Heidegger sur Actus Philosophia”, at www-site <http://strassdelaphilosophie.blogspot.fr/2014/04/lettre-dalain-badiou-propos-dune.html>, last accessed August 2015.

20 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 368. Sheehan’s claim that “no one working in Western philosophy” could have been surprised by the *Black Books* is arguably inaccurate, as the pitch of the reactions has reflected.

21 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 369.

22 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 369.

23 As we might call the positions that there is “nothing to see here”, and/or that anyone who thinks, or writes, that there is, must be politically motivated or otherwise grossly misguided. François Rastier has usefully divided responses to Heidegger and Nazism into “La séquence dénégation > euphémisation, banalisation > réaffirmation”, at François Rastier, “Le rouge et le brun : L’Heideggérisme clarifié par *Les Cahiers Noirs*”, *Cités*, 2015/1 n° 61, 132.

not proffered as a “whitewash” concerning the 100s of pages of evidences Faye assembles in *L'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie*, what effect does Sheehan imagine that his extraordinary public denunciation of Faye's book as a “fraud” in a leading journal should have in the highly polemical context surrounding these issues in 2015?<sup>24</sup> What effect does Sheehan imagine that his attempt “to disqualify Faye from being taken seriously as a reader of Heidegger”<sup>25</sup> will have on readers newer to the debates around Heidegger's politics than he is, if not to prevent these students from reading Faye's book for themselves, and thereby considering what is still the longest critical study concerning “the unedited seminars of 1933-1935” (Faye's subtitle, on which more anon), as well as the Heideggerian lectures of 1933-1936?

Given his longstanding engagement in the debates, Thomas Sheehan must know that thinkers less liberal-minded than he is will seize on his article (or just its title or opening page) to imply that all criticisms of Heidegger's politics, and its philosophical bases, are similarly “fallen,” “deficient,” liberal-modern “idle chatter”, lost in “ambiguity” and the “dictatorship” of “the They” and groundless “publicness”, etc.<sup>26</sup>, if not simply fraudulent. Such conclusions are comforting, turning all attention away from the historical and hermeneutic issues Faye's book raises, as the first book to have publicised and critically discussed a good deal of the material from Heidegger's most radical, politically engaged period as a National Socialist.

Clearly, unlike Alain Badiou, Thomas Sheehan has actually read the book by Emmanuel Faye he has publically commented on. Or at least, Sheehan has clearly read *L'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie*'s opening and closing chapters: One and Nine. Yet it has to be stressed, front and centre, that Chapters One and Nine are the only chapters and pages of Faye's nine-chapter book that are analysed, criticised and cited in Sheehan's 2015 call for Faye's philosophical head.

And so, with this extraordinary observation, we arrive to our second, more substantial set of questions concerning the adequacy or justice of Sheehan's 2015 charges against Emmanuel Faye. Why doesn't Sheehan's prosecution of Faye's 2005 book dedicate virtually any time at all to seven out of the nine of Faye's chapters, while claiming to cast an adequate or satisfactory critical judgment over them all? To pose the issue as clearly and distinctly as possible: how can Thomas Sheehan or anybody else hope to justify a conclusion so radical concerning a book whose subtitle announces that it is “*autour des séminaires inédits de 1933-1935*” without himself having examined *even one of Faye's claims concerning these titular Heideggerian seminars?*<sup>27</sup> Turning Sheehan's

---

24 A context in which we can already (for instance) see Peter Trawny's *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger's Anarchy* (London Polity: 2015) venturing the *avant garde* argument that Heidegger's will to publish the *Schwarze Heft* in 2014 evinces the great thinker's “liberty to err,” “worthy of our meditation today,” but not of our ethical and philosophical censure. See Rastier, “Le Rouge et Le Brun: L'Heideggérisme clarifié par *Les Cahiers Noirs*”, 128-133.

25 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 369.

26 These terms are of course from Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh (New York SUNY: 1996), respectively section 38, 164/[German]175-6; 26, 114/122; sec. 35, 157-159/167-171; sec. 37, 162-164/173-175; sec. 27, 118/126; “publicness” reappears as a *motif* throughout sections 35-38.

27 At the start of the central chapter 5, Faye writes “We now approach the main text” at Faye, *Heidegger*, 113. Compare to our question here the rhetorical question at Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 396. Note that “serious”, or the charge that Faye is not “serious”, or not up to serious scholarship is a recurrent key word in Sheehan's piece, appearing at p. 369, 372, 374, 376, and 379. This is an unusual word usage,

outrage against Faye around, we could even ask: can Sheehan really be serious, or expect any serious readers to be convinced by his arguments, on this so-clearly unsatisfactory hermeneutic basis?

After all, if we applied Sheehan's hermeneutical form concerning Faye to *Being and Time*, it would lead us to suppose that we could dismiss the text as "Nazi" through and through, having only read (say) sections 1 through 10, before skipping (more or less) to sections 74 and 77, without touching all of the rest. As fate would have it, this is one thing Sheehan charges that Faye has indefensibly done with the 1927 *magnus opus* of the Freiburg philosopher-rector of the future.

To be as clear as possible, again: neither I, nor any of Faye's alleged "acolytes" need deny that Sheehan is correct in several of his criticisms amongst Faye's literally 100s of evidential and inferential claims in *L'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie*. Like in any book of several hundred pages, there are probably thousands of evidential and interpretive claims made in Faye's dense work. The same Sidonie Kellerer cited above, for one, has commented critically, just as Sheehan does, that Faye's treatment of *Being and Time* is "too rapid and ... incomplete," and I am inclined to agree—at least if we suppose that a book devoted centrally to Heidegger's 1933-35 works should have aimed at a complete coverage of Heidegger's wider *oeuvre*, which could be contested.<sup>28</sup> "The simple affirmation according to which the work [of *Sein und Zeit*] in its entirety culminates in section 74 is not by itself convincing," Kellerer reflects, in words that might have come from Sheehan's pen: "The same goes for the judgment according to which [for Heidegger] this authenticity of the self has ... nothing individual" about it.<sup>29</sup> With that said, Faye might well

---

since Faye certainly appears to have been quite "serious" in making his claims, however contestable they may be.

28 Kellerer, "Envoûtement: Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande", 10.

29 Kellerer, "Envoûtement :Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande", 10. As in Part 4 below, to have not made a case well does not mean that the case cannot be made well. Lawyers are hired by innocent clients out of fear that, unless they get the best team possible, the truth of their innocence will not be established in court; again, while the documentary evidence is insufficient, it still may be the case that the Nazis burnt the Reichstag in order to justify consolidating their hold on power, etc. Sheehan mentions, and criticises Wolin (in Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).for suggesting, as Faye does, that section 74 enacts a move from individual to collective dasein, around the notion of "destiny", in a way which establishes Heidegger's proximity to the National Socialist discourses around German destiny, beginning from *Mein Kampf*. Sheehan paints Wolin's position an "embarrassing blunder", as if there were no debate on this issue, stressing that Heidegger's idea of "choosing a hero" in sections 71 and 74 comes from "the sage of Weimar", Goethe, who was clearly speaking about individuals (Sheehan, "Emmanuel Faye", 381, n. 47; for Heidegger's ambivalence about Goethe, see Faye, *Heidegger*, 300-307. But the impression that the issue is so clear-cut that Wolin's claim is "embarrassing" is misleading, relative to scholarly debate, wherein this section has been cited by more people than Faye and Wolin as the most clearly politicised moment in *Sein und Zeit*. The key text, which is not cited by Sheehan, is Johannes Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), esp. chapter 1; but see also "Heidegger's *Being and Time* and National Socialism", *Philosophy Today*, Fall 2012, 255-284; and Johannes Fritsche, "La Communauté, l'historicité, et la mort dans *Être et Temps* selon Heidegger et Löwith", in Faye dir. *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*, 49-68. This is one essay in this collection in which the issue of *Boden* is not raised, on which basis Sheehan suggests that "much of [this] book collapses", at Sheehan, "Emmanuel Faye", 383: In French, see also Hassan Givsan, "La Première Guerre Mondiale, ou Comment la Mort Fit son Entrée en Philosophie", | *Le Philosophoire* 2013/1 no. 39,

retort, with reference to work by Johannes Fritsche or Richard Wolin, that neither is the claim that section 74 represents the point of the most direct inscription of Heidegger's far Right politics into the axiology of 'authenticity' as completely incontestable as Sheehan would like his readers to suppose.<sup>30</sup>

Kellerer, despite Sheehan's polemical depiction of her (as a contributor to *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*) as an "acolyte" of Faye's, also critically targets several other points in Faye's text which Sheehan independently finds wanting in 2015—notably:

(a) Faye's claims about Heidegger's relations with the far-Right thinker Erich Rothacker concerning the development of his notion of "historicity" in the 1920s (Sheehan comparably targets Faye's related claims about Rothacker's friend Clauß, as we will see<sup>31</sup>), and;

(b) Faye's claims concerning the importance of the anti-Semitism of Paul Yorck von Wartenburg on the younger Heidegger.<sup>32</sup>

The point of difference is this between Kellerer's and Sheehan's critiques of Faye. While Kellerer agrees with Sheehan that Faye has not established conclusively all of the claims made in the opening chapter of *The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, unlike Sheehan, she in no way thinks that these limitations in chapter One of the nine-chapter study can sanction its total dismissal.<sup>33</sup> Sheehan after all himself laments, as if to spite his face, that there are "a mere 2.5 pages"<sup>34</sup> concerning *Sein und Zeit* in all of Faye's nearly 500-French-page/ 350-English-page tome. (By contrast Sheehan spends 8 out of his own 33 pages on these 1500 words). Then in his conclusion, Sheehan quietly concedes that he has dealt largely with matters arising from only "the opening fifty pages" of Faye's book<sup>35</sup>—as if this was no great thing when one is calling for

191-230. Compare also William H.F. Altman, *Martin Heidegger and the First World War: Being and Time as Funeral Oration* (USA: Lexington, 2012), 180-185.

