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On Heidegger’s Being and Time and National Socialism:
Johannes Fritsche and Thomas Sheehan

Abstract: In two papers published in 2015 and 2016 in Philosophy Today, Thomas Sheehan attacked books on Heidegger by Emmanuel Faye (Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935 [2009; French original 2005]) and myself (Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time [1999]). Peg Birmingham and Ian Alexander Moore, the editors of Philosophy Today, refused to publish a rejoinder of mine to Sheehan’s paper on me. In two papers that I had uploaded on my account with academia.edu in 2016 and 2017, I show that, misinterpreting crucial notions, such as the ones in §65 of Being and Time, and relying on an interpretation of §74 in Being and Time that is as banal as it is philologically and hermeneutically arbitrary, naive, and false, Sheehan’s critique of my book lacks any merit. The current document contains these two papers, and a short comment that I had uploaded in 2018. In addition, it contains an introduction summarizing the whole issue and referring also to five papers published in 2019 by William Blattner and four other authors. Furthermore, for reasons outlined in the introduction, I am working on a short book in which I discuss the issue at stake both more in detail and within a broader context. I include here a preliminary list of content of this book and drafts of a few of its sections.

Key words: academic conduct, academic fraud, Being and Time, Johannes Fritsche, Martin Heidegger, hermeneutics, historicity, National Socialism, pre-judgment, Thomas Sheehan

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I. Introduction

In the last twenty years, two major books have been published on an issue that has been on and off discussed in the literature on Heidegger, his relation to National Socialism. In 1999, University of California Press published my book, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Be-

Faye treats his topic, Heidegger’s seminars 1933-1935, in chapters 2-8 followed by a chapter on Heidegger after 1935. Chapter 1 contains a page on an occurrence of the word Bodenlosigkeit (absence of soil, groundlessness) in §77 of Sein und Zeit (Faye 2009: 12) and three pages with generic and unsubstantiated claims about the National Socialist character of Heidegger’s theory of historicity in §74 of Sein und Zeit (2009: 15-18). In 2015, Peg Birmingham and Ian Alexander Moore, the editors of Philosophy Today, published a paper by Thomas Sheehan in which he has nothing to say on chapters 2-8 of Faye’s book other than that he “had learned some notable things from” (Sheehan 2015: 370) them. However, he claims that Faye’s comments on §74 and on the occurrence of Bodenlosigkeit are false, and that therefore, “much of his book collapses and, along with it, his recent edited collection Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race (2014)” (Sheehan 2015: 383; see 369, 385). In the next issue in 2015, Birmingham and Moore published a response to Sheehan’s paper, an Open Letter initiated by François Rastier and signed by 21 scholars (Rastier et al. 2015). In 2016, they published two further responses, by Pégny (Pégny 2016) and myself (Fritsche 2016a). Especially since I had only skimmed some of chapters 2-8, I had nothing to say on them either but just showed that Sheehan’s claims about §74 and Heidegger’s usage of Bodenlosigkeit are false (see Fritsche 2016a).

Notably, in the very same issue of Philosophy Today in which they published Pégny’s and my papers, in Philosophy Today 60:2, Birmingham and Moore published a text by Sheehan in which he already responded to these two papers and Rastier’s Open letter and, in the first place, attacked my book from 1999. As he puts it ironically alluding to Faye’s suggestion that Heidegger’s works should be relocated to the archives of Nazism and Hitlerism (Faye 2009: 319),1 with “Fritsche’s elaborate narrative [in Fritsche 1999] we are at last upstream at the pristine source of the rushing torrent that is sweeping Heidegger’s books off library shelves the world over” (Sheehan 2016: 504). Sheehan labels my book a “Rülpser” (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 61), i.e., a belch, and a “Magic Theater (‘For Madmen Only. Price of Admission Your Mind’)” (Sheehan 2016: 504). According to him, in my “utterly bizarre” (Sheehan 2016: 484) interpretation I “literally get[s] nothing right” (Sheehan 2016: 492).

Birmingham and Moore refused to publish a response of mine to Sheehan’s paper on me (for the details, see below, p. 45f.). For that reason, I uploaded on my webpage with academia.edu in 2016 “The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham: Fritsche’s Rülpser on Heidegger’s Being and Time” (Fritsche 2016b), in which I show that Sheehan misinterprets crucial notions, such as the ones in §65 of Sein und Zeit, turns all the relevant notions in §74 in Sein und Zeit upside down, and relies on an interpretation of §74 in Sein und Zeit that is, philosophically, utterly banal and, philologically and hermeneutically, equally clueless, naïve, and false. In brief, his critique of my book lacks any substance. In 2017, I uploaded a summary of this paper with some new points, especially regarding the passage on Geschick (destiny) in §74, “The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham II: Fritsche’s Rülpser on Heidegger’s Being and Time” (Fritsche 2017). The current document contains, both papers (pp. 16-47, 48-57; lists of content pp. 18f., 49), and a short comment that I had uploaded on

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1 Provided that Sheehan has not misunderstood him, Faye was serious about his suggestion (see Sheehan 2015: 370).
academia.edu in 2018, “Heidegger’s National Socialism: A note on Emmanuel Faye and Thomas Sheehan” (Fritsche 2018a) (pp. 58-59). In addition, I am working on a short book in which I discuss the issue at stake both more in detail and within a broader context. I include here the preliminary list of content of this book (pp. 60f.) and drafts of a few of its sections (pp. 61-80).

Sheehan and I agree in that §74, the center of the chapter on historicity, is, in his words, “the emphatic climax of Being and Time” (Sheehan 2015: 381). The way this section is read depends not only on one’s understanding of its wording and the concepts used therein but also on one’s understanding of the structure and content of Sein und Zeit as a whole. In Fritsche (1999), I give very detailed analyses, with extensive philological comments, of several parts of §74, develop my own interpretation out of discussions of other readings, and pursue the issue in the later Heidegger. I also locate (though much more in later publications, in particular Fritsche 2012, 2014) §74 in the structure of the entire book of Sein und Zeit. In addition, it had been a shortcoming of the literature on the political content of Sein und Zeit that both Heidegger’s defenders and his critics confined themselves to comments on this book and other texts of Heidegger’s. Thus, I compare Heidegger in detail with the relevant contemporaneous theories of history and politics.

The three major political movements in Germany in the first decades of the twentieth century were the liberals, the leftists, and the rightists. Liberals and leftists shared the idea of progress according to which the development of the capitalist economy would liberate human beings from the confinements of pre-capitalist societies. They differed in that liberals claimed that capitalism and parliamentary democracy were the telos of history while leftists did not think so. Social democrats agreed regarding parliamentary democracy and capitalism but demanded that the state provide social welfare and education. Communists, by contrast, anticipated a revolution through which capitalism would be replaced with a socialist or communist society.

While for liberals and leftists universal reason or the forces of production ruled human history, for rightists God, Vorsehung (providence), Geschick (destiny) or Schicksal (fate) did so. Furthermore, many rightists saw an antagonism between society and community. They regarded universal reason as a mere cover for egotism and as a leveling force that eradicated individual and regional differences and ‘positive’ emotions. Society was nothing but the contractual and artificial product of individuals as persons, concerned only about their egoistic interests and treating everything and everyone else as mere means (or “merely as ‘numerals’” [Heidegger 1996: 118 = 1972: 125]). By contrast, community preceded individuals and enabled them to develop commitment, trust, love, etc. toward the community and its members. In addition, the equality proclaimed by Enlightenment, liberalism, and leftism ignored the essential features of human life, namely, hierarchy and authority.

In the view of rightists, society destroyed community, and social democracy and communism were merely intensifications of the egotism and ungodliness of liberalism, a downward plunge that would end in chaos and anarchy. Fortunately enough, however, at a time when it was not yet too late destiny would interfere and call upon the humans to destroy society and revitalize community as it did, according to Max Scheler and many others, with the beginning of World War I. Thus, the temporal structure of the rightist notion of history was the precise opposite of

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2 For Rechmen (reckoning, doing the numbers), the Jews, and the Holocaust in Heidegger, see Fritsche (2018b).
3 See Fritsche (1999: 87-92). For destiny, fate, or providence in Hitler, see Fritsche (1999: 71-87); for World War I in Hitler, see Fritsche (1999: 79ff, 271 n. 14). “Being and Time is a repetitive commemoration, or commemorative repeti-
the liberal and leftist one. For liberals and leftists, the future was the dominant dimension of time, the future state of society toward which history moved, and which would free the humans from the constraints and oppression in past societies. By contrast, for rightists the dominant dimension was the past, which, the rightists claimed, liberals and leftists denigrated, denied, and destroyed but which would raise its voice again and call for the cancellation of society and the revitalization of the past. The rightists disagreed about which past community to repeat: the Vikings, the Emperor’s Reign, the Volksgemeinschaft, or another community (Fritsche 1999: 124-129, 132-140)? In addition, according to nostalgic rightists, the past community should be re-realized, in principle, in the way it had been at its time. Revolutionary rightists, however, claimed that the re-realization had to incorporate achievements that, chronologically, had emerged with society but were independent of it. Once cleansed of the ‘spirit’ of society, private ownership of the means of production and modern technology would work for the benefit of the community (Fritsche 1999: 124-129, 132-140).4

I adudge Hitler as the most extreme rightist (Fritsche 1999: 68-87), the Scheler of the 1910s as a moderate rightist (1999: 87-124), and Georg Lukács as the paradigmatic communist (1999: 149-173). Scheler had sufficient means to unambiguously distinguish his concept of the community to be repeated—the worldwide Catholic love-community—from the Volksgemeinschaft. Thus, with the rise of Hitler, Scheler turned to the center, became a liberal social democrat, or social democratic liberal, and called upon all democrats to defend the Weimar Republic against Hitler (Fritsche 1999: 127-129, 136-148; for Heidegger’s opinion on these two Schelers, see 87, 146ff.). In the last minute, in 1933, the socialist Tillich called upon all the parties involved; upon the liberals, the social democrats, and the communists no longer to ignore the needs behind the calls for community, and upon the rightists to acknowledge that they could realize their ends not without society, not without, in his words, the call for justice (Fritsche 1999: 173-187).

The structure of Sein und Zeit exhibits the concept of history shared by all the relevant rightists, among them the Scheler of the 1910s and Hitler. The book consists of two Divisions. In Division One, Heidegger develops the different existentials (for what follows, see Fritsche 1999: 29ff., 274-279 n. 25; Fritsche 2012: 258ff.; Fritsche 2014: 57ff.). Regarding each of them, he distinguishes two ways of performing it, a pre-modern and a modern one, and characterizes each of the latter as a downward plunge, a fallen, deficient practice, a forgetting. In fact, it is a double forgetting, because the modern practice is not only a deficient mode but, in addition, covers up this alleged fact and claims to stand on its own feet. Regarding the existential of being-with-others-Dasein treated in Chapter IV (§§ 25, 26, 27), Heidegger presents the core of the theories on the priority of community over society and on society as a downward plunge and double forgetting,

4 How can a past community that has disappeared return to life? Paul Tillich saw in 1933 in the efforts of the rightists the “demand […] for the son to create the mother and to call the father into being out of nothing” (see Fritsche 1999: 180). By contrast, the architect in him (see Fritsche 1999: 72) prompts Hitler to give an answer that makes one forget that there has ever been a problem: the past has never disappeared, for, as he writes in Mein Kampf, the “meaning and purpose of revolutions” does not lie in the “destruction of the works of the past” but in the effort “to remove what is bad or unsuitable and to continue building on the sound spot that has been laid bare” (see Fritsche 1999: 73). One can probably see in this comparison the revolutionary rightist: once the stones of the house of society are removed, the ever present community can resume its growth and flourish, using modern technology, and private ownership of the means of production. In the late Heidegger, how can the pre-Socratics return? For an utterly metaphysical answer in Caputo, referring not to the foundation in the ground but to the heavenly stars, see Fritsche (1999: 318 n. 48).
and he does so in the same language as the one in Tönnies, the Scheler of the 1910s, and the other pertinent literature (see Fritsche 1999: 68ff., 74ff., 92ff., 270, 279f., and often; see below, pp. 28ff.).