30 See Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's Being and Time*, chapter 1, pp. 1-28 ; also "Heidegger's *Being and Time* and National Socialism", *Philosophy Today*, Fall 2012, 255-284; and "La Communauté, l'historicité, et la mort dans *Être et Temps* selon Heidegger et Löwith", in Faye dir. *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*, 49-68.

31 See Sheehan, "Emmanuel Faye", 376-379 and 4 below.

32 Kellerer, "Envoûtement: Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande", 10. For the record, Kellerer in fact adds a criticism Sheehan does not make of this kind: on the need for more studies concerning Heidegger's relationship with the National Socialist Nietzsche scholar Alfred Baeumler. Kellerer, "Envoûtement: Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande", 10. Faye devotes some eight English-language pages to this Heideggerian appreciation of Baeumler (Faye, *Heidegger*, 251-258), noting that Heidegger recommended Baeumler's "judicious afterword" to the 1930 *Will to Power* to his students, and the contents of that "Afterword", cited at pp. 253-4.)

33 In Kellerer's own words concerning Faye's work: "Il met en rapport des éléments jusqu'à présent inconnus avec des éléments plus ou moins connus et réussit ainsi à dresser un nouveau tableau. Mettre en rapport les différents niveaux textuels, tenir compte des aspects biographique et politique sur une durée de plusieurs décennies tout en passant d'une mise au point proche à une mise au point lointaine, constitue une entreprise presque inévitablement incomplète et bien plus risquée que ne l'est une interprétation ponctuelle de textes." Kellerer, "Envoûtement: Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande", 11.

34 Sheehan, "Emmanuel Faye", 379.

35 Sheehan, "Faye", 395 with 386. The intervening pages deal with material from Faye's last chapter, on the post-war Heideggerian texts.

the removal of a colleague's book from serious scholarly consideration, and impugning him as nothing less than a "fraud".

By contrast, there are somewhere above 200 *English-language pages* (over half the book) on the master's Nazi-era speeches, lectures and seminars. If Sheehan has lopped at some of the outer, surrounding trees, we might accordingly say, none of his criticisms ever reach anywhere near the heart of the forest of *L'introduction*.<sup>36</sup> Beyond Sheehan's trees, then, it is into the Heideggerian black forest Emmanuel Faye disclosed in 2005 that we must enter now, to see clearly just how far short of the mark Sheehan's dismissal of Faye falls.

### 3. In the forest clearing, remembering the ones who are drowned

We will return in due course to several more of Sheehan's alleged Fayeian offenses against exacting humanistic, professional scholarship. Sheehan's rhetorical goal, by rattling off Faye's alleged errors in the opening and closing pages of *L'introduction* off almost by number in a tone of growing outrage, is to convince his readers that "the same *modus operandi* persists throughout [Faye's] book." He wants us to make an inference: 'with so many bad arguments in the first and last chapters—... well, there can be nothing accurate or true here ...' This inductive inference alone could justify completely dismissing Faye's book as a fraud, including the most important chapters on the Nazi-era classes which Sheehan avoids addressing. Yet even if the premise were granted, the conclusion would not follow.

In the afore-cited British philosopher Francis Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, there is an amusing anecdote about a certain Diagoras, a man who gave a very witty answer which neatly captures Sheehan's fallacy here:

... to [the person] that showed him in Neptune's temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, "Advise now, you that think it folly to invoke Neptune in tempest." "Yea, but," saith Diagoras, "where are they painted that are drowned?"<sup>37</sup>

To mix metaphors awfully: however muddy Sheehan takes his examples to have made Faye's well, Sheehan's own thoroughgoing omission of Faye's treatment of the 1933-'35 seminars and lectures<sup>38</sup> is a *prize exercise in not painting Diagoras' drowned, even when they are legion*.

---

36 Sheehan's piece lets the central chapters and the years they cover be in almost complete silence, barring Faye's parsing of one sentence from the Hölderlin classes of 1933-'34 (which is considered in an article by Faye, not the book whose "fraudulence" is at issue, and that we will return to below). Evidently with this consideration in mind, we note that Faye has conceded to Sheehan the inadequacy of "my brief remarks on a text and a period [i.e., *Being and Time* and the 1920s] *that do not constitute the object of my book ...*" [italics mine] The fact that Sheehan adds to try to save his claim to wholesale dismissal, that nevertheless "Faye claims to find in *Being and Time*... the ideas that are at the very foundation of National Socialist doctrine" (Sheehan, "Faye", 379) do not affect the decisive issue at all, which concerns the 1933-1935 classes first of all. We can disagree with Faye on *Sein und Zeit* and consider much or the more militant and openly National Socialist content of the 1933-35 lectures and seminars "egregious," as an anonymous reviewer of this piece claimed.

37 Francis Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, II.XIII.9.

38 Leaving alone here, for reasons of space, Faye's documentation and the content of Chapters Two and Three on Heidegger's political activism and speeches, including some material of great bearing in

The “negative instances” to Sheehan’s roundhouse write-off of Faye as a fraud are, truly, too many to number. To encounter them all I can only invite readers to take up *L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie* for themselves, starting from Chapter Two: for by themselves, whatever the reader makes of Faye’s hermeneutic claims, they are in many cases shocking, and exactly the kinds of political claims proffered as philosophy that for a long time Heidegger’s manifold apologists insisted could not exist. Let me cite here just four of Heidegger’s statements in the Nazi-era lectures and seminars Faye’s book considers, to support his largest claim about the sheer depth of the imbrication between Heidegger’s Nazism and his thought. Although Sheehan and many other (especially German-reading) Heideggerians may have “long known” about this kind of material, the international shock surrounding the appearance of the *Black Books* in 2014-15 suggests that many other people, and much of the global philosophical fraternity, still do not.

First, illustrating one fact that was long denied by many, there is the seamless imbrication of Heidegger’s philosophical categories with his radical “personalist” adulation of Adolf Hitler in his 1933-35 classes. For the first time in French in 2005, Faye’s book cited the following passage from Heidegger’s “On the Essence and Concepts of Nature, History, and State” course of winter 1933-34:

Only where leader and led together bind each other in *one* destiny, and fight for the realization of *one* idea, does true order grow...Then the existence and the superiority of the *Führer* sink down into being [sic.] ... [a]nd when the people feel this dedication, they will let themselves be led into struggle, and they will ... develop and persist in their strength, be true and sacrifice themselves. With each new moment the *Führer* and the people will be bound more closely, in order to realize the essence of their state, that is their Being [sic] growing together, they will oppose the two threatening forces, death and the devil, that is, impermanence and the falling away from one’s own essence, with their meaningful, historical Being and Will ...<sup>39</sup>

Now, it seems to me that, in order to dismiss Faye’s book as a fraud, we would have to be able to certify one or more of the following claims about this and many other, like Heideggerian passages adduced by his book:

(a) that this passage is misquoted or sizably mistranslated by Faye, and/or Heidegger in fact never said or taught this to his philosophy students at Freiburg;

(b) that this passage is “taken out of context” (since there are no others like, illustrating or supporting it, either in the same seminar series or in the entire Heideggerian *Gesamtausgabe*);

(c) that, despite Faye, there is nothing “philosophical” in this declaration (it is just an optative political passage), despite the signally Heideggerian *Urworten* of destiny, struggle,

---

assessing Heidegger’s relationship with the racial theories of other National Socialist thinkers, notably the August 1933 lecture to “The Freiburg Institute of Pathological Anatomy”, discussed at Faye, *Heidegger*, 67-70..

<sup>39</sup> Cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 140. The text comes from Martin Heidegger, *Über Wesen de Begriff*, 7th session, 13, unpublished, and Faye gives the German transcript at p. 369, n. 84.

truth, essence, historicity and Being, all of which receive philosophical exegeses elsewhere in Heidegger's *oeuvre*; and also despite the fact that this statement comes from a classroom seminar addressed to "advanced students" in Heidegger's Freiburg philosophy cohort<sup>40</sup>;

(d) that Faye is wholly wrong, indeed incontrovertibly and implausibly wrong to suggest that the unusual reference to the "devil" here is most plausibly, in the historical context, a quiet Heideggerian nod to Adolf Hitler's description of the Jews as the "devil" in *Mein Kampf*, which we know the thinker had read by 1930-31; or

(e) that, even though this passage *is* philosophical, and shows the willingness of the philosopher-rector to bring his philosophical categories into line with Hitler's *Führung*, that the existence of such passages should in no way affect our evaluation of Heidegger's "greatness" as a thinker, or the alleged independence of his thinking from his National Socialist politics.

Sheehan has not attempted to establish any of these things (a)-(e) about this passage, which he does not consider, nor am I aware that any other critics of Faye who have.<sup>41</sup>

Take, secondly, Heidegger's 1934 comments concerning entire peoples allegedly deprived of any historicity, again adduced by Faye. There are "men and groups of men who have no history, being deprived of history (the Negroes, such as the Kaffirs, for example)", as Heidegger genuflects in a passage from his Summer 1934 "Logic" lectures, published for the first time only in the *Gesamtausgabe* 38.<sup>42</sup> Or rather, "[t]hey have no more history than do monkeys and birds"

---

40 See Faye, *Heidegger*, 114, 123.

41 Since penning this, I note that Peter E. Gordon, in his *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* review of Faye's work, in the 2009 translation, has commented as follows: "Unfortunately, Faye interlaces the most damning evidence with far less convincing documentation concerning Heidegger's contemporaries, not infrequently indulging in an easily refuted strategy of guilt-by-association. Concerning the passage above, for example, Faye reminds us that in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* the devil is explicitly identified with the Jew. Heidegger's listeners, writes Faye, "could scarcely be unaware" of this fact. For Faye it therefore follows that "In orchestrating the pathos of the devil in reference to the *Führer*, Heidegger awakens and cultivates the darkest side of Hitlerism in his students" (140). This is not only unconvincing, it is altogether unnecessary." Unconvincing, arguably and unnecessary, perhaps do not a "fraud make". Or compare Heidegger's evaluation of Hitler's pedagogical credentials, crowned by a statement of Heidegger's at-this-time fervent *Glaube*: "... when the *Führer* speaks continually of a reeducation of the National Socialist worldview, that does not mean – inculcate some slogans—but rather –bring about a total transformation, a worldwide blueprint, on the foundation of which he educates the whole people. National Socialism is not just any teaching, but the fundamental transformation of the German and, as we believe, also the European world." If Faye's book was a fraud, since it turns around coming to terms with dozens of pages of statements of this political ardour by Heidegger in which Hitler and the Nazi *Gleichschaltung* is heralded, interpreted, celebrated, and "ontologised" (as the assumption of an "historical" "mandate" or "destiny" by the "metaphysical" German people) and enjoined of students, at least one analogue of (a) through (e) would have to be established beyond reasonable scholarly doubt of these other passages also. On the Germans as for Heidegger "the metaphysical people", subject to a world-historical destiny, see Faye, *Heidegger*, pp. 2, 37, 87, 139, 251, 265; on their particular heroic destiny, see pp. 31, 61, 63, 83, 91-92, 104, 123, 164.

42 Cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 102. Faye gives the German from *GA* 38, 81 at p. 360, n. 71. I will continue to give the references to the German texts cited by Faye, since Sheehan accuses Faye of "often ... provid[ing] no page reference for the text he is referring

(*Die haben doch ebensogut Geschichte wie die Affen u. Vögel*).<sup>43</sup> This passage, Faye suggests, is to be compared to passages wherein the philosopher claims that even technological objects which are touched by the German *Führer* or Italian *Duce*, can become “historical”: “When the airplane takes the *Führer* from Munich to Venice to see Mussolini, of course, history happens.”<sup>44</sup> History does “of course” occur here, for the German philosopher. For the “two men” named in this reflection, far from being criticised by him as the kind of almost philosopher-*résistant* Heidegger is sometimes depicted as being, are as late as 1936 named by him as “Nietzschean” figures who have successfully launched “counter-movements to European nihilism” in our times.<sup>45</sup>

If Faye’s book was a fraud, we would again have to establish analogues of (a) through (e) above for these and all like statements Faye’s book was either the first (in many cases) or amongst the first (in other cases) to ask the scholarly community to consider. After 2014 and the *Black Books*, we would in addition have to establish that such philosophical or pseudo-philosophical views could have nothing to do with what Sheehan himself calls Heidegger’s attempt to “launder” an anti-Semitic racism which we now know dated back in writing at least as far as 1916.<sup>46</sup>

To...”, at Sheehan, “Faye”, 390, so evidently exactitude is demanded by the gravity of this charge.

43 Heidegger, GA 38:81, cited in Emmanuel Faye, “Being, History, Technology, and Extermination in the Work of Heidegger”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 50, Number 1, January 2012, pp. 111-130, at p. 120. While it is not the place to pursue this philosophically here, “historicality” or “historicity” is in these passages clearly a particular acquisition, not a universal property of all human beings alike, for the philosopher. From Division I of *Sein und Zeit*, wherein the possibilities delivered over to individuals, as thrown “factual” *daseine*, shaping their anticipatory understandings of the purposes (“for-the-sake-of-which-es) of things, it is impossible not to infer that this kind of basic sense-yielding temporality or “historicality” is universal to all speaking human beings. But then the term “historicity” does not, in fact, appear in Division I of *Sein und Zeit*, after sections 6 and 7 in the Introduction. Section 74 of *Sein und Zeit* delivers “The Essential Constitution of Historicity.” This section also introduces the terms destiny (*Schicksal*) and “fateful *dasein*”, further terms absent from Division I: all of which suggest that Sheehan’s dismissal of Faye’s having singled these passages out alone for attention from *Sein und Zeit*, given his task, to not be anything like so scandalous as Sheehan implies. Again, see Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time*, chapter 1, pp. 1-28 ; also “Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and National Socialism”, *Philosophy Today*, Fall 2012, 255-284; and “La Communauté, l’historicité, et la mort dans *Être et Temps* selon Heidegger et Löwith”, in Faye dir. *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*, 49-68. On German “destiny” in the National Socialist lectures, seminars and speeches, see Faye, *Heidegger*, pp. 2, 37, 87, 139, 251, 265; on the particular historical destiny of the German *Völk*, up to and including redeeming Europe from the modern nihilism at work in both Bolshevik East and liberal West, see pp. 31, 61, 63, 83, 91-92, 104, 123, 164.

44 Cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 102. Faye gives the German from GA 38, 81 at p. 360, n. 73. The full quote concerning the ‘historicality’ of the plane with Hitler and Mussolini reads: “Negroes are men, but they have no history□ Even nature has its history. But then blacks also have history. Or nature has no history? It can surely disappear into the past, but it is not the case that everything that becomes past enters into history. If the propeller of a plane turns, then as a result nothing really happens. But if this plane brings the Führer to Mussolini, then history occurs. And the plane itself enters into history, and perhaps will one day be preserved in a museum. The historical character of the plane does not depend on the turning of the propeller, but on what in the future will arise from this coming together...” See Tom Rockmore, “Heidegger, National Socialism and ‘Imperialism’: A Response to Radloff”, *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy*, Issue 2, 128-145, at p. 143.

45 Cited at Dominic Losurdo, *Heidegger and the Ideology of War: Community, Death and the West* trans by Marella and Jon Morris (USA: Prometheus Books, 2001), p. 136.

46 On the anti-Semitism in the *Black Books*, see amongst many others: Claude Romano, “L’idée d’antisémitisme philosophique est un non-sens”, entretien réalisé pour *Critique* par Claudia Serban,

Take then, thirdly, Heidegger's claims cited by Faye concerning the "essence of truth" as *alētheia*, rethought by Heidegger in 1933, via a return to Heraclitus 53, around the principle of "struggle" or "combat" (*polemos* or *Kampf*), as against the less openly politically resonant "robbery" of *Sein und Zeit* section 44.<sup>47</sup> As people who have read Faye's book will know, it is in the context of unrolling his understanding of the essence of truth as *Kampf* (a significantly charged word in the Germany of the 1930s, and in Germany after 1925 with the appearance of Volume 1 of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*) that Heidegger makes perhaps his most virulently anti-Semitic statement of all. Running far ahead of what Hitler or anyone else in the movement was pronouncing at this date, his philosophy students learned in a lecture series on "the essence of truth" that:

The enemy is one who poses an essential threat to the existence of the people and its members. The enemy is not necessarily the outside enemy, and the outside enemy is not necessarily the most dangerous. It may even appear that there is no enemy at all. *The root requirement is then to find the enemy, bring him to light or even to create him* [my italics, see 5 below], so that there may be that standing up to the enemy, and so that existence does not become apathetic. The enemy may have grafted himself onto the innermost root of the existence of a people, and oppose the latter's ownmost essence, acting contrary to it. All the keener and harsher and more difficult is then the struggle, for only a very small part of the struggle consists in mutual blows; it is often much harder and more exhausting to seek out the enemy as such, and to lead him to reveal himself, to avoid nurturing illusions about him, to remain ready to attack, to cultivate and increase constant preparedness and to initiate the attack on a long-term basis, with the goal of total extermination [*völligen Vernichtung*].<sup>48</sup>

If Faye's book was a fraud, once again, we would be able to establish analogues of one or more of (a) through (e) above about this disturbing claim also. We would have to rule out of court or plausibility Faye's exegesis of it as the philosophical vindication and ontologization of a radically discriminatory, potentially exterminatory political program, like to that which the Germans undertook after June 1941.<sup>49</sup> We would have to convince ourselves that the unnamed

---

*Critique*, 2014/12 n° 811, 1008-1018; Emmanuel Faye, "Antisémitisme et extermination: Heidegger, L'Oeuvre Intégrale et les *Cahiers Noirs*", *Cités*, 2015/1 n° 61, 107-122; Christian Fuchs, "Martin Heidegger's Anti-Semitism: Philosophy of Technology and the Media in the Light of the Black Notebooks. Implications for the Reception of Heidegger in Media and Communication Studies", *Triple C, Communication, Capitalism and Critique*, Vol 13, No 1 (2015), at www-site <http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/650/690>, last accessed August 2015. We cannot address the adequacy of Sheehan's "laundering" metaphor here, which still suggests a separation of the anti-Semitism from the philosophy: a separation which is arguably what the material in the *Black Books* linking *Verjudung* and "world Jewry" to modern technicity and its genesis calls into question.

47 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, sec. 44, 202/222. For an extended interpretation of the 1933-1934 lecture series, see Gaëtan Pégny, "Savoir et historicité dans l'enseignement et les discours de 1933-1934 (Vérité et combat selon Heidegger)", in Faye dir., *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*, 179-210. The term *Boden* is not central to these discussions.

48 Cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 168. Faye gives the German from *GA* 36/37, 90-91 at p. 376, n. 47.

49 Faye notes, as potentially significant, the currency of Heidegger's appeal to *völligen Vernichtung* in language of the Association of German Students of the University of Freiburg, in a call to action published on May 8, 1933 by the *Breisgauer Zeitung*: "The German Student Association has determined to wage a spiritual struggle, unto total annihilation [*völligen Vernichtung*], against the Judeo-Marxist dissolution

“inner enemy” here was not the Jews, as Faye suggests (compare (d) above) in this charged period after the April 1933 National Socialist Laws “for the reconstitution of public functions” (under which Husserl lost his emeritus status on April 14, as a Jew), and “against excessive numbers of enrollers in German schools and Universities”, limiting Jewish enrolments to 1.5%.<sup>50</sup> Or perhaps we would have to so wholly “ontologise” the appeal to *völligen Vernichtung* here as to rob it of any and all “ontic” connotations involving what Carl Schmitt, very much in the frame at this time for Heidegger<sup>51</sup>, had called “the possibility of physically killing” the enemy.<sup>52</sup>

But Sheehan attempts none of these things, perhaps to his credit. For he does not mention this entire passage in his critical assessment of Faye’s 2005 book on these lectures and contemporary seminars.