Division Two is about the temporal interpretation of the existentials and how to get out of the downward plunge (for what follows, see Fritsche 1999: 37ff.; Fritsche 2012: 262ff.; Fritsche 2014: 66ff., 301ff.). While, in the chapter on conscience, ordinary or modern Dasein treats the call of conscience according to the norms of society, as a business partner with whom one can bargain, Dasein becoming authentic recognizes its fundamental indebtedness, its guilt, which it can never pay back, and it begins to open itself for a communitarian life. In §68, ordinary or modern Dasein shields itself from anxiety (Angst) and from the past. By contrast, authentic Dasein is open to anxiety, and is brought back “to throwness [Geworfenheit] as something to be possibly retrieved,” inasmuch as “the having-been [Gewesenheit] that constitutes Angst” is about “[b]ringing before the possibility of retrieval” (Heidegger 1996: 315f. = 1972: 343) of that having-been. In German, everyone uses for things happened in the past two kinds of expressions, namely vergangen and gewesen, everyone uses the abstract noun Vergangenheit (the past), and some also the abstract noun Gewesenheit. As the quote shows, the translators render gewesen/Gewesenheit with formulas containing “having-been,” “have-been,” or “has-been.” From the time of Sein und Zeit on, at the latest, Heidegger has always used Vergangenheit primarily for a past that will, or shall, remain past and Gewesenheit for a past that claims to be repeated, and shall be repeated (Fritsche 1999: 284ff. n. 57). In the last two sections before §74, Heidegger argues for the primacy of Gewesenheit (Fritsche 1999: 43ff.) to raise as an “enigma” the question: “why is it that precisely the ‘past’ [Vergangenheit] or, more appropriately, the having-been [Gewesenheit] predominately determines what is historical when, after all, having-been temporalizes itself equiprimordially with present and future.” (Heidegger 1996: 349 = 1972: 381) It is an enigma only for liberals and leftists, and Heidegger solves it in §74. Referring back to §26, Heidegger offers here a brilliant summary of the concept of history of the revolutionary right which consists of three major steps (for what follows, see Fritsche 1999: 43ff., 124ff. [the summary]).

As I pointed out, he operates with the motive of a double forgetting, to the effect that, in each of the three steps, he presents a phase in the course of a battle between two opposed powers, between community and society. It is in no way the case that Heidegger has invented such a choreography. The Scheler of the 1910s, for instance, emphasized that the decisive turn in history is preceded by a period in which the communitarian ethos, which until then had been silent or successfully suppressed by the ethos of society, begins to be active and, more or less visibly, infiltrates and unsettles the ethos of society (see Fritsche 1999: 107ff., 118ff.; for Hitler, see 79f.). Heidegger’s first name for this suppressed communitarian past of the Germans is Erbe (heritage, legacy), and he conveys in a very precise formula that the Erbe (which is gütig [see Fritsche 1999: 54ff., 259-262 n. 25]) begins to establish itself against the ethos of society (Fritsche 1999: 45ff., 55-60). In the second step, God, destiny or however else it was called, openly enters the stage, raises

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5 Daniel Meyer shows the continuities between Heidegger’s usage of the concept of Generation (generation) in the 1920s (see, e.g., in §74, Heidegger 1972: 385 = 1996: 352) and his national socialist usage of Geschlecht (generation) after 1933. Strangely enough, ignoring Heidegger’s distinction between Vergangenheit and Gewesenheit (see Meyer 2019: 347f.) Meyer makes statements about §74 that are, without any further comment at any rate, contradictory (see Meyer 2019: 347ff). When one corrects Meyer’s mistake regarding Gewesenheit, the difference he sees between §74 and the talk of Geschlecht after 1933 disappears. For Geschlecht (generation, sex organ, etc.) in Heidegger, see Fritsche (1999: 188-194), with the respective notes, in particular n. 10 (1992: 310-312) (where I point out a possible subversive act of a typesetter).
its voice and calls upon Dasein to cancel society and re-realize the communitarian ethos (for Scheler and Hitler, see Fritsche 1999: 87ff., 80ff.). In §74, this second step is the passage on Geschick (destiny) that calls into the Kampf (battle) against society and for community. In a correct procedure, starting with the genus and determining the species, Heidegger specifies Gemeinschaft and inserts in this step his vote for the most extreme rightists, the National Socialists: Geschick (destiny) and Erbe is neither, as in the Scheler of the 1910s, the worldwide Catholic love-community nor the Vikings, or so, but the Volk, the Volksgemeinschaft (Fritsche 1999: 46ff., 132ff., 286f. n. 62; see below, 31-39, 50-55, 70-77). In the third step, Dasein obays to the call of Geschick and begins to re-realize community by cancelling society (Fritsche 1999: 7ff., 13ff., 21ff., 134ff., and often; for Scheler and Hitler, see 87ff., 85ff.).

I should note that I stopped systematically following the literature on Heidegger around 2003. This is in no way a handicap. For, in his papers on Faye and me Sheehan quotes literature on Heidegger by, as he likes to say, “Faye et Cie.” (Sheehan 2016: 486 and often) but other than that only Richardson’s book from 1963, two papers by himself from 1981 and 1988, and Making Sense of Heidegger (Sheehan 2015). The bibliography of this book, published in 2015, contains, in addition to two papers of Sheehan from 1988 and 1990, just five publications on Heidegger after 1963.

The American literature differs fundamentally from my interpretation regarding both basic aspects, the structure of the whole book Sein und Zeit as well as the interpretation of §74. To be sure, Heidegger’s comments on the history of philosophy in §§ 6 and 44 cannot be overlooked. Other than that, however, with the exception of William Blattner (2019) (see below, in this introduction) no American interpreter seems to take into account the possibility of some sort of theory of history in the chapters before the one on historicity, let alone the one that I have identified. A case in point is Hubert L. Dreyfus’ Commentary on Being and Time, widely used in courses on Heidegger in the USA. Dreyfus finds in the section on the They (§27) and the surrounding ones his own theory of skillful coping; that is, the ground of the postmodern critique of metaphysics and philosophy of subjectivity: humans are in the world, not through perception and thinking, but through all those everyday practices that one performs without thinking, and which are handed down to the next generation without thinking. Inasmuch as Dasein cannot but imitate the others, its life is based on the need to conform. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger captures this constitutive conformity by the concept of Abständigkeit (distantiality) in §27 (Dreyfus 1991: 152ff.) but “unfortunately” does not distinguish it from “the evils of conformism” (Dreyfus 1991: 154). As the latter remark already indicates, for Dreyfus the chapter on the They is “not only one of the most basic in the book, it is also the most confused” (Dreyfus 1991: 143). This is no wonder because he thoroughly misinterprets Abständigkeit. The German text shows clearly that Abständigkeit cannot be about conformity (see Fritsche 2003: 76ff., 83ff.). Rather, Heidegger means competition, competition in the capitalist economy (Fritsche 2003: 78ff.) and the other spheres of modern societies (Fritsche 2003: 84ff., 87ff.); that is, he means “a very specific histori-

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6 For a critique of Dreyfus’ basic assumptions regarding his concept of skillful coping and of the corresponding basic assumptions in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Samuel Todes and for a defense of the universal validity of Kant’s table of the forms of judgment (but not of his categories) in his Critique of Pure Reason, see Fritsche (2019c). For a defense of the universality of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, in modern and post-modern times, also according to the criteria of postmodern philosophers such as Derrida and Caputo, see Fritsche (2012b, 2019b)
cal phenomenon, namely civil society [Hegel’s name for capitalist society, J.F.],” analyzed “as a ‘downward plunge’ away from community” (Fritsche 2003: 92).7

As to §74, according to the They in the USA one shall not believe in destiny and fate. Rather, one has to take one’s fate into one’s own hands. As a matter of fact, authentic Dasein does so because it chooses its destiny and fate by itself. This is the way in which (with the exception of Tom Rockmore) since Richardson’s book from 1963 §74 has been interpreted by American readers, including Sheehan in 2015.8 I label this the “American interpretation” of §74, in the spirit of the self-made man (see Fritsche 1999: 212ff.; see below, e.g., 25, 42), from the 1970s on reinforced by deconstructionism and postmodern thinking. Consequently, the American interpretation and my interpretation are in direct opposition to each other regarding the main issue, the status of the past and the temporality of historicity. In my view, the one ruling power, Geschick (destiny), calls upon Dasein, in particular upon that Dasein which has already opened itself for something different from society and for the repeatability of the past. Geschick calls upon Dasein to submit to its call, it calls Dasein back into the past, or Gewesenheit, and demands a cancellation of society for the sake of a repetition, or re-vitalization, of the past, of community. Geschick, or the past, is the dominant dimension and reasserts itself against its denial in society and society’s orientation toward the future. According to the American interpretation, it is precisely the other way around. Anticipating death authentic Dasein steps out of its inauthentic futurality and turns back to the present to recognize that there is no power, neither in the present nor in the past, that can demand obedience or submission. Authentic Dasein treats the past as a passive pool that contains several possibilities one of which it might choose without that the past has any influence on this choice; or, authentic Dasein rejects all these possibilities and any power or possibility demanding obedience. Thus, the American interpreters either ignore the battle in each of the three steps or turn it upside down and read it as a battle of authentic Dasein against destiny and the past and not, as I do, as a battle of destiny and authentic Dasein against society. According to the American interpretation, authentic Dasein is concerned about its authentic future for which the past might be of help but on which it has no claim (see Fritsche 1999: 7ff., 13ff., 43ff., and often; for the variations of the American interpretation up to 1999, see the summary, Fritsche 1999: 207-215; for Sheehan’s formulation of the basic assumption of the American interpretation [with the past as a passive pool], see Sheehan 2016: 495f.; see also below, in this introduction).

Sheehan claims that the meanings of all the decisive terms in §74 “diverge from their ordinary German meanings” (Sheehan 2016: 487). Indeed, in order for the American interpretation to hold one has to assume that, in §74, Heidegger speaks in a private language in which several terms even mean precisely the opposite of what they mean in everyday language as well as elsewhere in Sein und Zeit. However, this is in itself not probable. In fact, one just has to read Sheehan’s quotes or references in their contexts to recognize immediately that he is utterly wrong. I briefly summarize here the main points.

In German, Überlieferung is usually used in the sense of „tradition,“ “handing down,” as the translators rightfully translate; both for that which is handed down—or, as Heidegger often says (see below, p. 69) hands itself down—to the next generation, to the recipients of the tradi-

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7 Alternatively, Heidegger means by Abständigkeit not the basic feature of the They of society but a characteristic of each and any They, and regards competition in a capitalist society as a fallen mode of ancient Greek and other pre-modern forms of excellence (see Fritsche 2003: 105-107 [n. 18]).
tion, and for the act of handing down the tradition to them. An Erbe (heritage, legacy) has come from the past and has been handed down, or has handed itself down, to the present. Thus, in Heidegger’s first step in §74 it is the Erbe that does the Überlieferung. As was mentioned, according to the American interpretation the past plays no active role. In this vein, Sheehan claims that it is not the Erbe but rather its recipient, authentic Dasein, that does the Überlieferung, and that Heidegger means by überliefern not “to hand down,” but rather “to free up,” which is what authentic Dasein is doing when it chooses its favorite possibility out of the Erbe. However, to make his case Sheehan offers only a Heidegger quote from 1955, thoroughly distorts it, most probably fraudulently, and ignores that, at other places in Sein und Zeit, most notably in §6, Heidegger uses Überlieferung in the sense of “tradition,” “to hand down” (see below, pp. 19-26, 50f., 65-70).

As was said, in the second step in §74 Geschick, the community of the people, enters the stage of history. Native German speakers, both those who believe in Geschick and those who deny its existence, mean by this word a supra-human power, be it God or not, that determines the history of the world or of a group, say, of the German people, and which also announces itself to that group or some of its members. Thus, the translators rightly translate Geschick as “destiny.” Sheehan, however, claims that, in Sein und Zeit, “Geschick is not ‘Destiny’ (supervening, necessary, and inevitable)” (Sheehan 2016: 487). For, according to him Dasein produce their destiny by themselves. However, he turns each sentence of the passage on Geschick upside down (see below, pp. 31-38, 51-55, 70-77).

The Geschick of an individual is called its Schicksal (fate). With Schicksal it is the same as with Geschick. Whether one believes in it or not, in German one calls Schicksal the course of life of an individual, predetermined by Schicksal, God, or providence, a major event that happens to an individual, or confinements that she is subject to; in any case, the individual should accept his or her fate and not try to rebel against. Sheehan, however, perverts Heidegger’s concept of Schicksal and claims that an authentic Dasein produces its fate by itself (see below, pp. 25, 34ff., 49, 51ff.; to pro-duce, to lead a possibility from out of the pool onto the stage; in his two examples for Geschick [see below, p. 32, 73] Sheehan leaves open whether he understands this as a production in this sense or as a kind of creation). Furthermore, Wiederholung (repetition) is the repetition of a past and not, as Sheehan has it, the activity of Dasein choosing its possibility (see below, pp. 23f., 28, 50). In addition, he comments on Heidegger’s usage of Bodenlosigkeit as though he had never looked into Sein und Zeit, and gets insolent when being alerted to his blunder (see below, pp. 39-42, 49).