Since Sheehan does single out Faye’s alleged, “surreptitious” misquotation of one sentence from Heidegger’s 1934 lectures on Hölderlin, in his only engagement with the central objects of Faye’s book<sup>53</sup>, let us take our fourth, closing example in this section from this lecture series. Sheehan’s charge concerns the “Conferência de Emmanuel Faye no Brasil sobre Heidegger, Academia Brasileira de Filosofia abril de 2011” transcription of a speech that is no longer available online, and was never a certified academic publication.<sup>54</sup> And the misquotation Sheehan is up in arms against is simply not in the English-language text published in *Journal of History of Philosophy*, nor in the German language article.<sup>55</sup>

of the German people. The symbol of this struggle will be the public burning, on the tenth of May 1933, of the Judeo-Marxist writings. Germans, gather yourselves for this combat! Demonstrate the collective willingness to fight publicly.” In Faye, “Being, History and Extermination in Heidegger”, 113.

50 For these laws, their content and context, and Heidegger’s actions in relation to their implementation as Rector from May 1 1933 at Freiburg University, see Faye, *Heidegger*, 40-43, 49-58.

51 For Heidegger’s August 23 1933 letter to Schmitt, reporting his appreciation for what Schmitt had said about Heraclitus fragment 53 and intimating that he had his own long-meditated interpretation in preparation, see Faye, *Heidegger*, 155-163. See also Geoff Waite, “Heidegger, Schmitt, Strauss: The Hidden Monologue, or, Conserving Esotericism to Justify the High Hand of Violence”, *Cultural Critique* No. 69, *Radical Conservative Thought in Transition: Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, and Carl Schmitt, 1940-1960* (Spring, 2008), pp. 113-144

52 See Carl Schmitt, *Concept of the Political* translated with a Introduction by George Schwab, Preface by Tracey Strong (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1996), 33, 48–49. On this possible “ontologisation” and its implausibility, conceded by a longstanding Heidegger scholar, see Gregory Fried, “A Letter to Emmanuel Faye”, *Philosophy Today* Fall 2011, 227.

53 Sheehan, “Faye”, 390-391.

54 Sheehan gives this web address for this transcription at <http://www.freudiana.com.br/documentos/Heidegger-Bresil-avril-2011-FAYE.pdf>. It is not clear why he does not cite the publication of the article in *Journal of History of Philosophy* (see note 53). The transcript cited is no longer available. Sheehan is outraged that, in this transcription, Heidegger is made to put quotation marks around “Seyn” in Heidegger’s claim that, following Hölderlin, “the ‘fatherland’ is Seyn itself”, so it reads: “the fatherland is ‘Seyn’ itself.” But see note 55.

55 In Faye’s 2012 *Journal of the History of Philosophy* piece (Emmanuel Faye, “Being, History, Technology, and Extermination in the Work of Heidegger”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 50, Number 1, January 2012, pp. 111-130), and also in the German original (Emmanuel Faye “Der Nationalsozialismus in der Philosophie: Sein, Geschichtlichkeit, Technik und Vernichtung in Heideggers Werk”, *Philosophie im Nationalsozialismus*, Hans Jörg Sandkühler (éd.), Hambourg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009, p. 133-155) the error Sheehan alleges simply does not occur. Sheehan does not note this in his 2015 response in the long footnote 76, but it is figured as what Sheehan calls “the contortions Faye went through to save his blatant fabrication.” Here is Faye’s 2012 text: “As proof of this, let us consider the course of winter

But leaving that aside, even were Sheehan’s factual claim concerning what Faye has allegedly said right here, a critical reader can nevertheless ask why, if defending the philosophical credentials of this Heideggerian lecture series on Hölderlin from Faye’s allegations is the stake, Sheehan again simply ignores all of the other remarkable claims Faye’s book draws out and examines from it. Why do we hear nothing in Sheehan’s defence of Heidegger on Hölderlin about how we should “think” the philosopher’s specifications about the ontological status of the *Führer* as akin to a “demigod” or “superman”<sup>56</sup>: “The true and only *Führer* makes a sign in his being towards the domain [*bereich*, ‘empire’] of the demigods. Being the *Führer* is a destiny ...”<sup>57</sup> Why do we not see Sheehan, for instance, considering this passage in relation to seemingly confirming, cited instances of Heidegger’s “ontologisation” of Hitler’s domination elsewhere in the seminars Faye was the first to publish, as when the master tells his advanced students that:

... the origin of all political action is not in knowledge, but in being. Every *Führer* is a *Führer*, must be a *Führer* [italics in original], in accordance with the stamp in his being, and simultaneously, in the living unfolding of his proper essence, he understands, thinks, and puts into action what the people and the state are ...<sup>58</sup>?

In any case, the main point here again is that, if Faye’s book was a fraud, analogues of claims (a) through (e) would have to be assembled for these passages also. Faye’s suggestions about them as standing testimony to Heidegger’s “introduction of Nazism into philosophy” would need to be explicitly challenged, and shown to be not simply inadequate, but somehow “fraudulently” incorrect. Yet Sheehan’s article tackles neither Faye’s reportage nor his interpretation of these passages; indeed, to say it once more, Sheehan tackles exactly none of the dozens of like passages Faye examines in chapters Two through Eight<sup>59</sup> of *L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie*.

---

semester 1934/35, on Hölderlin’s Germania, in which he exclaims, underlining it in the published text, “The ‘Fatherland’ is being itself” (Das “Vaterland” ist das Seyn selbst).” Emmanuel Faye, “Being, History, Technology, and Extermination in the Work of Heidegger”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 50, Number 1, January 2012, pp. 111-130, at p. 115). The transcript of Faye’s conference presentation in Brasil, with the incriminating quotation marks in 2011—as against an authorised publication by the author—can still (as of August 24 2015) be found online at <http://skildy.blog.lemonde.fr/2015/06/26/etre-histoire-technique-et-extermiation-dans-loeuvre-de-heidegger-conference-de-faye-2011/>. All of this makes Sheehan’s outrage at Faye’s “error” itself the more unsettling in a piece so accusatory of another author: “He already knows what he wants to find and claims he does find it, even if that entails rewriting Heidegger’s sentences.”

56 According to Heidegger, “Stanza X of “The Rhine” contains the bracing “thought” that “the superman and the demigods are the same thing,” as Faye, *Heidegger* 108 notes, citing GA 39, 226 at 361, n. 108.

57 Faye, *Heidegger*, 106, citing GA 39, 210 at 361, n. 98.

58 Cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 121. From Martin Heidegger, *Über Wesen de Begriff*, 7th session, 1, unpublished, and Faye gives the German transcript at p.364, n. 24.

59 The one case from the 1934 lectures concerns the article Faye, “Being, History ...”, and significant question marks surround this one example’s factual accuracy, as per notes 52 and 53.

#### 4. What do Diagoras' drowned, Heidegger's Nazi courses, ask of us?

This article, like Sheehan's, is not intended as a "whitewash." At least, for what it is worth, like Sheehan, I find some of Faye's particular assessments and reasoning unconvincing: as one might expect in reading any work that is so long, and so full of philosophical contents which the author attempts to comprehensively interpret. Like Kellerer, I can nevertheless see that, whatever Faye's particular interpretive and other shortcomings may be, they in no way license a wholesale rejection of his entire work—which is an extraordinary polemical hyperbole.<sup>60</sup> For 'flawed does not fraud make'. We do after all include flawed books on and by philosophers on our library shelves all of the time: this is probably the human condition. After 2014 or 2018, libraries will continue shelving the dozens of monographs which have falsely or erroneously denied that Heidegger was anti-Semitic, or that there was any connection between his philosophical and political views.

The other kind of non-mortal error I would contend Faye has made, mentioned in **2** above, is more rhetorical than philosophical. It concerns the structuring of his work from the point of view of its rhetorical requirements and foreseeably polemical reception. In a summary piece translated into English, Faye has reflected on his own order of research or inquiry, in contrast to how he then chose to *present* his discoveries in 2005:

For many years I have been interested in the work of Martin Heidegger and the effects of his hermeneutics on our concept of the history of philosophy, notably in Cartesian studies. Five years ago, I became aware of particularly odious texts that had just been published in the sixteenth volume of Heidegger's so-called *Collected Works*, or *Gesamtausgabe* (GA). These texts exceed in their radicalism what one had been able to read up until then in the earlier editions of Guido Schneeberger. As a result, I began re-examining the essence of Heidegger's work ... [The text in question showed that] Heidegger's Nazism is ... not limited to a few speeches of the moment. It can be found at the heart of his teachings from 1933 to 1944. Equally important, far from having

---

60 Unlike Sheehan, however—for instance, when it comes to Faye's claims about the ontological difference (Being-beings) being wholly "identical" with the "political difference" of state-individuals—my interpretive hesitations concern the avowed "object" of Faye's book: his claims about Heidegger's 1933-35 courses. That Heidegger can say in his winter 1933-34 seminar that the State is the "Being" of a people as "political beings" ("the State is to its people what Being is to beings") suggests only that "the political" is one analogue or perhaps one "regional" instantiation of Heidegger's more fundamental ontological difference—albeit implicating a highly contentious ontologisation of said "political" with radically authoritarian dimensions. Cf. Faye, *Heidegger*, 131-2; Kellerer, "Envoûtement", 6) Even if I am right and this is an interpretive error, this would in no way impugn everything Faye says, even about the seminar in question ("On the Essence and Concepts of Nature, History and the State"), this seminar "for advanced students" clearly intended by Heidegger to help educate a new Nazi "political nobility" for the *Führer*, as Heidegger says in the 7th session, cited by Faye at *Heidegger*, 122 (see 365, n. 26 for the German): "A *Führer* does not need to be educated politically, but a troop of guardians [*Hüterschar*] within the people who contribute to bearing the responsibility of the state, must be. Where this nourishing, securing ground/soil [*Boden*] is lacking, the best ideas of state cannot take root... today we must not neglect the foundation of a political tradition and the education of a political nobility..." The significance and importance of Faye's publication and assessment of such a seminar—a seminar not published in the *Gesamtausgabe*, and not publically available even in German at the time Faye was working—far outweighs any arguable flaws in Faye's analysis of several of its claims.

distanced himself from these lectures, he planned to include their publication in his collected work: the lectures of 1933 to 1944 today represent, in effect, twenty volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*. *In my own work, I have attempted to gauge just how deeply this Nazi indoctrination penetrated ...* I have [since] discovered, along with the volumes recently published, a certain number of unpublished texts, especially two seminars from the years 1933–1935 which shed an even more radical light on the question of his Nazism ...<sup>61</sup>

It is the italicised sentence that I want to emphasise. For Faye here clearly indicates how he came between 2000 and 2005 to write his controversial book. What was ‘first for Faye’ in all of this were the Nazi-era lectures which we have seen Sheehan completely avoid tackling in 2015, *sans* explanation. On the basis of reading these most extreme texts (then the seminars which Faye was, as we repeat, the first to unearth and publish), Faye came to frame what are evidently three interconnected hypotheses. Despite Sheehan’s outrage, each of these hypotheses is eminently reasonable, although in need (like any historical, hermeneutic claim) of adequate and exacting proof, contestation and demonstration, as far as the historical and documentary evidence allows. Given the well-attested realities of Heidegger’s 1933-1936 Nazism and its philosophical bases, Faye hypothesised:

(a) looking backwards, isn’t it reasonable to suppose that Heidegger’s philosophical-Nazism could not have appeared like a proverbial “May flower” in 1933, at the time he assumed the Rectorship of Freiburg University and NSDAP membership, but must have been formed (and so be discernible) much farther back?;

(b) looking forwards, isn’t it reasonable to suppose that such a deep and extremist political commitment, so closely bound to the great thinker’s core thoughts, could equally surely never have been completely or fundamentally renounced after 1936 or 1945, in the notorious absence of any apologetic statement?;

(c) looking both fore and aft, isn’t it reasonable to suspect the claims to originality of any thinker whose thought could become so deeply imbricated with National Socialist dogmata as Martin Heidegger’s was in the mid-1930s, and to therefore want to reconsider his relationships with other thinkers associated with the Nazi movement?

In terms of *L’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie*:

- hypothesis (a) explains the genesis of Chapter One, which Sheehan firstly and mostly attacks, and which Faye might arguably have been better advised to place later in the piece, after his major, much less contestable exegetical work was done; while
- (b) is the basis for chapter Nine, from which three of Sheehan’s last four, allegedly “most egregious” examples of alleged scholarly misdemeanours are drawn.<sup>62</sup> Finally;

---

61 Emmanuel Faye, “Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work”, translated by Alexis Watson, Richard Joseph Golsan, *South Central Review*, Volume 23, Number 1, Spring 2006, pp. 55-66

62 Sheehan, “Faye”, 370.

- (c) operates throughout the book, including the central chapters which we have seen Sheehan almost completely avoids.

Why does this clarification of Faye's procedure matter? It matters since, inescapably, since all thinking does not proceed except on the bases of preformed "forestructures of understanding"<sup>63</sup>, so Faye's researches into the pre-Nazi-era and post-Nazi-era texts were indeed clearly guided "in advance" by these hypotheses. And, equally inescapably, since it is "inherent in human nature and the very tribe or race of man"<sup>64</sup> that:

... when any proposition has been once laid down [the mind] forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet [the mind] either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusion ...<sup>65</sup>;

so Faye's readings of Heidegger's letters and texts in the 1920s and after 1945 inescapably run the risk of ignoring and silencing a few of "Diagoras' drowned" of his own.<sup>66</sup> Sheehan's best work in his 2015 piece about Faye is definitively Baconian—and I hope the irony of this is not lost on readers, given Heidegger's near-complete silence on the entire history of British, post-Baconian thought. It comes in those passages of "Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?" in which Sheehan tries to "call" Faye for cutting corners, "either ... not observing or despising ..., or getting rid of and rejecting" counter-evidences to hypotheses (a), (b) and (c) "with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of [his] first conclusion." This kind of critical work, in contrast to polemical calls to dismiss entire books or careers, is an invaluable part of critical scholarship.

With that said, laying aside the "meta-level" paradoxes involved in defending, using the best instruments of critical reasoning, any position for which "reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought,"<sup>67</sup> I do want to challenge Sheehan's assessments of three of the particular issues he raises against Faye's attempts to establish hypotheses (a), (b) and (c) in his 2015 polemic. In these cases at least, matters are not anywhere near so clear-as Sheehan wants his readers to suppose, and the same critical attentiveness he demands of Faye needs to be demanded of Sheehan's own claims:

- i. in a letter to Jaspers from July 1923 Faye cites, "Heidegger jokes [Sheehan tells us] that he will take "an assault detachment [*Stoßtrupp*] of sixteen [students]" with him to Marburg. In the same letter, Heidegger professes his hope for an "invisible community"

---

63 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, sections 31-32, 134-144/142-153.

64 Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I 41.

65 Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I 46.

66 Albeit, to state an important fact, nothing like so numerous or so grave in kind as the "negative instances" Sheehan's flawed dismissal of Faye faces in the Heidegger-Nazi-era works discussed in 3 above.

67 See Hans Sluga, "Heidegger and the Critique of Reason", in *What's Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question*, edited by Michael Baker, Peter Hanns Reill (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001).

“to overthrow the sclerotic German university ...”<sup>68</sup> Faye proposes that these letters show that Martin Heidegger was from as early as 1923 engaged in a “radical, concerted, and clandestine” political activism<sup>69</sup>, at least within academe, anticipating and laying the grounds for what would become his 1933 *Kairos*. Faye also suggests a comparison of this optative 1923 “invisible community” with that “*Schar der Heideggerschen Elite*” (“group of Heideggerian elite”) Toni Cassirer reported that Heidegger brought with him to the Davos debate in 1929, suggesting that by this date Heidegger had had some recruiting successes.<sup>70</sup>

Sheehan is right that the evidence Faye gives for these claims is insufficient to establish beyond all reasonable doubt the conclusions he wants to draw. But this insufficiency does not by itself establish the contrary, as Sheehan suggests: i.e. that Faye is historically wrong. Nor does it render absurd Faye’s larger hypothesis concerning a political dimension to Heidegger’s developing thought of Being in the 1920s. Heidegger, we know, was both anti-Semitic<sup>71</sup>, and deeply sympathetic from very early on with the *Völkisch* Right, as his comfort in citing Count Yorck von Wartenberg in *Sein und Zeit* reflects.<sup>72</sup> He can accordingly reasonably be supposed to have hoped that his philosophical leadership, countering the liberal modernism of the (largely Jewish) neoKantians, would contribute to the regeneration of Germany from the “absence of *Boden*” of the industrialised cities he lamented in letters to his family as early as 1922<sup>73</sup>, abetting what he would describe in May 1934 as:

... the overcoming of the whole bourgeois essence; in other words, of that behaviour which from first to last only sees what is repellent, inadequate, and noisy; the behaviour that absorbs itself in minutia and half-way measures; the

---

68 Sheehan, “Emmanuel Faye”, 373-374; Faye, *Heidegger*, 11.

69 Faye, *Heidegger*, 11; cited at Sheehan, “Faye”, 373.

70 Faye, *Heidegger*, 11.

71 See the 1916 letter to Elfride, cited by Faye wherein Heidegger declaims in the middle of the war that: “The Jewification (*Verjudung*) of our culture and universities is horrifying, indeed, and I think the German race (*die deutsche Rasse*) should muster enough of inner strength to rise to its feet ...” Cited by Faye at “Being, History, Technology, and Extermination in the Work of Heidegger”, 114.

72 See note 58 also. As Sheehan comments: “Yorck unquestionably was an anti-Semite, as is obvious from the following letter to Dilthey, dated February 18, 1884: ‘I thank you for all the particular cases in which you keep academic chairs away from the thin Jewish run-of-the-mill [*die dünne jüdische Routine*] who lack consciousness of the responsibility of thought, just as the whole race [of Jews] lacks a feeling for psychic and physical groundedness [*Boden*].” We note here that for figures of the German Right in Heidegger’s and the previous generation like Yorck, *Boden* could and most clearly did indeed mean something other than “rational grounds”. Heidegger was clearly aware of this historicity of the term, when he used *Boden* some “54 times” to describe the bases of philosophical arguments, in *Sein und Zeit*. (See Sheehan, “Faye”, 384). We know also that Heidegger’s wife Elfride’s involvement with National Socialist youth movements begun as early as 1922, making her an *Alter Kämpfer*: see Faye, *Heidegger*, 29. On the “rational bases” in Heidegger’s thought in the 1933-34 “Essence of Truth Course”, see below.