As to the third step, Heidegger concludes it with two sentences, one of them containing the verb erwidern with an accusative object, that are, indeed, in themselves as well as in their relation to the preceding passage rather elaborate. Still, all linguistic aspects of them leave no doubt that he says that authentic Dasein submits (erwidert) to the call of destiny to re-realize community by cancelling society (see Fritsche 1999: 7-28, 43ff., and often). By contrast, according to the American interpretation it is, if not already in the second, then at the latest in this third step that authentic Dasein does the opposite of submission, namely breaking with any submission to any past or present and producing its own destiny and fate. According to Peg Birmingham, for instance, in §74 Heidegger develops a theory of anti-totalitarian politics and says in the third step that Dasein’s “critical response (Erwidert) […] frees the historical space of destiny to be something different from what has been” (see Fritsche 1999: 11-13, 46-48, 214f.). In this vein, Sheehan talks of “the utterly bizarre meaning [Fritsche] has to torture out of erwidern / Erwiderung at SZ 386.4-6 = BTM 438.1-4 (submitting to Fate-and-Destiny!) to get them to dance to the choreogra-
phy of his ‘Drama of Historical Dasein’” (Sheehan 2016: 490). He could have known for more than ten years that one of the two or three major authorities on Heidegger in contemporary Germany, Dieter Thomä, a native German speaker and in no way a ‘foe’ of the thinker, adds as his only argument my interpretation of the sentences with erwidern to agree with my rejection of what I label the American interpretation of §74 (Thomä 2003: 145-46; see below, p. 28).

According to the American interpretation, the main actor in §74 is not Geschick but rather Dasein. A single authentic Dasein produces its own Schicksal, and a group of Daseine produce their common Schicksal, their Geschick. They do so for the sake of their authentic future. Sheehan sees in a phrase in §18 a reference to a concept in Aristotle and the same reference in a different phrase in §65—indeed, as Sheehan says, a “pivotal section” (Sheehan 2016: 491)—to claim that Gewesenheit “refers not to Dasein’s past in any sense but to its existential aheadness, its Zukunftigkeit or futurity” (Sheehan 2016: 491). However, already the sentence from §73 that I quoted above speaks against his thesis, and so does the entire §65 as is indicated already by the first three words—“future, having-been, and present [Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart]” of the paragraph in which Heidegger gives his famous definition of primordial temporality (Heidegger 1996: 302 = 1972: 328) (for Sheehan and Gewesenheit, see below, pp. 23f., 26ff., 50f.).

Sheehan infers from his interpretation of Gewesenheit that my thesis of the primacy of the past, of Gewesenheit, is my “fundamental mistake” (Sheehan 2016: 498). His claim regarding Gewesenheit works in tandem with the first step of his exposition of §74, a statement on “der vornführende Rücken; the appeal of conscience that calls Dasein forward by calling it back to its aheadness” (Sheehan 2016: 494). In support of this statement he refers to five short phrases or passages only one of which he quotes, and which all together take ten lines of a page (Sheehan 2016: 495f.). None of these passages has anything to do with the call of conscience, and none of them is taken from the chapter on the call of conscience or from the one on historicity. As already my quote from §68 indicates and as Heidegger says more than once, the call of conscience calls “back [zurück] to thrownness [Geworfenheit]” (Heidegger 1996: 264 = 1972: 287) and not to Dasein’s aheadness. As one can see in §65, §74, and elsewhere, thrownness is related to the past, or Gewesenheit, and aheadness to the future.9

Sheehan claims that, through our mistranslations, the translators and I “have misled scholars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487). This is a surprising sentence. For, Sheehan should have noticed, at the latest when reading my book, that his interpretation is just a variation of the American interpretation. As I have briefly summarized it here, the translators have rendered all the terms at stake properly, and Sheehan’s claim regarding Heidegger’s private language lacks any merit. Nonetheless, he is right about the translators, though not in the way he thinks. For, they have translated the decisive sentences in each of the three steps in §74 falsely or ambiguously, and this in such a way that every American reader, especially from the 1970s on, will strongly be inclined to read §74 along the lines of the self-made man (see Fritsche 1999: 7-28, 54f., 69, 238f., 259-262, 263, 268, 327-331, 335f., 349; see below, pp. 18 n. 3, 27, 33, 53f., 70). Sheehan has not noticed any of these mistakes, as perhaps no one else has. He has read Richardson’s book in 1964, and he admires it so much that he has dedicated his Making Sense of Heidegger to him and even written a little poem in honour of him (see below, p. 43). Thus, since 1964 he has believed to know that Heidegger uses at least two of his terms in a private language, namely

9 For the nexus between Erbe (the German Heimatl) and its history, ignored and suppressed by society), birth, and thrownness in §74, see Profeti (2019).
Schicksal and wiederholen. For, “[a]s William J. Richardson pointed out,” the first “does not mean ‘fate’ with its ‘lugubrious overtones’ of a predestined or pre-determined future” but rather “refers to the future that the individual freely and resolutely chooses for him- or herself” (Sheehan 2016: 493), and “Heidegger’s wiederholen does not mean ‘to repeat’ something or someone” but rather “is closer to ‘fetch’ (cf. holen), as in the British ‘to fetch someone’” (Sheehan 2016: 489). Probably, therefore, Sheehan means with his sentence about the translators and me that he has spent the last fifty years to identify all the terms that Heidegger uses in a private language and to pull §74 out of all the possible shadows the supposed mistranslations by the translators can throw onto it. Has he succeeded? No, to the contrary, he has led scholars even deeper into the dark—unless, to quote myself, “one says that, with his interpretations of fate along the lines of a midlife crisis and of destiny as pertaining to issues, such as the founding of a rabbit breeders association, readers have reached the end of the wood-path of triviality where one can no longer avoid the thought that this cannot have been what the epochal thinker had reserved for, as Sheehan says, the ‘emphatic climax’ (Sheehan 2015: 381) of his most influential work” (see below, p. 43).

By claiming that, in §74, Heidegger uses a private language Sheehan wanted to corroborate the American interpretation that Heidegger is the thinker of radical individualization and not the Germanic philosopher of destiny. According to Derrida, Heidegger joined the National Socialists because he “failed to avoid what he knew he ought to avoid,” namely the word Geist (see Fritsche 1995: 135). According to Birmingham, the thinker of anti-totalitarian politics did so because “in certain crucial texts in the 1930s, namely, the Rectorial Address and in some passages of Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger forgot the sublime moment which calls for Dasein’s resolute judgment” (see Fritsche 1999: 215). Sheehan does not deny what probably no one denies, namely that, in his history of being, Heidegger assumes that Geschick sends epochs and meanings of being (see Sheehan 2015a: 249ff.; see below, p. 70). According to Sheehan, Heidegger did so because he “forgot” (Sheehan 2015a: 293) the principle of his early philosophizing. John D. Caputo claims that, being in every respect the consummation of modern philosophy, of Kantian and neo-Kantian transcendentalism, Sein und Zeit cannot have lead Heidegger into National Socialism (see Fritsche 2012a: 268ff.). Rather, it was an error in reasoning, namely his mistake of expecting that the conditions of the possibility of empirical experience and history could appear as events within history. However, Heidegger had committed the same mistake already in Sein und Zeit, and he was not alone in doing so. Moreover, this is a mistake only from the viewpoint of a trans-historical a priorism (see Fritsche 2018b: 323ff.). As Marion Heinz has argued, in the happening of destiny in §74 primordial temporality manifests itself, against its being covered up by ordinary Dasein (Heinz 2019: 268ff.; see already Fritsche 2012a: 269ff., 2014: 207ff., 2019: 200ff.). Heinz also shows that already contemporaries of Heidegger raised already before 1933 the same kinds of concerns about Sein und Zeit as do Rockmore and I myself (Heinz 2019).

Sheehan can hear in the ‘Germanic’ notion of Schicksal or Geschick only, as he quotes Richardson, the “lugubrious overtones’ of a predestined or pre-determined future” (Sheehan 2016: 493; for a comment, in 1955, by Heidegger on this understanding, see below, p. 66). He displays by this his ignorance of the Kairos situation in the Weimar Republic where, as not only Tillich observed, “weariness with autonomy” (see Fritsche 1999: 174) was widespread. According to rightists, submitting to destiny, fate, and the Volksgemeinschaft and actively fighting for its realization relieves one from the burden of autonomy, and opens up a being-with-one-another in trust, love, etc. for the other Dasein and the Volksgemeinschaft (and, as Heidegger says in 1934, one should not mix up this “essentially German notion” with the “Asian notion of fate” [see Fritsche
1999: 141]). Heidegger's logic is “a logic not of reconciliation or of dialectical mediation but rather one of transfiguration” (Fritsche 1999: 323 n. 57), the transfiguration of the modern person into a follower of a communitarian ethics that is the precise opposite of Kantian ethics (see Fritsche 2019a). Such paganized Christian grace is a characteristic of Sein und Zeit—and, in a different way, also of Heidegger's history of being—to which the usual promoters of the American interpretation of §74 are deaf, gnadenlos (void of any grace) as this interpretation is. However, a professor of religious studies and author of a book on Jesus Christ, such as Sheehan (see below, p. 77) should have known better. According to Sheehan, I regard as the real issue in Sein und Zeit the “Manichean struggle between society and community” (Sheehan 2016: 485). One cannot turn my book upside down more thoroughly. I emphasize from the beginning on Heidegger’s basic motive in Sein und Zeit and throughout his entire career, namely the notion of a beginning and a fall-away-from it (and the covering up of this fall) (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 204, 274-79 n. 25, and often; Fritsche 2014: 57-105; see also Fritsche 2016: 585f.), which already, along with neo-Platonists, St. Augustine explicitly and extensively used to combat Manicheaism.11

Readers of my papers will acknowledge that it is Sheehan who “gets nothing right” (Sheehan 2016: 492). His paper contains frequent bullying, personal insults, and obscenities. In addition, it does not contain any single argument but only statements, statements that he sells as arguments through what I label his “circular-sandwich strategy” (see pp. 61-65). Moreover, to make his case Sheehan excessively practices what seems to be the ‘professional disease’ of so many Heideggerians, namely to heavily manipulate quotes, manipulations that can only be conscious fraud. Furthermore, he declares in one of his many bullet-lists that “interlocutors” in the debate shall have “a reasonable record of published work, in peer reviewed journals and presses” (Sheehan 2016: 483). Everyone somewhat familiar with Heidegger sees easily that, with all its—more often than not utterly incomprehensible—errors and blunders Sheehan’s paper has nothing to do with scholarship, besides that its tone disqualifies it as an academic text. In fact, in light of his paper no one should be surprised that Donald Trump, a master of fake news, bullying, and aggressive vulgarities, was elected President of the USA (see below, pp. 45, 56). Given the circumstances of the publication of Sheehan’s paper on me (see below, p. 45f.) it seems rather unlikely that no one at Philosophy Today had read it. Perhaps, Birmingham and Moore did not have

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10 In the 1930s, Heidegger often talked of blood and soil as the necessary but not sufficient condition of the being of a people. Several interpreters read this as Heidegger’s rejection of the national socialist concept of race or of any racism whatsoever. Profeti shows that Heidegger means that one must not just pay lip-service to one’s blood and soil but rather take it over in a resolute decision and actively fight for it (Profeti 2019). In other words, in these sentences Heidegger applies the “essentially German notion” of fate, and they are the equivalent to the third step in §74, the Eroberung.

11 In Making Sense of Heidegger, Sheehan talks only about fate and not about destiny in Being and Time (Sheehan 2015a: 178-83). Thus, it is possible that the difference between Schicksal and Geschick has escaped him throughout the 54 years he has been reading Heidegger (see Sheehan 2015a: XI) and that it needed the “canard” (Sheehan 2016: 486) of Faye’s book or my publications to open his eyes (for his reaction to his discovery, see below, p. 36). Finitude and mortality seem to be Sheehan’s main concern (see, e.g., the privileged treatment of a quote from St. Augustine, below p. 24 n. 4). Thus, he says that, in §74, “from among its ‘inherited legacy’ (Erbe) of possibilities, Dasein chooses one or another of them that it will endeavor to live out authentically in the light of its radical mortality. In Goethe’s phrase, Dasein will consciously choose the ideal it seeks to emulate (its ‘hero’). But in being faithful to that ideal, Dasein is being loyal to nothing other than itself, its own co-existence” (Sheehan 2019: 496; for his reference to Goethe, see Fritsche 2016a: 433f.; see below, p. 42). Already in the sections on death in Being and Time death is the eye of the needle, the purgatory, through which Dasein has to pass on its way from society to community, and in the 1930s Heidegger adduced the German soldiers in World War I as examples for his concept of death in Being and Time (see Fritsche 2012a: 272-274; 2014: 301-329).
enough of civil courage to reject it. Perhaps, however, they are equally incompetent when it comes to matters of philology, beyond just reading Heidegger, in English or German. Or, recognizing at least some of Sheehan’s gaffes, they are perhaps of the same mindset as Sheehan might be. After all, his paper, as already the one on Faye, is a strong feel-well shot for their Heideggerian clientele, and they may cynically assume that hardly anyone would take the time, or be able, to check anything in Sheehan’s paper. To my knowledge, no Heideggerian has publicly reproached Sheehan for his papers; neither, say, Karsten Harries just simply to dissociate himself from Sheehan’s reference to him regarding the issue of Bodenlosigkeit (see Fritsche 2016a: 434ff.; see below, pp. 41f., 45 n. 25), nor Gregory Fried who plays it both sides.