73 See Sidonie Kellerer, “Heidegger et le Nazisme à travers sa correspondance avec sa famille et Kurt Bauch”, *Critique*, 2014/12 n° 811, pp. 988-998, at 990 : “En 1922, il développe ces idées à propos de « la ville moderne » et de « l’absence de sol et de caractère de la vie moderne » (ES, p. 51). Il fustige l’absence de « patrie » (*Heimat*) et l’absence de « sol ». Je sens, écrit-il, « de plus en plus à quel point je suis enraciné dans ma patrie, dans ce qui est la racine [*Stamm*] de mon peuple ». Le « retour à la santé de notre peuple » qu’il appelle de ses vœux suppose l’enracinement dans le sol de la patrie (ES, lettre du 29 janvier 1922, p. 51)

behaviour that never wants to see and never can see the great and most distant, the unique and truly powerful.<sup>74</sup>

In this vein, alongside the Heidegger letter to Kurt Bauch Sheehan cites in his article (to challenge Faye's reading of the contested term, *Deckname*<sup>75</sup>), it is a shame that Sheehan did not consider the epistolary advice Heidegger also gave to his friend in their exchanges about how to read his philosophical texts. For this advice, emphasised by Pégny, suggests that Heidegger, at least in the Nazi years, retrospectively saw his life work as engaged in just the kind of long-term *Kampf* a reading of the "Essence of Truth" of 1933-1934 would lead us to suppose, and which Faye's hypotheses concerning the Heidegger of the 1920s suggest:

... [my] isolated writings, lessons and lectures are, when taken as a whole, always an action by which a conquest is accomplished: that is to say, the consolidation of a new starting point for the sake of a very long offensive. What precedes [each new text or starting point] is not simply exceeded or improved, but is a 'position' which, because it is abandoned, confirms its necessity ...<sup>76</sup>

We cannot conclude on the bases given that everything is now completely clear concerning the thoroughgoing politicization of Martin Heidegger's philosophy in the 1920s, or that there is not more that further research might not still establish. We can nevertheless say that Faye's failure to satisfactorily confirm his hypothesis (a) in no way establishes that (a) is in itself a groundless and fruitless hypothesis, or that its supposition is certainly untrue. There are many historical or physical hypotheses that may be true, yet we lack at this juncture adequate evidence to establish them beyond all reasonable doubt.

ii. As we commented above, Sheehan claims that Faye's attempt to establish Heidegger's uncritical debts to the biological work of the later-Nazi Ludwig Clauß in the 1920s is indirect, not categorical:

Heidegger derived the notion of *Umwelt* from Uexküll. But Uexküll edited a posthumous book by Chamberlain nineteen years after Uexküll had published his own treatise on *Umwelt*. Ludwig Clauß *also* used the word *Umwelt*, albeit in a radically different sense from Heidegger's. Nonetheless, Niemeyer published both Clauß (1923) *and* Heidegger (1927). And finally: the Nazi philosopher Erich Rothacker once associated Heidegger with Clauß and Uexküll nine years after Heidegger's lectures on *Umwelt*. Faye's resounding conclusion: In the 1920s

---

74 Martin Heidegger, "Appendix: The Reunion Speech. 'Twenty-Five Years after our Graduation', Reunion in Konstanz, May 26-27, 1934" in Altman, *Martin Heidegger and the First World War*, pp.287-290, at p. 289.

75 Sheehan, "Faye", 388-389.

76. This passage, from an August 1934 letter of Heidegger to Bauch, is notably cited and considered by Gaëtan Pégny, "Polysemie et Equivoque: Pour Une Philologie Numerique du Corpus Heideggerien (L'exemple du Terme *Dasein*)", *Études Romano de BRNO*, 35: 1, 2014, at pp. 132-133,

Heidegger used the racist concept of *Umwelt* to introduce Nazism into philosophy  
 ...<sup>77</sup>

In the passages of *L'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie* at issue, Faye is principally pursuing hypothesis (c): the idea that, for his work to have become so 'Nazified' in the 1930s, Heidegger must have been much more indebted than his admirers have investigated to many lesser-known National Socialist or fellow-travelling thinkers. As in i., let us grant that Sheehan makes the counter-case concerning Heidegger and Clauß. Again, it simply does not follow that hypothesis (c), one that concerns several thinkers, can therefore be dismissed *tout court* as Sheehan implies, as not simply untrue but also unlikely to produce further insights into Heidegger's thought-paths. When, for instance, in the same Hölderlin lectures we have touched on, Heidegger intones about the German *Geschlecht* having originated in the "East" near the Caucasus, but "then the vector of the direction taken by the river manifests something decisive. The direction, initially pointing East, turns suddenly ... north towards the German country"<sup>78</sup>; or when he accepts the idea, very much in the air at that time, that the Greeks are a related people to the German and also "*völkisch*"<sup>79</sup>; or when he clarifies, with this in view, to students that:

The name 'Heraclitus' is not the title of a philosophy of the Greeks long run dry, no more than it is the formula for universal humanity as such. In truth it is the name of an original power of Occidental-Germanic historical existence, and it is such in its first confrontation with the Asiatic ...<sup>80</sup>;

then it seems impossible for any fair-minded critic to deny that Heidegger was pretty heavily "buying into" (and "ontologising") pseudo-scientific and politicomythical notions propounded by Nazi thinkers like Oskar Becker (for whom Heraclitus was a "Nordic", opposed to the "Asiatic"<sup>81</sup>), Alfred Rosenberg (who talks of "the great river of German-Nordic rebirth"<sup>82</sup>), and more widespread Nazi ideas about the "German race"'s Eastern origins and provenance before it occupied its present, Northern *Vaterland*.<sup>83</sup> Similar claims could be and are made in Faye's central chapters concerning Heidegger's debts in his readings of Plato between 1930 and 1934 to proto-Nazi texts like Hans K. Günther's 1928 work *Plato as the Guardian of Life*<sup>84</sup>; his debts to Ernst Jünger in the remarkable calls

77 Sheehan's reconstruction of Faye's "loopy logic", as he calls it at Sheehan, "Faye", 378.

78 Heidegger, cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 111: German text drawn from GA 39, 204 is cited by Faye at 362, n. 128.

79 For Heidegger and the terms and political resonances of his reading of "the Greeks" in the decisive period surrounding 1933, see Johannes Fritsche, "Heidegger in the *Kairos* of 'the Occident'", *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* Volume 21, Number 2, 1999; also Charles Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots, Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks*, especially pp. 46-68, 99-111; 146-159, 180-246.

80 Heidegger, cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 111: German text drawn from GA 39, 134 is cited by Faye at 361-, n. 120. I do not think that Sheehan could contest Faye's assessment: "This Germanising of Heraclitus has no historical basis..."

81 Becker, "Nordic Metaphysics", cited at Faye, *Heidegger*, 110.

82 Rosenberg, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, at Faye, *Heidegger*, 111. On Rosenberg, the Greeks and the National Socialist revalorisation of myth and Heidegger's "Essence of Truth" lectures, see Gaëtan Pégny, "Verité et mythe dans De L'essence de la Vérite", in Faye dir., *Le Sol, La Communauté, La Race*, 212-219.

83 This is Faye's interpretation at Faye, *Heidegger*, 110-112.

84 Faye, *Heidegger*, 122-123.

to *Arbeit* in the Rectorship-period speeches<sup>85</sup>; and his debts to more recognised Nazi figures like Alfred Baeumler in his Nazi-era readings of Nietzsche.<sup>86</sup>

Yet Sheehan's dismissal of Faye's book once more does not address any of these other Faye's claims. Instead, his legitimate hesitations concerning Clauß are cited by Sheehan, rhetorically, to illegitimately deter readers from considering Faye's other claims, and with them, the clear evidence of Heidegger's engagements in his most militant period with other, today-wholly-discredited National Socialist authors.

iii. We close this section by briefly examining what the author has struggled not to see as Sheehan's extraordinary over-reaction to Faye's paraphrasing of the widely-known sentence from the "Only a God can Save Us" *Der Spiegel* interview of 1966.<sup>87</sup> To let Sheehan lay things out, in the most famous sentence in the interview, speaking about his Nazism, Heidegger tells us that "he wanted to help humanity achieve an adequate relation to ["the clearing as"-T. Sheehan added] the essence of technicity" ("*ein zureichendes Verhältnis zum Wesen der Technik*")." Then Sheehan continues, that: "[he] claimed—incredibly—that National Socialism went in that direction ("*Der Nationalsozialismus ist zwar in die Richtung gegangen*")."<sup>88</sup> Faye for his part reports that, for the Heidegger of 1966, "*le national-socialisme serait allé dans la direction jugée 'satisfaisante.'*" Now, Sheehan mistranslates this (adding an "as a whole" and reworking Faye's "would have gone" with the more definitive "to be") as: "Heidegger judged the direction of Nazism as a whole to be satisfactory."<sup>89</sup> This mistranslation accomplished, Sheehan then declaims about a resulting, alleged "shocking alteration of the present text" by Faye: one which "was pointed out to Faye in considerable detail at the New York conference, but he remained unflappable..."<sup>90</sup>

It is true that Faye, paraphrasing the *Der Spiegel* text which is very widely available and well known, moves the adjective "adequate" or "satisfactory/satisfying" away from its predicating "an adequate [*zureichendes*] relation to the essence of technicity", towards a claim about the direction of the National Socialist movement. But Heidegger by 1966 had posited establishing such an "adequate relation" with technicity as the necessary and sufficient condition for anything like a "satisfying" politics (democracy and bolshevism, we know, definitely do *not* fit the bill).<sup>91</sup> Accordingly, if "National Socialism went in that direction", then it was for the philosopher, if not "satisfying", then as "satisfactory" or "adequate" as could be—and satisfactory in a way which no one who has read Faye, Ott, Farias, Rockmore, or Bambach could find "incredible" at all. After all, if the necessary and sufficient condition of my car's being fixed is my mechanic's doing an "adequate"

---

85 Faye, *Heidegger*, 76-78; compare Richard Wolin, "*Arbeit Macht Frei*: Heidegger as Philosopher of the German "Way", in *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 173-202.

86 On Baeumler, see Faye, *Heidegger*, 251-258.

87 Martin Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us" in Sheehan ed. *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, 45-68.

88 Sheehan, "Faye", 393.

89 Sheehan, "Faye", 393.

90 Sheehan, "Faye", 393.

91 Heidegger, "Only a God", 55; Heidegger specifies that communism and democracy is not adequate or satisfactory, in his optic, at p. 56.

job, to the extent that he alone can and has done it, I am likely to find this outcome “satisfactory”, if not “satisfying.” Yet, Sheehan protests, Faye claims that “*befriedigend* is a synonym of *zureichend*—which in fact it is not: *befriedigend* means “satisfying” or “satisfactory,” not “adequate.” This may be so, but—amazingly—in *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, edited by Sheehan himself, “satisfactory” is the word given for *zureichend* in Thomas Richardson’s translation of the sentence at issue.<sup>92</sup>

Just two comments on this. Firstly, as we have been using the terms in this essay, “satisfactory” can in many contexts be used synonymously with “adequate”, in French as in English.<sup>93</sup> Secondly, this is because, many times in life, if we find something “adequate”, with only a little humility we can learn to live with it as “satisfactory”, if not as wholly “satisfying.” Perhaps, as Heidegger thought about the terrible times he had been destined to live in by 1966, there seems no better option available just now.

## 5. Conclusion: Of tragedy or farce: in (Aeschylean) response to Sheehan’s 2016 contribution

Since penning the preceding sections in 2015, Thomas Sheehan has been given the right of reply to the critique of his article penned by Gaëtan Pégny in *Philosophy Today*.<sup>94</sup> Sheehan decided to call this reply, for I will translate: “The Faye Affair: should Heidegger be burned?”<sup>95</sup> As this title already suggests, and if it were not such a staid Heideggerianism, we would be forced to say of Sheehan’s 2016 contribution that, relative to its predecessor, “there is nothing new here.”<sup>96</sup>

On the one hand, Sheehan opens by *en effet* conceding everything that was at decisive issue in Emmanuel Faye’s work on Heidegger: “there is no question in my mind—and I hope in no one else’s—that Heidegger was a contemptible anti-Semite throughout his entire life and, for a good number of years, a crass and entirely culpable champion of Hitler and National Socialism.”<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, per the classic formula of the perverse subject, according to Lacanian theory: *je sais bien, mais quand même...* Sheehan knows all of this very well and nevertheless he will

92 Heidegger, “Only a God”, 61. This makes Richardson’s translation, under Sheehan’s editorship, a “mistranslation” by the latter’s 2015 lights (Sheehan, “Faye”, 393). Nevertheless, here is Richardson’s translation: “It seems to me that you take technicity in much too absolute a sense if you see the situation of man in the world of planetary technicity not as an inextricable and inescapable destiny, but I see the task of thought precisely in this, that within its own limits it helps man as such achieve a satisfactory relationship to the essence of technicity. National Socialism did indeed go in this direction. Those people, however, were far too poorly equipped ...”.

93 As Richardson obviously thought when, under Sheehan’s 1981 editorship, he translated “*zureichenden*” as “satisfactory”, Heidegger, “Only a God”, 61.

94 Gaëtan Pégny, “The Right of Reply to Thomas Sheehan,” in *Philosophy Today* 60:2 (Spring 2016): 447-479.

95 Thomas Sheehan “L’affaire Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger? A Reply to Fritsche, Pégny, and Rastier”, *Philosophy Today* 60: 2 (Spring 2016): 481-535.

96 Sheehan does not even confront and take a single step back on his *zureichend* blunder, despite frequently quoting Thomas Richardson. See Sheehan “L’affaire Faye”, 489 ff.

97 Sheehan “L’affaire Faye”, 482; cf. 515. He also lists, at p. 482, the real issues very well which he then makes no contribution to addressing, barring the second (“with what texts, for how long”: *viz.* whether Heidegger’s philosophy is imbued with his anti-semitism; if so, in which texts, to what degree, and for how long; and whether his texts should be taught as philosophical, not ideological or historical artefacts.

still reproduce, in another legal-brief style dossier, a prosecution of Faye, at whose side he now arraigns Fritsche and Pégny in the docks.<sup>98</sup> And again he will focus on that tree or idol called *Sein und Zeit*, plus several claims by Pégny concerning Heidegger's letters and one post-war work<sup>99</sup>, when the untouched heart of the issue was always the black forest opened up by the *Seminars* between 1933-35 that Faye was the first to examine in 2005.<sup>100</sup> Sheehan again denies, this time more directly, any defamatory intention in calling Emmanuel Faye, in a well-known academic journal, a "fraud", although one suspects that this could be disputed, even legally.<sup>101</sup> *Quand même*, he cannot help but again go into details purporting to show how Faye and other critical scholars on Heidegger's Nazism are incompetent or worse, with some new, colourful polemic thrown in. This time, without citation or translation, Xenophon of Athens is called to the stand in the epigraph to suggest that these figures are in fact "rhapsodes", whose interpretations of Heidegger are ultimately "silly" or "stupid".<sup>102</sup>

Again, we understand from Sheehan's text that it was never Heidegger's myriad commentators, who for three decades denied that there was any political forest behind Heidegger's sometimes-impenetrable trees, who were clueless, and of one voice, about Heidegger's politics. It is Faye's students who are "lemming-like."<sup>103</sup> And when they, and other French and German academics, co-sign an open letter to *Philosophy Today* wondering about the propriety of Sheehan's calling Faye a fraud on the grounds we have seen, they become (in another Heidegger *topos*) a conspiratorial "twenty-one",<sup>104</sup> whose concerns about the way Heidegger's politics has been obfuscated since 1945 can be mocked: "*La Patrie en Danger!*"<sup>105</sup> Besides, only scholars who have published in peer-reviewed Heideggerian journals can "qualify as interlocutors", in a revealing image of how the scholarly debates concerning Heidegger's putative hostility to democracy must for Sheehan be carried out.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>98</sup> For Fritsche, see Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 483-504, for Pégny, "L'affaire Faye", 504-513.

<sup>99</sup> See Sheehan, "L'affaire Faye", 504-513.

<sup>100</sup> For Fritsche's own response to Sheehan's first, see Johannes Fritsche, "Absence of Soil, Historicity, and Goethe in Heidegger's *Being and Time*: Sheehan on Faye", *Philosophy Today* 60:2 (Spring 2016): 429-445. For his response to Sheehan's second, see especially Johannes Fritsche, "The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham II: Fritsche's *Rülpser* on Heidegger's *Being and Time*", online at [www-site https://www.academia.edu/34525621/The\\_Affaire\\_Sheehan\\_Birmingham\\_II\\_Fritsches\\_R%C3%BClpser\\_on\\_Heideggers\\_Being\\_and\\_Time](https://www.academia.edu/34525621/The_Affaire_Sheehan_Birmingham_II_Fritsches_R%C3%BClpser_on_Heideggers_Being_and_Time); and his "Heidegger's National Socialism: A note on Emmanuel Faye and Thomas Sheehan", online at [www-site https://www.academia.edu/36976592/Heideggers\\_National\\_Socialism\\_A\\_note\\_on\\_Emmanuel\\_Faye\\_and\\_Thomas\\_Sheehan](https://www.academia.edu/36976592/Heideggers_National_Socialism_A_note_on_Emmanuel_Faye_and_Thomas_Sheehan). I thank the author for directing me to the latter articles.

<sup>101</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 514.

<sup>102</sup> Sheehan cites Xenophon, *Symposium*, 3.6 as his epigraph. He finally spells things out, or translates the pejorative Greek adjective, at p. 512.

<sup>103</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 514..

<sup>104</sup> One response of Heideggerians to the international alarm about the *Black Notebooks* has been to blame the international, global media, an argument which looks back to the master's denunciation of *Technik*, but also has conspiratorial overtones. On shooting the messenger, see the following.

<sup>105</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 513. We will leave aside the frankly snide remarks on Pégny's PhD and Fritsche's supposed anti-Americanism; the latter in a defence of Martin Heidegger, who was in fact no friend of the USA, especially after early December, 1941. Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 519. Sheehan cannot help suggesting that Fritsche is hostile to Americans because he did not get tenure. *Simplement*, this is not an argument but a slur.

<sup>106</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 483. We note also that having German as a native language is not an advantage in reading Heidegger, for this Sheehan, in one of a number of unusual claims (notably, it is less Fritsche and Faye who are to blame for misunderstanding *Sein und Zeit* than their English and French-

Indeed, Sheehan doesn't stop short of suggesting that Faye and the other critical scholars who were the first to show exactly what Sheehan opens by conceding about Heidegger's Nazism, are the real book-burning totalitarians here. Actually, he *starts by suggesting this*, in his very title. For this is the blunt hint or the nudge behind the "faut-il brûler Heidegger?", which won't be lost on Sheehan's Francophone readers, although Sheehan doesn't do Anglophone readers the courtesy of his translation or commentary.<sup>107</sup>

Let us then answer Sheehan's Xenophon, in translation, with Aeschylus's *Libation Bearers*: "O woe, oh utter woe! My master is slain! O woe! I cry yet again, for the third time..." For, just as in his opening attack on Faye, Sheehan's 2016 strategy is to cry, yet again, almost exclusively about a single tree, section 74 and *Sein und Zeit*. This, when Sheehan again concedes that its analysis occupies "a stingy ten pages" of Faye's 2005 book<sup>108</sup>, as if this ought not to make us pause. Johannes Fritsche, whose work on *Sein und Zeit* Sheehan (questionably) arraigns for pre-shaping Faye's own pages on this subject, now becomes a principal co-target for Sheehan's textual operations.<sup>109</sup> The philological apparatus is also now expanded, complete with Appendices which mimetically mirror what Sheehan criticises in Fritsche's footnotes, including mock-playful colloquialisms: "'Waddayagonnado?'"<sup>110</sup>

But Sheehan's displacement, and his continuing avoidance (or disavowal) of the forest for the trees, is the same—even "in essence the same", as we might echo one of Heidegger's darkest formulations. And it is this that I want to close by underscoring, excluding the Appendix that Sheehan's own precedent suggests. The issue of whether Fritsche, Faye, Wolin and others misread section 74 of *Sein und Zeit* is, as Rastier et al's "Open Letter to *Philosophy Today*" discerns, a "diversion"<sup>111</sup> in the period when the premier issue is the *Black Notebooks*, and the massive vindication they present, from Heidegger's own pen, of all of the most significant of Emmanuel Faye's 2005 contentions concerning Heidegger's Nazism. It is a significant issue, but Sheehan's continual recourse to the *pars pro toto* fallacy cannot stand, as a way of discrediting Faye and others—even if we were to grant that Sheehan is right on *SZ* 74.<sup>112</sup> In fact, I think there are very good reasons to doubt whether Sheehan's "individualist" reading of section 74 of *Sein und Zeit*, for all his ironically un-Heideggerian enumerations of words, pages and paragraphs, is incontrovertible. As Guillaume Payen's *Martin Heidegger. Catholicisme, Révolution, Nazisme*<sup>113</sup> has again recently documented, we now know a good deal more than previous generations about the philosopher's own anti-semitism, that emerges in the great thinker's letters from as early as the Great War, his frequent epistolary denunciations from the war years onwards of the emptiness of

---

language translators, a saving move which brings with it the danger of impugning very large amounts of English and French language scholarship on Heidegger, which has proceeded on the basis of the same translations).