These facts render the affaire Sheehan/Birmingham an excellent subject of research in the sociology of parts of American academia in the age of neo-liberalism and Donald Trump (for Sheehan’s insinuation about my attitude toward American citizens, see Fritsche 1999: 334 n. 72; Fritsche 2014: 299; see below, pp. 18 n. 3, 44 n. 22). However, there are also philosophical aspects that I treat in the short book on which I am working. The astonishing career of Heidegger as the one and only liberator of philosophy and the West in the USA (and elsewhere) raises the question of pre-judgments, in Gadamer’s sense, the body of conscious and unconscious assumptions operative in one’s reading of texts (and the question of the influence of individuals on the history of the reception of texts). I discuss this issue with regard to the Heidegger reception after 1945, Heidegger’s philosophical development, the scholarship of Heideggerians on Heidegger, and Heidegger’s interpretations of the Greek philosophers (see the Appendices on the list of content [p. 61] and a draft of Appendix 5 [pp. 77ff.]). In addition, I will adduce as examples of the problem of hermeneutics and as further arguments for my interpretation several additional points.

The reception of my 1999 book itself could be of interest for research on pre-judgments. An American scholar, not a Heideggerian, author of a book on Heidegger’s prominent fellow on the extreme right, Ernst Jünger, regarded my book as “the best analysis of Heidegger’s Being and Time to come along in a long time.” Still, obviously under the impact of the idol of the self-made man, he attributed to me, despite my long discussion of this issue (Fritsche 1999: 7-28, and frequently), Peg Birmingham’s anti-totalitarian interpretation of §74 (see Fritsche 2012: 276 n. 21; published in Philosophy Today when David Pellauer was the editor). After this mistake, the remainder of the review could not make much sense for anyone not aware of it. Or, in a paper from 2002 the Heideggerian Simon Critchley sees me in the footsteps of a hero of postmodernity: “The systematic connection between fundamental ontology and national socialism was convincingly established by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in his ‘Transcendence Ends in Politics’ (1989) [and] his (1990) Heidegger, Art and Politics, …] the same argument has been stated much more polemically and in extraordinary scholarly detail by Johannes Fritsche in (1999).” (Critchley and Schürmann 2008: 150 n. 8). My book has nothing to do with Lacoue-Labarthe. In addition, every reader with not that narrow a horizon will, rightly, assume that its author belongs to those who regard Heidegger, Art and Politics as one of those pathetic efforts to present Heidegger as the tragic hero to whom alone the West owes the prospect of overcoming metaphysics and what comes along with it.

To my knowledge, Sheehan has been the only one to try to challenge points of my interpretation. As one can also see in their bibliographies, American Heideggerians only read the usual heroes of postmodernity and their fellow Heideggerians, and some have their private favorites, Sheehan apparently Jesus Christ and St. Augustine. Such literature does not help one to recognize
that, and how, not only the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit but often also the one of the history of being answers to the sociological and political context in which he is writing. The most astounding example for this is probably Heidegger’s effort, in the famous Bremen lectures from 1949 and in Question Concerning Technology, “to silence Auschwitz silently” (Fritsche 1995: 155), as I put it in my first publication on Heidegger, in an argument vindicated by the publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks since 2014 (see Fritsche 2018b).

Most recently, a Heideggerian, William Blattner, has acknowledged—somewhat bashfully, just in a footnote that is as short and inexplicit as possible—a key point of my texts, namely Heidegger’s ‘Germanic’ understanding of Geschick (destiny) and Schicksal (fate) and the ignorance thereof amongst Americans (Blattner 2019: 163 n. 12). In the body of his paper, he concedes that my philological comments on Abständigkeit in §27 are right (2019: 166f.). Perhaps as a kind of compensation for this generosity, he misrepresents Heidegger and me regarding the issue of Bodenlosigkeit, ignores my explicit emphasis on the historical character of Abständigkeit, and credits himself for the insight that Heidegger’s theory of the They has the “implications” (2019: 173) of historical variability, besides that he falsely makes me sport some rather biased assumptions. Most importantly, his own interpretation (“conformism run amok” [2019: 171]) is rather nebulous and seems to amount to a trivialization of my interpretation, besides that in order to establish it he has to ignore, amongst other things, the long paragraph with Abstand and the one on empathy in §26.

Blattner regards his interpretation of the They as an example of the strategy “to disburden Sein und Zeit” of the “fascist and folkish […] uses to which Heidegger tried to put it” so that, with the last words of his paper, “perhaps we must end up saying that we understand Sein und Zeit better than Heidegger did” (Blattner 2019: 177). As a second example he adduces works of other Heidegger scholars and himself on Heidegger’s theory of conscience (2019:173f.). With all due respect for these scholars, the results that I have read are, it seems to me, neither in the spirit of Heidegger nor, philosophically, particularly new or interesting. Both examples lead Blattner “to ask whether a similar strategy might be carried out with respect to Heidegger’s treatment of historicality and his comments on das Volk in II.5 [= §74, J.F.]” (2019: 176). For the time being, he “must leave the project of answering that question to further research” (2019: 176). When, in 1992 during a discussion after a talk of his at the New School for Social Research in New York City, Gianni Vattimo said in response to a question, “I don’t know, Reiner. We are not gods,” Reiner Schüermann, along with Derrida the only creative Heideggerian, said with his divine poker face on: “Speak for yourself!” Schüermann (see on him Fritsche 2019d) liked to remind people of something else, namely Kant’s “Think for yourself!” More likely than not, possible further research on §74 by Heideggerians will result in something more or less trivial that one could have thought out by oneself in a short period of time, without spending years on reading Heidegger.

Up to now (July 2019), Faye has not responded to Sheehan’ paper on him, neither in Philosophy Today 60:2 (see Birmingham and Moore 2016: 427) nor thereafter. It could have been a matter of half an hour, so to speak. For, Sheehan had nothing to say on chapters 2-8, and I had already sufficiently rejected Sheehan’s claims regarding chapter 1 in my papers. Three individuals—and the other signatories of Rastier 2015—had intervened in Faye’s support, and they had been attacked by Sheehan in 2016. In addition, without a response by Faye readers of Philosophy Today do not know that the editors of Philosophy Today refused to publish a response to Sheehan’s

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12 He did not respond to an e-mail in which I asked him to explain one of them.
paper from 2016 by one (or perhaps even more) of these three individuals. Reacting to a polemic not at all or only more than four years later will for many readers just prove that the polemic was right. It is up to every author not to avoid this impression, but only as long as only he or she herself is involved.

Bibliography


II. The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham: Fritsche's *Rülpser* on Heidegger's *Being and Time*

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Abstract: In a paper, “L'affaire Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger? A Reply to Fritsche, Pégny, and Rastier,” published in *Philosophy Today* 60(2) (2016), Thomas Sheehan claims that in my book, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's Being and Time* (1999), I mistranslate every key term in §74 of *Being and Time* and get everything wrong regarding this section. In this paper, I show that Sheehan’s critique is unfounded. Relying on an interpretation of §74 that is as banal as it is philologically and hermeneutically wholly arbitrary and false it is rather he himself who has got wrong all the points that he adduces. I also present some of Sheehan’s numerous fraudulent allegations and manipulations. *Philosophy Today* refused to publish my response (see the postscript). To whom it may concern: please, note Shannée Marks’s project of a documentary on Reiner Schüermann that I mention, along with her e-mail address, at the end of my paper.

Key words: *Being and Time*, Birmingham, Faye, Fritsche, Heidegger, historicity, *Rülpser*, Sheehan

After Faye’s book, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935* (2009; French original 2005), my book on Heidegger, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Fritsche 1999),¹ has come under the scrutiny of Thomas Sheehan because it “has profoundly influenced Emmanuel Faye and other members of Faye et Cie.,” and is “one of the foundational pillars holding up the canard that is Faye’s” (Sheehan 2016: 486) book (canard, canard [French]: duck, cock-and-bull-story, newspaper hoax, canard, local rag, J.F.). The result is as alarming as is his paper on Faye’s book (Sheehan 2015). The tone is equally impudent, and one has to seriously worry about his state of mind. For instance, right at the beginning he suggests that I say that Heidegger wrote the theory of history in §74 of *Sein und Zeit* because he had read it in volume 2 of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* and then claims to refute me by pointing out that this volume was published “on 10 December 1926, a week after Heidegger had sent off his manuscript of SZ to the printers” (Sheehan 2016: 485).² The result is

¹ I have referenced every quote in a quote according to my own way of referencing quotes. In all quotes, three dots in brackets (“[...]”) indicate my omissions, italics and three dots without brackets are with the respective authors, and English words in square brackets (e.g., “[in order to press]”) are my abbreviations of the quote or (e.g., “[the Überlieferung]”) my replacements of “he / she / it.” I did not indicate when I (and not the respective translator) inserted the German wording into the English translation. For the bibliography, see p. 34 [here 46f.].

² As proof of his claim Sheehan quotes me: “‘Heidegger’s concept of historicity is identical to Hitler’s.’” (Sheehan 2016: 485) My whole sentence reads: “[O]ne sees easily that Heidegger’s concept of historicity is identical to Hitler’s and Scheler’s ideas of history and, thus, politically on the Right.” (Fritsche 1999: 126) I say this in a summary, right before I discuss the strong theoretical differences between Scheler and Hitler (see also Fritsche 2016c) (which enabled Scheler in the 1920s, in sharp contrast to Heidegger, to recognize in Hitler the real foe and turn from the right to the center [Fritsche 1999: 142-48]). Most rightists wanted to destroy, or delimit, society and repeat or re-realize the community that had been destroyed, or marginalized, by the emergence of society. The question was which community should be repeated (the Vikings, the first emperor’s reign, Prussia, etc.). Scheler recognized already before World War I that for the promoters of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (the community of the people) the individual counts for nothing in and of itself. That’s why, in his view, the *Volksgemeinschaft* was the lowest of the large-scale communities and should enter politics only in the service of the higher ones. He himself argued for the repetition of the world-wide Catholic love-community in which the respect for each individual as a value in and of itself and the solidarity for all
also kind of funny: my book—a philosophical “Rülpsen” (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 61). A Rülpsen (a German word) is that particular noise people produce, normally involuntarily, when they have eaten too much and the air in the overwhelmed stomach forces its way out upward and out of the mouth, i.e., a belch, a very powerful burp. Many would probably be happy to produce books that way as, for instance, I am sure one finds this idea somewhere in one of the novels of the German romantic writer of the Goethe era, Johannes Paul Friedrich Richter, alias (pen name or Dockname) Jean Paul. Sheehan’s piece is not a Rülpsen. Rather, to make me look as stupid and hallucinatory (Fritsche’s “Magic Theatre (‘For Madmen Only. Price of Admission Your Mind’)” [Sheehan 2016: 504]) as possible it is well done—well, all too well. Independent of its numerous absurd allegations and manipulations, with its tone, its display of seemingly vast knowledge, its know-all judgments about each and anyone and -anything, its childish pride, its supposedly acidic formulations and innuendos, its getting personal, its frequent repetitions, its obsession with unimportant issues, its complete lack of any discursivity, and its machine-gun (“Wrong! Wrong! Wrong!”) lists of alleged errors and other supposed oddities in my book (Fritsche 1999) and my response to his paper on Faye (Fritsche 2016) that altogether unavoidably evoke sad and unpleasant images of its author, readers will wonder how the referees and editors at University of California Press al-

are combined (see Fritsche 1999: 97-100, 136-40; Fritsche 2016: 431; Fritsche 2016a: 587-88, 590-91). As a matter of fact, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger uses the core of an ethics in which, just as in Hitler, the individual is essentially for others (and the Volk) (see Fritsche 2016c). By the way, Hitler made all the main points already in the first volume of Mein Kampf from 1925. Thus, there was enough time for Heidegger to recognize that with his vote for the Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people) as the Gemeinschaft to be repeated (see my sections 2-5) he was in agreement with Hitler.

3 Since I had experienced that many Americans were misguided about Heidegger because they had no knowledge of German and the culture in Germany at that time, I relatively often explained the usages of German words and the associations coming to the mind of native speakers and sometimes made jokes (see Fritsche 1999: XIV) and polemical comments, especially in the 124 pages of endnotes, which “often run from four to nine pages each in small print” (Sheehan 2016: 484) (see Fritsche 1999: 229-352). Treating these passages as though they came out of a regular scholarly book, it is, of course, easy to find phrases that, taken out of context, sound outlandish. Sheehan aducres my endnotes almost as often as the main text, and says that one “reason for reading the notes is that you might find them entertaining—if, that is, your taste in humor runs to (reader discretion advised) the German slang for having a hard-on, a woody, or a droopper (Fritsche 1999: 310.30-311.36 [end. 10]) or for defecating un urinating in your pants (Fritsche 1999: 192.13)” (Sheehan 2016: 484).