<sup>107</sup> Compare Sheehan's repetition of the idea that Faye et al wear "brown-tinted glasses," at Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 492, 515. One could read this as meaning to suggest these thinkers see Nazism ("brown") everywhere; it equally suggests that their perspective is "brown" all the way down, *ergo* ...

<sup>108</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 504.

<sup>109</sup> See Fritsche, "Absence of Soil, Historicity, and Goethe in Heidegger's *Being and Time*: Sheehan on Faye", *Philosophy Today* 60:2 (Spring 2016): 429-445; with Fritsche, "The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham II: Fritsche's *Rülpser* on Heidegger's *Being and Time*".

<sup>110</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 519.

<sup>111</sup> Francois Rastier et al, "An Open Letter to *Philosophy Today*", *Philosophy Today* 49:4 (Fall 2015): 713.

<sup>112</sup> Sheehan "L'affaire Faye", 486.

<sup>113</sup> Guillaume Payen, *Martin Heidegger. Catholicisme, Révolution, Nazisme* (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2016).

modern and Weimar *Gesellschaft*, and the politics of Heidegger's wife, an early NSDAP member, and her influence on her husband's political perspectives. A philosopher with such Far Right views, even in a scholarly work meant to establish his reputation like *Sein und Zeit*, can reasonably be expected to have wanted to let sympathetic readers know where he stood in the kinds of esoteric "lightning flashes" that Leo Strauss showed that untimely authors have long employed, when forced to write in hostile political *environs*.

However, my point is once more that, even should we grant Sheehan his unlikely, unhistorical insulation of *Sein und Zeit*, this book on primordial historicity, from the Nazism Heidegger would avow from 1930 onwards and never renounce, his 2016 polemic simply does nothing to show that there is anything problematic, let alone fraudulent, about what Faye in 2005 documented and examined in Heidegger's 1933-35 lectures and seminars. In these classes, as Faye showed, the philosophy of Being is proffered up to students (and to all comers) as the key to understanding what the thinker will hold onto as "the inner truth and greatness" of the National Socialist awakening. Yet all this is quarantined by Sheehan in a silence which Heidegger himself, no less than Leo Strauss, might suggest is richly disclosive.

It is not difficult to understand the psychodynamics underlying why Sheehan, a man who has spent much of his life expounding a Heideggerian thought "safe" from his National Socialism, would choose the moment after the *Black Notebooks* to turn the rage he should rightly direct at his fallen, wily master against Faye et al. "Arrest the villain, seize and pinion him!", blurts out Oedipus unjustly at the hapless herdsman, made to confess that he had saved the King's life as an infant. "Alack! Alack! What have I done?" is the herdsman's just reply. For what is truly at stake, in this moment, is what Oedipus himself has done and cannot face up to. Likewise, the issue today which Sheehan cannot address is that of what his hero, Heidegger, did and said, how deeply all of this was imbricated in his philosophy, and how complicit—willingly and unwittingly—the scholarly community in the liberal-democratic nations has been since 1945 in concealing and obfuscating this philosophical politics. It has taken the *Black Notebooks* to silence almost all of those scholars who for so long had denied Heidegger was ever a Nazi, or an anti-Semite, or claimed that all of that was somehow unrelated to his "great thought". As Sheehan cries out against in vain, however, it is the indelible merit of thinkers like Emmanuel Faye and Johannes Fritsche, and before them Victor Farias and Hugo Ott, to have first asked the scholarly community to confront what the master would only disclose to outsiders—and *can anyone, even Heideggerians, believe it was by chance?*—in the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary year of the inception of the Great War.

Sheehan notwithstanding, we should not at this moment put out our own eyes.

### **Appendix: The question concerning Hönigswald**

We should applaud Sheehan's demand of Faye and others that we read Heidegger closely, to the letter, closely but charitably—if that could be the word in the context of considering someone who was, in the 1930s years, so witheringly anti-Christian. But to bring things to the sharpest point, let us then ask in this light how we should weigh Faye et al's alleged scholarly flaws against the kinds of claims Heidegger was capable of making in 1933, as Faye showed, in his capacity as a prestigious philosopher-Rector. We will take as our example what the thinker penned concerning a colleague, the Neokantian Richard Hönigswald, a Jewish thinker whose subsequent removal from his Chair at Munich University briefly made "the possibility of

approaching Hitler” seem real to Heidegger.<sup>114</sup> The paradox for Sheehan and others comes from how clearly this Heideggerian document (dated June 25, 1933)—but many others could be adduced—openly attacks the scholarly standards Sheehan wants to hold Faye to, however uncharitably.<sup>115</sup>

The italicised interpolations in square brackets in the letter, quoted now in full, are mine. The final words belong to the philosopher himself:

Hönigswald comes from the school of neoKantianism, which has defended a philosophy that goes hand in hand with liberalism [*so we note, straight away, the direct politicisation of Neokantianism, in a way which might well prompt us to reconsider the political signification of Heidegger’s debate with Cassirer at Davos four years earlier, and in a way that we might also question, historically, given that many Neokantians were also socialists*].

In it, the essence of man has been dissolved into a free-floating consciousness, and the latter, in the final analysis diluted until it becomes a general logical world-wide reason. [*Would this extraordinary generalisation stand from a tertiary student today, even as a shorthand description of Kantianism or Neokantianism? Would Sheehan accept anything like its clichéd over-generalisations from Faye or any other critic, about Heidegger himself? – And we note again the seamless imbrication of philosophical and political concerns in the reference to “worldwide reason,” presumably a blanket term used here by Heidegger to describe the Kantian universal categories and universalising moral law.*]

In taking this route, of ostensibly strictly scientific philosophical foundations [*see below*], our attention has been diverted away from man in his historical enrootedness and his tradition derived from the people and blood and soil (*Boden*) [*A clear appeal to National Socialist dogma, ‘blood and soil’, here positively counter-posed by the philosopher against cosmopolitan, Neokantian abstraction*].

This has been accompanied by a deliberate repression of all metaphysical questioning, and man’s only worth was that of a servant to an indifferent, general world culture [*Again, Heidegger is simply parroting Far Right polemical characterisations of liberalism and modernity at this point*]  
...

and we must add to this the fact that it is precisely Hönigswald who defends neoKantianism with a particularly dangerous subtlety and an empty dialectic [*This is a sentence and phrases which, written about a Jewish thinker, are not innocuous under Heidegger’s pen. Also, in denigrating “subtlety” and “dialectic,” they are tendentially anti-intellectual*].

---

114 See Faye, *Heidegger*, 38: citing Heidegger’s 29 September letter to Elizabeth Blochmann: “At the same time, Munich is prospecting: a full professorship is vacant. That would have the advantage of a larger theatre of activity and would not be as remote as Freiburg is at the present time. The possibility of approaching Hitler ...” Heidegger was considered by the Munich Professors as “politically too extreme” (*politisch zu extrem*) and they worried that with his “ecstatic language” (*ekstatischen Sprache*) and “such sentences, the students could not consider themselves to be getting any philosophy”, as documented at Faye, *Heidegger*, p. 48. It seems that Faye was not the first to make this kind of claim.

115 The text of the letter in translation appears in full at Faye, *Heidegger*, p. 37, and Faye’s interpretive comments at pp. 37-38. All the succeeding quotations come from this source, the critical comments in the brackets being mine.

The danger consists precisely in the fact that this bustle gives the impression of great objectivity and rigorous knowledge and has already fooled and misguided many young people [*With “bustle” we rejoin Heidegger’s characteristic philosophical and political denigrations of modern urban life; and the “impression of great objectivity” here is ambiguous, like his “ostensibly strictly scientific” above, suggesting that “objectivity” itself may not be a scholarly ideal but a wilful illusion, a thought that will be confirmed by the sequels*].

I will consider the appointment of this man to the University of Munich to be a scandal, the only explanation for which is the fact that the Catholic system prefers such individuals who are apparently indifferent to any vision of the world [*This is another flagrantly ideological misrepresentation, this time targeting universalistic Catholicism, a forebear in Heidegger’s views at this time of liberal modernity*] ...

because they are without danger to its own effort, and because they are, in a well-known expression, ‘objective-liberal’ [*Here, we have a closing expression that now unambiguously shows that for Heidegger, modern scholarly ‘objectivity’ is a politicised, ‘liberal’ misnomer for an outlook not grounded in any robust “vision of the world,” far from being the sine qua non or regulative ideal of scientific discourse or rigorous scholarship*].

Heil Hitler. Your devoted Heidegger.