As to the first of these two passages, in a contribution to the research, initiated by Derrida and in the 1990s fashionable, on Geschlecht (sex, sex organ, generation [as in “generation of the baby boomers”], etc.) in Heidegger (Fritsche 1999: 188-194), I quote an occurrence of a German expression for an erected penis in Heidegger, which the English translator, deliberately or not, has made unrecognizable but which Heidegger employs in a talk about the task of the university in the National Socialist state in November 1933 in Tübingen (according to the only source, at any rate, namely the version of the talk printed in a local newspaper [see Heidegger 2000a: 823]) in the context of speaking about himself and his co-fighters in the fight for the realization of National Socialism as “merely a transition, merely a sacrifice”: “we must have“ this bodily organ in that peculiar state in which it “no longer clings to / hangs on anything of its own but commits itself to / fits itself on the rationale of the existence / the foundation of the people” (Fritsche 1999: 189.19-21, translation changed, J. F., 307.44f. [endn. 1]; Heidegger 2000a: 772.27f.), a sentence that requires some comments on Heidegger’s rhetoric and the sociological aspects of some expressions. In addition, I point out that Heidegger’s wording as it appeared in the newspaper was perhaps a courageous act of subversion of the pompous language of Heidegger and the National Socialists on the part of a typesetter of that newspaper (Fritsche 1999: 307.41-309.18 [endn. 1], 310.26-312.18 [endn. 10]). (cont. of the note on the next page)

The second passage definitely contains no humor at all. Commenting on the rather old-fashioned German word Gemeinde (something someone has gemacht [produced], male sex organ, etc.) that Heidegger uses in his theory of production and technology I give as my fourth example of the usage of the somewhat colloquial everyday verb machen a phrase that probably all parents use: “Or, babies or children ‘machen Pipi.’ or ‘machen sich in die Hose,’ that is, urinate or defecate into their pants.” (Fritsche 1999: 192)

Sheehan quotes me: “has not understood anything” (Fritsche 1999: 333.26-27 [endn. 72]) (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 62). In the preceding sentence, I say that I imitate here the style of David Krell, whom I quote in that context (Fritsche 1999: 333f. [endn. 72]). Only “those who are unable to read and listen’ (Fritsche 1999: 340.37 [endn. 6])”
owed Fritsche to ramble on and on for 371 pages. Sheehan does not even mention that, in sharp contrast to his own dogmatic and authoritarian procedure, I develop—(since he names texts of mine on Aristotle [Sheehan 2016: 483, 532, 534; see also 490f.]) in the “good old way” of the Aristotle commentators in late antiquity and the middle ages: first the other interpretations, only thereafter one’s own—my interpretations out of discussions of other readings and that I present the theories of history and politics in Adolf Hitler (Fritsche 1999: 68-87), the early Max Scheler (Fritsche 1999: 87-124), the late Max Scheler (Fritsche 1999: 142-48), Georg Lukács (Fritsche 1999: 149-173), and Paul Tillich (Fritsche 1999: 173-187) and compare Heidegger with them.

After a general introduction and an overview of my interpretation of §74 (Sheehan 2016: 483-486), Sheehan claims, as he announces in five headings, that “Fritsche Mistranslates” (Sheehan 2016: 481, 486, 487, 489, 490) every key term in §74 (Sheehan 2016: 486-492) and “Mistranslating the Whole of §74” (Sheehan 2016: 481, 492-504, 525-31; Fritsche “literally gets nothing right” [Sheehan 2016: 492] in his “utterly bizarre” [Sheehan 2016: 484] interpretation). Later, Sheehan adds a “Coda: On Fritsche’s Mistranslation of Bodenlosigkeit” (Sheehan 2016: 507-508) and three pages of “Notes” (Sheehan 2016: 517-519) on me. I discuss the issues of (1.) the mistranslation of the terms (p. 4 [here 19]) and of (2.) the misinterpretation of §74 regarding these terms, the temporal trajectory, and the main actor in that section (p. 10 [24], lay out (3.) the problem of Gemeinschaft (community) in Being and Time (p. 14 [28], discuss (4.) Sheehan’s reading of

(Sheehan 2016: 503) will doubt my interpretation, as Sheehan suggests I say. My text has “able” and not “unable,” and he obviously hasn’t understood the whole note (which he adduces eight times [Sheehan 2016: 499 n. 41, 499 n. 42, 500 n. 44, 500 n. 46, 502 n. 53, 503 n. 60, 518, 518]) anyway (see Sheehan 2016: 499f.), as he turns upside down Fritsche 1999: 286-88 (endn. 62) (see Sheehan 2016: 502f).

In a decisive sentence in §74 (see the beginning of my Section 4), Heidegger determines Geschick (destiny) as the “Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes” (BT 384.32). Both Stambaugh and Macquarrie and Robinson mistranslate the phrase by rendering the second definite article (“des”) as an indefinite one (“occurrence of the community, of a people” [BTS. 352.5], “the historizing of the community, of a people” [BTM: 436.18]. Macquarrie and Robinson mistranslate the words that precede this quote [see Fritsche 1999: 268f. [endn. 3]]. When I quote in my book from 1999 the English translation of Heidegger’s determination of Geschick for the first time, I emphasize the indefinite article (“the community, of a {sic} people” [Fritsche 1999: 13]), add a long note in which I point out the mistranslation in both Stambaugh and Macquarrie and Robinson, explain with reference to an elaboration on the difference between both kinds of articles by Rosenzweig the significance of Heidegger’s original wording [while the definite article with Volks is used by rightists to exclude anything and anyone “non-German” from the German Volks [as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit [see my Sections 2-5; see also Fritsche 2016c]], the indefinite article transforms Heidegger into a multiculturalist à la Herder], and say that, from now on, I will quote the English translation in a modified form indicating through curly brackets my change (“of the community, of {the} people”) (Fritsche 1999: 238f. [endn. 17]). Whatever one thinks of my comments, no one can deny that Heidegger’s text has the definite article in front of “Volks” and that in replacing “a” with “{the}” I don’t change the wording of Sein und Zeit but rather to the contrary—with two pet words of Sheehan’s (see my Section 1)—“free up” or “retrieve” this original wording from under its mistranslation in both English translations. In my first paper on Sheehan, I point out that, in his paper on Faye, it is not, as Sheehan claims, Faye but rather he himself who misquotes Heidegger’s definition of Geschick (Fritsche 2016: 430-31; see Sheehan 2015: 379, with n. 40). Nonetheless, in Sheehan 2016 he writes without mentioning my first paper on Faye’s, it is not, as Sheehan claims, Faye but rather he himself who misquotes Heidegger’s definition of Geschick (Fritsche 2016: 430-31; see Sheehan 2015: 379, with n. 40). Nonetheless, in Sheehan 2016 he writes without mentioning my first paper on Faye’s. Heidegger’s phrase and my long note and without any further comment but with hyperventilating italics: “Note how Fritsche changes the wording of SZ 384.32 at Fritsche 2016: 433 n. 4 and in Fritsche 1999: 132.39-40; 140.12-16; 217.41-218.2, and 218.24-26.” (Sheehan 2016: 517; see also his insertion “[note the comma]” [as though I had smuggled in the comma between “Gemeinschaft” and “des Volkes”] at 499 n. 39 where he, in addition, misunderstands a sentence of mine in Fritsche 2016: 431), obviously to make readers forget that I had pointed out that it was not Faye but rather he who had misquoted Heidegger’s phrase.

For my attitude toward US-Americans (Sheehan 2016: 519), see Fritsche 1999: 334 (endn. 72), Fritsche 2014: 299 (see also my footnote 23). Hopefully, every instructor would “have a problem” (Sheehan 2016: 519) with the student of Charles Scott and John Sallis whom I mention (see Fritsche 2012: 282 [endn. 146])—except perhaps Sheehan. For, as will become clear, he has even less respect for the words of a text than this student. When Sheehan realizes that his prejudice about a word in Heidegger doesn’t fit what he reads in his dictionaries, he just simply declares that Heidegger uses the word in a special way. In the course of the paper, I will adduce some more of Sheehan’s abundant false allegations. For someone who enjoyed my endnotes along with the book, see Bambach 2001.
Geschick (destiny) in §74 (p. 17 [30], present (5.) my own interpretation of this notion (p. 23 [36]), comment on (6.) his “Coda” (p. 26 [39]), and (7.) summarize my first paper on Sheehan (Fritsche 2016) and the current one (p. 29 [42]). (In a postscript [p. 33 (42)], I inform readers about the history of the refusal of Philosophy Today to publish my paper; for the bibliography, see p. 34 [46]) As I shall show, relying on an interpretation of §74 that is as banal as it is philologically and hermeneutically wholly arbitrary and false, none of his points is valid. Hence, his critique of my book lacks any foundation.

1. The English Translations of the Key Terms in §74 of Sein und Zeit

Sheehan should have said, more precisely, that Fritsche adopts the mistranslations of Macquarrie’s and Robinson’s English translation, the only one available for most of the time I worked on the book. For, after presenting a list of twelve terms (“Zeit is not ‘time,’ Sein is not ‘being,’ […] wiederholen is not ‘to repeat,’ das Gewesene is not ‘what has been’” [Sheehan 2016: 486f.]) he continues:

Yes, the current English translations (Macquarrie-Robinson and Stambaugh-Schmidt) do render those German terms as above, but in so doing they have misled scholars for over fifty years. (Sheehan 2016: 487)

Sheehan explicates his opinion on three terms of his list.

Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh render überliefern and Überlieferung as “to hand down” and “handing down” or “tradition,” and rightly so. In everyday language, Überlieferung is most of the time used in the sense of Tradition (tradition). Any tradition or Überlieferung überliefert, überliefern (transmits, hands down) something from one generation to the next, and there is probably in English no alternative to “handing down” and “tradition.” According to Sheehan, however, this translation “betrays their philosophical meaning. Überlieferung in §74 and elsewhere in Heidegger’s work does not mean ‘to hand down’ but ‘to free up, to liberate’” (Sheehan 2016: 487; see Sheehan 2015a: 181-182). He adduces two quotes from two texts of Heidegger’s from 1955. In the first, Heidegger says in the lecture course on the principle of reason in Sheehan’s rendering:

“… because Überlieferung is a freeing-up in the sense of liberare, to set something free. As such a freeing-up, Überlieferung brings to light the hidden treasure of das Gewesene….” (Sheehan 2016: 488; das Gewesene(e) : pace Sheehan, that which was / has been, i.e., something in the past or coming from the past; see below in this section, J. F.)

Sheehan claims that, in §74, when using the vocabulary of Überlieferung Heidegger does not mean a tradition but rather exclusively Dasein inasmuch as Dasein überliefert, chooses, or “frees up” (Sheehan 2016: 529 and often) a possibility “that it will endeavor to live out authentically in the light of its radical mortality,” a possibility that it takes from a tradition, from “its ‘inherited legacy’ (Erbe)” (Sheehan 2016: 496; see 492-97, 525-31; see Sheehan 2015a: 178-82). Whatever the phrase “and elsewhere” is supposed to cover, it is clear that Sheehan assumes that there are in Heidegger usages of Überlieferung or überliefern where the word means “to liberate” without meaning “to hand down.”
To be sure, Sheehan’s quote looks as though Heidegger would say that Überlieferung in his sense has only one meaning, namely “to set something free,” to the effect that, when one applies this meaning to §74, one might get the idea that not any tradition but exclusively Dasein überliefert and that Dasein überliefert, frees up, something, a possibility, that it has found in a tradition. However, this impression is created through three mishandlings of the quote.

1) In the year of 1955, Heidegger had been for more than twenty years engaged in his history of Being, in which the issue of tradition is indeed important inasmuch as, with the beginning of a new epoch, a body of literature and many concepts are transmitted from the old epoch into the new one. Sheehan probably does not want to say that Heidegger in that year at the beginning of the last session of a lecture course dedicated to an important topic in the history of Being all of a sudden returns to a theme that was important to him within the framework of Sein und Zeit and of his engagement with National Socialism. As a matter of fact, the context of the quote shows without any doubt that Heidegger is talking here about tradition and that, in addition, he distinguishes between two meanings, or modes, of tradition. Speaking about Übersetzung (translation), he says that the translation of a Grundwort (basic / foundational word) from one historical language into another such language, as for instance of the Latin word ratio (“ nihil est sine ratio”) into the German word Grund (“nothing is without Grund”) at the beginning of modernity, becomes an Überlieferung to continue:

If [the Überlieferung] rigidifies, a legacy [Überlieferung] can degenerate into a burden and a handicap. It can become this because a legacy [Überlieferung] is genuinely, as its name says, [eigentlich, was ihr Name sagt] a delivering [Liefern] in the sense of überliefern, of liberating. As a liberating, a legacy raises concealed riches of what-has-been [des Gewesenen] into the light of the day even if this light is at first only that of a hesitant dawn. That Grund is [sei] the translation of ratio means to say that ratio has passed over into Grund [Die ratio hat sich in den Grund überliefert], a legacy [Überlieferung] which already early on speaks with a double sense. (Heidegger 1991: 102 = Heidegger 1997: 153; “sei” might better be translated as “shall be”; literally translated, the subordinated clause reads: “ratio has delivered itself / handed down itself / transmitted itself into / as the Grund”

The abstract noun Überlieferung can be used in two ways, for the thing handed down or handing itself down (say, fairy tales or, in this case, the body of Roman and Medieval Latin literature) or for the activities of the individuals through which they hand down that thing (the telling of fairy tales or, in this case, the translating of the translators). In the last sentence, Heidegger definitely means the former, since it is ratio in the Latin literature and not the translating of the translators that transmits itself into the Grund. Therefore, he will mean in the entire passage the tradition and not the translators. However, even if he mainly or exclusively means the translating, he will certainly not say that they made a resolute decision in the sense of Sein und Zeit but rather that they understood their work as the handing down of a body of literature from one language into another one and from the past and present into the future. Thus, he is talking here about a tradition and how it is transmitted or transmits itself (via the translators) and not about freeing up possibilities in Sheehan’s sense.

In addition, he is talking about two meanings, or modes, of tradition and not just one, for he distinguishes between a mode in which the Überlieferung rigidifies and a mode in which it liberates. Therefore, to liberate is by no means the one and only meaning of Überlieferung but only (part of) the meaning of one of its two modes. What, then, is the meaning of Überlieferung for
Heidegger? Most certainly, as for everyone else, “to hand down / transmit / deliver something for / to someone),” “to move something from somewhere to somewhere else for / to someone” as, in the case of the Latin literature, from Latin into German and from the readers in the Middle Ages to / for those in the future. Thus, an Überlieferung both as a tradition that transmits itself and as the activity of the transmitters of that tradition hands down something, and without doing so it can neither liberate nor rigidify something.

2) In his quote itself, Sheehan has left out the phrase, “genuinely, as its name says,” which has the effect that readers are prevented from getting the idea that Heidegger might talk in the quote itself and its context of several meanings or modes of Überlieferung.

3) In contrast to Lilly (“a delivering”), Sheehan falsely translates liefern, namely as “freeing-up.” Heidegger certainly does not say that liefern means nothing but freeing-up, liberation. Rather, he will, as anyone else, say that liefern means “to deliver something” or “to hand over something to someone,” as any tradition or any Lieferung of a piece of furniture or a pizza that one had ordered liefert (delivers) something to someone. Liefern is just another everyday name for übergeben, anständigen, überliefern (to deliver, to hand over, to hand down, etc.) and as such means an act of moving something from somewhere to someone else. In addition, in Heidegger’s opinion it can happen in the case of traditions that the Lieferung is a liberation. Furthermore, he believes that some medieval Latin usages of liberare and their German translations as liefern entitle one to say that the genuine meaning of the German word liefern is, or was, “to liberate” (as one can see already in the pertinent dictionaries, without being in need to read the texts they refer to, in the sense of “to punctually hand over to A something that one owes A,” wages to one’s employees, interest to one’s creditor, taxes to the church or the landowner, etc.; i.e., in a meaning that has nothing to do with Sheehan’s Dasein freeing up a possibility). In brief, he distinguishes between several meanings or modes of liefern and privileges one of them, but each of these meanings is, or implies, an act of handing over or down.

Sheehan’s third mishandling has the same effect as the second and the first one, namely to prevent readers from realizing that not only in the context of the quote, but even in the quote itself Heidegger talks about several modes of Überlieferung. Since all three mishandlings are necessary and sufficient for keeping readers in the belief that Heidegger is talking about only one meaning, it seems unlikely that Sheehan mishandled the quote inadvertently. Thus, as in the case of his silly allegation that I maintain that Heidegger copied Hitler’s Mein Kampf and as in numerous other cases, most certainly readers will have to live with the shocking truth that the professor at the Department for Religious Studies at Stanford University and, by courtesy, professor at the Department of Philosophy at the same institution, Thomas Sheehan, deliberately violates the basic protocol of any academic work and deliberately cheats or, as he charges Faye with (Sheehan 2015), commits frauds. To be sure, Heidegger does use one meaning of Überlieferung, but this meaning is not, as Sheehan has it, “freeing up” but rather, as any other native German speaker understands the word, “handing down, transmitting, delivering.” In addition, he does not use just one meaning of Überlieferung but rather develops two meanings or modes, namely a handing down that rigidifies and one that liberates. Furthermore, the general meaning that he employs is used by common parlance as well as by him for traditions and not, as Sheehan has it, exclusively for Dasein’s resolute decision in the sense of his understanding of Sein und Zeit. In sum, Sheehan turns the meaning as well as the reference of Überlieferung upside down. Sheehan’s second quote and its context show the same. Thus, his examples don’t bear out his claim that Überlieferung in
Heidegger means more or less often “to free up” without meaning “to hand down” (Sheehan 2016: 487).

In addition, in 1955 Heidegger explains the second mode, obviously because he is aware that readers won’t be that familiar with Überlieferung as liberare, and this is what he normally does when he uses an established word in an unusual meaning. Now, outside of the chapter on historicity Heidegger employs überliefert and Überlieferung in Sein und Zeit exclusively in the usual meaning of “handing down” or “tradition.” To give a few examples, the word occurs for the first time in §2: “Furthermore, the average, vague understanding of being can be permeated by traditional [überlieferten] theories and opinions about being […]” (BTS: 4 = SZ: 6). The noun follows just a few pages later: “In the historical and humanistic disciplines the drive toward historical actuality itself has been strengthened by the transmission and portrayal of tradition.” (BTS: 8 = SZ: 10; or, “by the tradition / transmission and its presentation and tradition [durch Überlieferung und deren Darstellung und Tradition]” (BTM: 8 = SZ: 10). Probably, “Überlieferung” covers here things, such as the oral transmission of, say, fairy tales, “deren Darstellung” the collecting (and publishing) of these fairy tales by the Grimm brothers, and “Tradition” the later reprints of the collection, but “Überlieferung” might also mean the collecting itself. In the latter case, Überlieferung might have an aspect of Sheehan’s “freeing up” inasmuch as the collecting hands down / over the fairy tales to the public and thus brings to the attention of people something that they have ignored up to that point. However, it is clear that even in that case the word is self-evidently used with regard to processes or activities of handing down something to someone and not with regard to choices in Sheehan’s sense and that the fairy tales could not be “freed up” for the public, or the Grimm brothers could not “free them up” for the public (or themselves), without that the fairy tales were handed down to the public (or to the Grimm brothers).

Heidegger has treated the problem of Überlieferung already in Sein und Zeit, in the famous §6, “The Task of a Destruction [Destruktion] of the History of Ontology” (BTM: 17 = SZ: 19; replacement of “Destructuring” with “Destruction” is mine, J. F.). Heidegger writes in this section:

The tradition [Tradition] that hereby gains dominance makes what it “transmits” [“übergeb”.] so little accessible that initially and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been handed down [das Überkommene] it hands over to obviousness; it bars access to those original “wellsprings” out of which the traditional [überlieferten] categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance altogether. (BTS: 19 = SZ: 21)

Überliefert is here self-evidently used in the sense of “handed down from one generation to the next.” In addition, Heidegger uses the word for a case that is the opposite of the one for which Sheehan reserves the word, for Heidegger uses it here for a rigidifying Überlieferung, one in which the tradition does not liberate but rather produces “concealments” (BTS: 20 = SZ: 22). Thus the task of

the destruction [Destruktion] of the traditional [überlieferten] content of ancient ontology which is to be carried out along the guidelines of the question of being. This destruction is based upon the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of being were gained. (BTS: 20 = SZ: 22; see BTS: 23 = SZ: 26; replacement of “deconstructing” with “destruction” is mine, J. F.)
This quote, too, shows that Heidegger uses already in Sein und Zeit Überlieferung / überliefern in the same way as in Sheehan’s quote from 1955. The meaning of überliefern is not, as Sheehan has it, a liberation without any handing down but rather a handing down, and in the case of traditions this handing down can take two forms, a rigidifying and a liberating one. In the chapter on historicity itself Heidegger at no point indicates, in contrast to the quote from 1955, that he would employ these words in an unusual way. Thus, it is unavoidable also in Being and Time to translate them as “handing down”—and probable, if not unavoidable, to assume that Überlieferung is also in §74 in the first place a matter of the tradition and not of Dasein choosing a possibility from the tradition.

How does Heidegger use das Gewesen(e)? The word is the noun to the perfect participle (gewesen) of the verb sein, “to be,” and thus refers to something in the past, as it clearly does in the above Heidegger quote from 1955 and in everyday language (“Yesterday, the weather was / has been [war / ist gewesen] beautiful,” “I’ll keep in mind everything that was / has been yesterday [alles, was gestern gewesen ist],” “Everything that was / has been yesterday [Alles gestern Gewesen] will never be forgotten.”). Hence, Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh render gewesen, and related words, with phrases containing “having-been” or “been” indicating the past, and there seems to be no viable alternative. According to Sheehan, however, in doing so they mistranslate these words. In the last eight lines of a short paragraph of 14 lines in, as Sheehan himself points out, the “pivotal” (Sheehan 2016: 491) §65 of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger three times uses gewesen and twice Gewesen, and determines Gewesen as Dasein’s “eigenstes ‘wie es je schon war’” (SZ: 325f. = Dasein’s “ownmost ‘how it always already was,’ that is, its ‘having-been’ [Gewesen]” (BTS: 299 = “its ownmost ‘as-it-already-was’—that is to say, its ‘been’ [sein ‘Gewesen’]” [BTM: 373]). Even though Heidegger uses here wholly naturally the imperfect tense to explicate the perfect tense of Gewesen, according to Sheehan this phrase

refers not to Dasein’s past in any sense but to its existential aheadness, its Zukunftigkeit or futurity. (Sheehan 2016: 491; see Sheehan 2015a: 171-173)

All-knowing Sheehan is sure that it never occurred to me, after all an “expert in Aristotle” (Sheehan 2016: 490), that Heidegger’s determination of Gewesen is a reference to Aristotle’s notion of τὸ τί ἦν ἄνω (Sheehan 2016: 490f.; “the: what-was-to-be?” [according to Sheehan, this literal translation is, of course, a false translation (Sheehan 2015a: 171)], e.g., “the: what was it for a human being to be a human being?”). However, especially if this is the case, Sheehan’s claim is as incomprehensible as the one concerning Überlieferung. Already at the end of the very paragraph itself, Heidegger employs the abstract noun Geweisenheit (SZ: 326 = BTS: 299 [“having-been”] = BTM: 373 [“The character of having-been”]), and he does so clearly as the abstract noun to gewesen and Gewesenheit. Geweisenheit, however, Heidegger uses in §65 itself and elsewhere as the technical term for that ecstasy of the primordial temporality which corresponds to what traditionally has been called the past (e.g., “Future [Zukunft], having-been [Geweisenheit], and present [Gegenwart]” [SZ: 328 = BTS: 302 = BTM: 377]). Other than that, he has always used Geweisenheit only for a past that claims to reoccur and can, and shall, do so (see Fritsche 1999: 284-85 [endn. 57] or Heidegger 1998: 100-118). Thus, Heidegger uses gewesen, das Gewesen(e), and Geweisenheit always in the way it is always used in everyday language, namely to refer to some past or something in the past and not to any future.
Finally, Macquarrie and Robinson render *Wiederholung* and *wiederholen* in §74 (SZ: 385.19-386.26 = BTS: 352.25-353.19 = BTM: 437.13-438.21) as “repetition” and “to repeat” (Stambaugh has “retrieve”), and I adopt their translation also because, in German, the noun *Wiederholung* is most of the time, if not always, used in the sense of “repetition.” According to Sheehan, however, this is a mistranslation, for ever since Richardson’s book from 1963 scholars know that Heidegger’s *wiederholen* is closer to “to fetch” in the sense of “to go get somebody” and hence should be translated as “retrieval” or “retrieve” (Sheehan 2016: 489f.; see Sheehan 2015a: 183). Sheehan does not mention that, right at the beginning of my discussion of this issue, I quote Macquarrie and Robinson who, in a note, say the same thing as Richardson does (Fritsche 1999: 15f.), and I discuss this suggestion. In addition, I don’t infer from the word *Wiederholung* itself but rather from my interpretation of SZ: 385.24-386.9 (= BTS: 352.29-353.5 = BTM: 437.18-438.7) that Heidegger is talking in §74 of the repetition of the having-been of the German community of the people (see my next sections). Furthermore, American interpreters normally ignore that “to fetch” is not *bolen … wieder* but simply *bolen*, and *bolen … wieder* in the sense of “to fetch” would be “to fetch back,” to retrieve for oneself something that one had had at some point but then had lost or given away (thus, the children’s verse: “Given (as a gift) is given (as a gift), *wiederholen* [and not just *bolen*, J. F.] is theft [Geschenkt ist geschenkt, *wiederholen ist gestohlen*]”). Therefore, “to fetch” as a translation, or explication, of *Wiederholung* is simply wrong whether *Wiederholung* is used in the sense of a repetition or of *bolen … wieder*. In addition, even *wiederholen* in the sense of *bolen … wieder*, of “to fetch back,” is a repetition, namely the repetition of, or the return to, the state in which one had already had the item that one fetches back, “repetition” in the sense of “bringing back (to life) something that had disappeared” as opposed to, say, singing without a break the same song over and over again (see Fritsche 1999: 7-28, 37-68, 83f., 134f., 173f., 327-31 [n. 70], and often). In sum, Sheehan is wrong (and hasn’t learned anything in these matters since he began reading Richardson “some fifty years ago” [Sheehan 2015a: XI]). For, one must not translate *Wiederholung* as “retrieval” but rather as “repetition.”

2. The temporal Trajectory, the main Actor and the key Terms in §74 of *Sein und Zeit*

Regarding all three notions discussed in the preceding section, Sheehan makes the same mistake, namely to claim a later phase, or activity, as the exclusive content of the notion. A *Gewesenheit* as a past that shall reoccur does indeed approach us from out of the future, or is our futurity, but only because it is a past that calls upon us to re-realize it in the future. Similarly, a tradition or *Überlieferung* hands down possibilities to Dasein and enables Dasein to take them over. Sheehan does not give any example of Dasein’s freeing up of a possibility that it takes from somewhere, namely from a tradition. If he had thought about just one, he would have quickly realized that such freeing up is impossible without an activity of moving something from here to there, for Dasein moves this possibility from somewhere, the tradition, where it belonged to someone else or to no one into its own domain and from the past or present into the future. Therefore, not only a tradi-

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4 As I pointed out, the English prefix *re-* functions differently from the way the Latin *re-* and the German *wieder-* do (Fritsche 1999: 285-86 [endn. 58], 334-35 [endn. 72]). See some quotes from this context in Sheehan (2016: 490 n. 18). Anxious that they miss what seems to be the pet topic of his philosophico-religious career, Sheehan translates for the readers St. Augustine’s *vivere moriendo* (“live mortally” [Sheehan 2016: 496]) and lengthily references the quote. Other than that, he constantly boasts with untranslated foreign-language phrases but is obviously clueless even in the face of a little bit of amateurish linguistic coffee-table talk.
tion and the activity of transmitting a tradition but even Sheehan’s activity of freeing up is, or implies, an act of handing down something, and it is simply impossible to cleanse Überlieferung of the aspect of handing down. Sheehan obviously does not notice that, both in the case of the Heidegger quotes from 1955 and in the context of §74 of Sein und Zeit, Überlieferung as a handing down accounts easily for the aspect that he labels “freeing up.” Everyone understands without any thought the phrase that a tradition überliefert (hands down) possibilities for Dasein to take over, and everyone equally easily understands when one describes the activity of Dasein that has been made possible by the work of the tradition by saying, as Heidegger does in this context (SZ: 385; BTS: 360), that Dasein überliefert (hands down, takes over) a possibility to / for itself. If one likes, one can certainly label this activity and the one of the tradition an act of freeing up possibilities. However, one must not ignore, as Sheehan does, that this freeing up would not be possible without a tradition and a Dasein handing down possibilities in the sense of carrying them from somewhere to somewhere else. As to Wiederholung, it is the same as with Gewesenheit. A past that displays repeatable possibilities enables Dasein to repeat, or fetch back, these possibilities, and without such a past Dasein would not be able to do so.

As will become clear in the following sections, regarding Schicksal (fate) and Geschick (destiny), Sheehan makes the same mistake to declare the last phase, or the activity of Dasein having been made possible by something else preceding it, as the exclusive content of the notion. Through this consistently repeated mistake, an exemplary subjectivist misreading of Sein und Zeit and of German words, Sheehan establishes the individuals as the only actors in §74 and as those who individually freely forge their individual fates and collectively their common destiny. Despite his clamor that Macquarrie, Robinson, and Stambaugh have “misled scholars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487) and despite the seeming of deep “originality” that Sheehan creates in his book Making Sense of Heidegger, his reading of §74 is, as I already pointed out (Fritsche 2016: 431), just a further example of what I labelled the “American” interpretation of authentic Dasein which one finds already in the early 1990s in Birmingham, Caputo, Fynsk, Guignon, and others, whose interpretations in all their differences share the common denominator of turning Heidegger’s “Germanic” notion of Schicksal and Geschick upside down and presenting individual Dasein as the creator of its Schicksal (e.g., Caputo: “Dasein gives itself a fate” [Fritsche 1999: 283f. {n. 51}]), the postmodern version of the proverbial American self-made man who takes his fate resolutely into his own hands. In addition, with the exception of Sheehan’s claim regarding Gewesen, these authors make, with no or hardly any discussion, similarly wrong claims concerning the meaning of the words in §74 (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207–15 and the index of names). In brief, to render, as Sheehan does, “Überlieferung” as “exclusively Dasein’s activity of freeing up,” “Gewe- sen(es)” as “exclusively Dasein’s futurity,” or “Schicksal” and “Geschick” as “exclusively my / our forging, freely and by myself / ourselves, of my / our future” is as good as saying that since sunlight makes it possible for plants to grow, sunlight is by definition nothing but the growth of plants or that since stars are available for navigation, stars are essentially nothing but navigation.

Both Sheehan and I regard §74 as, in his words, “the emphatic climax of Being and Time” (Sheehan 2015: 381) as a whole (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 274-79 [edn. 25]; more concisely Fritsche 2012: 258-66, Fritsche 2014: 57-70), but our interpretations of that section could hardly differ more. For him, the actors are the individuals, and a community plays only a passive role while, for me, the community turns out to be the main player. In addition, for him the past occurs only as a pool out of which Dasein freely chooses one or the other possibility while, for me, the past community as the main player claims to be re-realized (see Sheehan 2016: 492-497).
Thus, we see different temporal trajectories in which for me the past, for Sheehan and the entire American interpretation, however, the future has primacy. As Sheehan puts it:

Oblivious of the fundamental pattern that Heidegger had laid out in §§41 [in which Heidegger uses none of the three terms presented in my preceding section, J. F.] and 65 and that he builds on in §74, Fritsche makes resolve into its exact opposite. It is no longer a matter of confronting one’s mortal future and returning to the present to free up an available possibility. Instead, Fritsche claims that Heidegger “affirms the primacy of the past” [inasmuch as Destiny appeals to Dasein] to step back from the future […] to [the] past [in order to press] forward into the present to “repeat” […] a pure Volksgemeinschaft. (Sheehan 2016: 498f.)

As to the three terms from my preceding section, gewesen occurs five times in §74. Heidegger talks of “a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been [gleichursprünglich gewesen]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352). “Equiprimordial” is in §65 and elsewhere Heidegger’s term for the equiprimordiality of the three ecstasies of primordial temporality (SZ: 329 = BTS: 302), with Gewesenheit, as was pointed out, as the technical term for what traditionally has been called the past. In the next paragraph he says that the repetition that Dasein performs is the move back to “the possibilities of the Da-sein that has been [des dagewesenen Daseins]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352); that Dasein performs the repetition “of a possibility that has been [gewesen Existenzmöglichkeit]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352); and that this repetition “of a possibility that has been [einer gewesenen Möglichkeit]” discloses “the Da-sein that has been there [das dagewesene Dasein]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352) in a certain way. In all four of these quotes, it is not the repeating Dasein but rather the possibility that this Dasein chooses that is called gewesen and which is in the past or comes from it. In his “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” (Sheehan 2016: 525-31) of §74, making the same mistake as the one regarding Überlieferung and the other words, Sheehan renders these words in the spirit of the American interpretation arbitrarily and falsely as “already-available” (Sheehan 2016: 529) and adds a note in which he tacitly acknowledges that Heidegger uses here gewesen for the past and not, as in Sheehan’s general claim, the future (Sheehan 2016: 529 n. 100; compare with 530 n. 103).

In a summary toward the end of §74, Heidegger attributes to “Gewesenheit” the “unique priority of what is historical” (BTS: 353 = BTM: 438 “[peculiarly privileged position in the historical”] = SZ: 386 “[eigentümlichen Vorrang im Geschichtlichen”]), or says that the “occurrence of authentic history has its weight in having-been [Gewesenheit]” (BTS: 353 = SZ: 386f.). In other words, in historicity Gewesenheit and not, as Sheehan and the “American” interpretation in general has it, the future or the present is the dominant dimension. In his “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” of §74, Sheehan explicitly admits that Heidegger uses Gewesenheit here “in its traditional sense of what-has-been-and-still-is-operative” (Sheehan 2016: 530 n. 103). Thus, in the entire §74 Heidegger uses gewesen in its everyday usage to characterize a past and not Dasein’s futurity. Sheehan does not comment on what, for him only and not even for the other promoters of the “American” interpretation of §74, is an inconsistency between this section and §65 on the part of Heidegger with regard to one of his life-long pet notions, and Sheehan does not explain either in what, according to his interpretation, the priority of Gewesenheit in the historical consists. Indeed, it is difficult for him inasmuch as, according to the “American” interpretation, Dasein moves between the future and the present and uses the past in principle just as a pool of possibilities, none of which has any obligatory force for Dasein (see Fritsche
1999: 7–13, 207–15, and passim). By contrast, according to my interpretation, such sentences are a very appropriate summary.5

One has here a striking example of Sheehan’s absurd hermeneutical arrogance or incompetence: he predicates his interpretation of §74 on the assumption that, in §74, Heidegger makes Dasein enact a notion of Gewesenheit that flies flatly in the face of the way Germans use that word and which Heidegger has, Sheehan assumes, presented in a very short passage in §65, and he acknowledges at the same time that, in §74, Heidegger uses Gewesenheit in the opposite meaning, the one everyone is familiar with. Probably, Sheehan will admit as well that everywhere else in Sein und Zeit, including §65 itself, Heidegger uses Gewesenheit in the meaning familiar to everyone. Thus, he maintains that, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger uses Gewesenheit frequently and that he does so always in the meaning familiar to everyone, except once where he uses it in a meaning that is the precise opposite of the usual one without indicating this in any way. Still, according to Sheehan, this meaning is operative in §74 (and already in Heidegger’s discussion of resoluteness and the call of conscience [Sheehan 2015a: 158-178]) even though in that section, too, Heidegger uses Gewesenheit in the way familiar to everyone.6

It adds to the incomprehensibility of his claim that, as the interpretations of Birmingham, Caputo, Fynsk, Guignon, and others show, the “American” interpretation of §74 does not need Sheehan’s understanding of the term Gewesenheit, and he didn’t need to make any ado about the other words either. Perhaps, he felt the need to ground the notion of historicity in the structure of care (Sorge) better than, he thought, Heidegger himself had done. In the process, he completely cleansed Heidegger’s vocabulary of its “Germanic” content, took out a certain wit that one can find in some variants of the “American” interpretation, and removed motifs in others that could still, in a way, remind one of the political and cultural conflicts at Heidegger’s time or which were the philosophical and political options pursued by leftists or other antipodes of Heidegger, such as Walter Benjamin (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207–15 and the index of names). The result is an unsurpassably boring interpretation of “the emphatic climax” (Sheehan 2015: 381) of Sein und Zeit. Indeed, it can happen that, in the course of some existential crisis (“confronting one’s mortal future” [Sheehan 2016: 498]), one thinks about what one has been doing all the time (“returning to the present” [Sheehan 2016: 498]), and gives up one’s job to engage in an activity which one got to know in one way or the other (“to free up an available possibility” [Sheehan 2016: 498]). No one needs years of studying Heidegger to come up with such a banality that looks like a deep insight only if one is obsessed with finitude and mortality and entertains a caricature of the notion of the modern subject.7

According to Sheehan, Überlieferung is performed exclusively by Dasein, the act of freeing up an available possibility (Sheehan 2016: 487-489). By contrast, for me it is, as in the Heidegger quotes from 1955 and in everyday language, in the first place the past. I develop the first step of this Überlieferung in an interpretation of the paragraph in which Überliefern occurs for the first time in §74 and whose main actor is, in my view, something that definitely comes from the past, namely Erbe (legacy, heritage) (SZ: 383.31-384.14 = BTS: 351.13-32 = BTM: 435.15-37) (Fritsche 1999:

5 In contrast to me, adherents of the “American” interpretation have to explain why Heidegger confines the repeatable possibilities to those coming from the past, why he is so “critical” of the They, and why Dasein cannot invent possibilities. However, they ignore these issues.

6 For a more recent treatment of Aristotle’s notion of τὸ τι ἐπεμένων than the ones Sheehan adduces (Sheehan 2016: 491 n. 22), see Fritsche 1997, which could help Sheehan to cure himself of his mirage regarding Gewesenheit.

7 See also my footnote 16.
47-65; in the spirit of the “American” interpretation Stambaugh turns the decisive sentence upside down [Fritsche 1999: 263 {endn. 321}]. Sheehan ignores this part.

He rather targets my interpretations of the passage on the community of the people and destiny (SZ: 384.29-384.38 = BTS: 352.2-10 = BTM: 436.14-23) and of the one on Wiederholung (repetition) (SZ: 385.24-386.9 = BTS: 352.34-353.5 = BTM: 437.22-438.7). I infer my interpretation of the repetition of the community of the people from both of them and, in the final step, from the last two sentences of the passage on Wiederholung, the ones on erwidern and Widerruf (SZ: 386.4-6 = BTS: 352.42-353.3 [{"responderi" and "disavowal"] = BTM: 438.1-4 [{"reciprocative rejoinder" and "disavowal"]}), whose decisive importance I have stressed from the beginning (Fritsche 1999: IXf.) and which I discuss with even more than the notorious German Gründlichkeit (thoroughness) (Fritsche 1999: 7-28, 65-67, 83f., 134f., 173f., 327-31 {endn. 70}, and often) because I was aware that in particular the mistranslation of the first of these two sentences (which Sheehan adopts [Sheehan 2015a: 180 n. 89]) was an expression of the “American” interpretation of historicity and strongly reinforced it (for a particularly striking confirmation, in addition to the authors I discuss in Fritsche 1999, see Fritsche 2012: 276 {n. 21}).

The first passage I treat more in detail in my next sections. As to the second, Sheehan claims, as always without any discussion, that my mistranslation of Wiederholung (repetition) leads to

the utterly bizarre meaning [Fritsche] has to torture out of erwidern / Erwiderung at SZ 386.4-6 = BTM 438.1-4 (submitting to Fate-and-Destiny!) to get them to dance to the choreography of his ‘Drama of Historical Dasein.’ (Sheehan 2016: 490)

He should be alerted that, in an article on the question of Heidegger and National Socialism in a handbook on Heidegger (that is, in a genre in which one is not supposed to develop “fancy” thoughts but to present the state of the debate and reliable information), one of the two or three major authorities on Heidegger in contemporary Germany, Dieter Thomä, a native German speaker and in no way a “foe” of the thinker, refers once to my book—precisely to my interpretation of erwidern to reject, as I had done, what I had labelled the “American” interpretation of §74 (Thomä 2003: 145-46).

3. Gemeinschaft (Community) in Sein und Zeit

Sheehan claims that my interpretation of §74 is wrong because the notion of community occurs only in this section (Sheehan 2016: 493) and because Heidegger shows in it “how we can [...] forge a common destiny, a Ge-schick” (Sheehan 2015: 381). Both claims are false. In his lecture course from the summer of 1925, in the chapter that corresponds to the one on being-with-one-another and the They in Sein und Zeit Heidegger says explicitly that on the basis of being-with-one-another in the world Dasein “can develop the various possibilities of community [Gemeinschaft] as well as of society [Gesellschaft]” (Heidegger 1992: 241). As a matter of fact, relying on the sections before and anticipating some points from §27, Heidegger just summarizes in §26 in his own vernacular and a variation of Hegel’s vocabulary one strand, the more radical one, in the literature on community and society, namely that, historically, the pre-modern communities, the historically first mode of being-with-one-another, were pushed aside by liberalism, the second mode of being-with-one-another, and that, as by no means all of the then communitarians as-
sumed, the social democratic welfare state, the third mode, is just an intensification of liberalism. At the same time, Heidegger develops a fourth mode of being-with-one-another, the anticipation of a rightist revolution (see for §26 Fritsche 1999: 274-279 [endn. 25], Fritsche 2012: 258-61, Fritsche 2014: 60-64). Furthermore, Heidegger claims that the vulgar understanding of the call of conscience interprets it as the voice of universal reason, and he presents as this vulgar interpretation of the call of conscience a theory of modern society that was also commonplace in the literature on community and society, namely that modern societies are based on arithmetical justice—the justice of business activities and business exchanges—and institutionalized procedures of discussion as opposed to the proportional justice in communities (Tönnies 1957: 186 = Tönnies 1979: 163, Fritsche 2012: 264f. [endn. 33], Fritsche 2014: 66-68). As a matter of fact, the issue of community and society even determines the whole structure, or choreography, of Sein und Zeit with its culmination in the script for a rightist revolution in §74 (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 274-79 [endn. 25]; more concisely Fritsche 2012: 258-66, Fritsche 2014: 57-70).8

Heidegger also adopts the then usual characterizations of community and society. Scheler talked of the “principle of summation [Summenprinzip]” as the principle of modern thinking according to which society and everything else is nothing more than the mere sum of its parts and thus dependent on them and determined by them. According to Scheler, this does indeed hold for society but not for organisms and communities. Each organism and each community is a totality that has a life of its own and organizes, and determines, its parts, each of which has its existence and peculiar character from the totality of the organism or community. Scheler develops wordily how society emerged when, in modernity, the integrating powers of community were weakened by the rising individualism or egotism (see the long quote Fritsche 1999: 113f.). This distinction between society and community was commonplace among the then communitarians. In the classic book on the issue, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society) from 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies expresses the same idea when he says, for instance, that a society is “a mechanical aggregate and artifact” (Tönnies 1957: 35 = Tönnies 1979: 4), a “mere co-existence of persons independent of each other [bloßes Nebeneinander voneinander unabhängiger Personen]” (Tönnies 1957: 34 = Tönnies 1979: 4; replacement of “peoples” with “persons” is mine, J. F.); that are “not essentially bound together / obligated to each other [wesentlich verbunden], but essentially separated from each other” (Tönnies 1979: 34, to be added before “However, […] uniting factors” [Tönnies 1957: 65]); none of whom grants the other something, or does something for the other, unless he gets back in return an equivalent or more (Tönnies 1957: 65 = Tönnies 1979: 34); and amongst whom “hostilities are natural and only veiled and, for that reason, […] break out easily” (Tönnies 1957: 170 [translation changed, J. F.] = Tönnies 1979: 143) because society is a matter of “egotistical” (Tönnies 1957: 185 = Tönnies 1979: 162) individuals, i.e., persons—in brief, society is “merely abstract reason, that reason in which every rational being qua definition partakes, inasmuch as this abstract reason is conceived to be willing and acting” (Tönnies 1957: 71 = Tönnies 1979: 39). By contrast, a community is a “living organism” (Tönnies 1957: 35 = Tönnies 1979: 4) and as such

8 Sheehan, after all a professor at a department for religious studies, claims, without reference and falsely, that Fritsche regards as the real issue in Sein und Zeit the “Manichean struggle between society and community” (Sheehan 2016: 485), a remark which betrays a deep misunderstanding of my whole book and perhaps also of the whole of Heidegger inasmuch as I emphasize what was Heidegger’s basic motive in Sein und Zeit and throughout his entire career, namely the anti-Manichean notion of a beginning and a fall-away-from it (and the covering up of the fall-away: “forgetting of a forgetting” [Fritsche 1999: 204 and often]) (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 274-79 [endn. 25]; Fritsche 2014: 57-105; see also Fritsche 2016a: 585f.).
a whole [...] that is [as in contrast to a society, J. F.] not put together by the parts, but rather has / maintains these parts as dependent on it and as conditioned by it; [...] therefore, it itself is as a whole, thus as form real and substantial [Ganze [...] was nicht von den Teilen zusammengesetzt wird, sondern sie ist von Anfang an und durch sich bedingte hat; [...] also es selber als Ganze, mithin als Form wirklich und substantiell ist” (Tönnies 1979: 5f.)

At the end of §26 of Sein und Zeit Heidegger writes:

In that Da-sein is at all, it has the kind of being of being-with-one-another. Being-with-one-another cannot be understood as a summative result [summatives Resultat] of the occurrence of several “subjects.” Encountering a number of “subjects” itself is possible only by treating the others encountered in their Mitda-sein merely as “numerals.” This number is discovered only by a definite being with and toward one another. “Reckless” [“rücksichtslose”] being-with “reckons” with others [“recknet mit den Anderen”] without seriously “counting on them” or even wishing “to have anything to do” with them. (BTS: 117-18 = SZ: 125; replacement of “inconsiderate” with “reckless” is mine, J. F.; for Heidegger’s notion of Rechnen, see Fritsche 2016b)

As will become clearer in the following sections, Heidegger is here not talking about several individuals forging a common destiny in Sheehan’s sense, and he is not just talking in general about being-with-one-another. Rather, he uses the same formula as Scheler does in order to identify, in the “spirit” of the whole of §26, the “real” being-with-one-another and community, and he offers his formula for the emergence of society: the modern individual, the person or subject, no longer has the concern that members of a community have for each other, namely the “[e]ncernful taking care” or “taking care of concern” (BTS: 116; the “[s]olicitous concern” or “concernful solicitude” [BTM: 161]; “fürsorgende Besorgen” or “besorgende[n] Fürsorge” [SZ: 124]); the modern individual rather recklessly reckons with the others, i.e., treats them and the whole society as mere means of its own egotism and self-promotion (see Fritsche 2016b).10

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9 Loomis translates: “a totality which is not a mere aggregation of its parts but one which is made up of these parts in such a manner that they are dependent upon and conditioned by the totality, and that such a body as a totality and hence as a form possesses reality and substance.” (Tönnies 1957: 36) My literal translation of the first phrase of the quote is important because of Heidegger’s language (see the beginning of my section 4).

Two further remarks might be useful: 1) Tönnies does not say that, so to speak ontogenetically, phylogenetically or systematively, the entities that become, or are, parts of a community are first independent of the whole and that later on, however, the whole makes them dependent on it. Rather, the whole has always already kept the parts as conditioned by it. 2) Tönnies uses here the vocabulary of Aristotle. An organism consists of its essential form (say, to-be-a-human-being, something immaterial) and its material parts (say, the head, the legs, the arms, etc., each consisting of flesh, bones, etc. as matter). What is a community? Just the essential form or the composite of essential form and all the material parts? Tönnies is not very clear on this issue but seems to say here and elsewhere that it is just the essential form (which can be labelled the “[true] whole,” since it is the essential form that determines which material parts the entire organism as a whole has). To say so makes it much easier regarding an option in the debates about the revitalization of community among rightists (see my footnote 2 and my section 5). In modernity, the parts of the community change (i.e., the individuals become egotists, in the first place) to the effect that the community disappears and society is established (the formula of Hegel [who was by no means a communitarian] for this process was that the accidents become substances). To say so that community is in the first place the essential form enables one to say that the revitalized, or repeated, community need not necessarily have all the parts that it had when it was for the first time real and that it can have parts that it did not have at that time (see my section 5).

10 When saying close to the beginning of §26 that the others are encountered from the world in which Dasein dwells and not from discriminating one’s own subject from other subjects (SZ: 119 = BTS: 112), Heidegger does not deny that a world of subjects is possible and real. He just says that this world presupposes resources that it hasn’t produced and that it denies (SZ: 124f. = BTS: 116-18). Scheler says in the long quote Fritsche 1999: 113f. that the
4. Sheehan on Geschick (Destiny) in §74 of Sein und Zeit

In §74, Heidegger determines Geschick as the “occurrence [Geschehen] of the community [der Gemeinschaft], of [the] people [des Volkes]” (BTS: 352 = SZ: 384)\(^{11}\) and continues:

Destiny is not composed of individual fates [setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen] nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects [Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte].\(^7\) These fates are already guided beforehand [im vorhinein schon geleitet] in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] for definite possibilities. In communication [Mitteilung] and in battle [Kampf] the power of destiny first becomes free [In der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschickes erst frei]. (BTS: 352.5-10 = SZ: 384.31-38; the phrase “setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen” is literally translated “does not put itself together out of singular fates”; i.e., it is a variation of the first, negative, part of Tönnies’ definition of an organism and of community quoted in my preceding section; “mutual” has no equivalent in the German text, and might be misleading; Heidegger refers to the contract theories in early-modern philosophy or just to subjects in general; they kommen zusammen vor on the same spot, i.e., they are spatially in the same area and can, as subjects, form, through contracts, a society but they don’t make up “real” being-with-one-another, a community; in other words, Heidegger’s “occurrence of several subjects [together on the same spot]” is equivalent to Tönnies’ formula of society, quoted in my preceding section, as a “mere co-existence of people independent of each other.”)

“Occurrence” is an appropriate translation of the word Zusammenvorkommen in Heidegger’s phrase “Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte,” but as a translation of Geschehen in Heidegger’s determination of Geschick (“occurrence [Geschehen] of the community [der Gemeinschaft], of [the] people [des Volkes]” (BTS: 352 = SZ: 384) it is probably too pale (Macquarrie and Robinson have “historizing” [BTM: 436]). Geschehen in everyday language is the “happening / taking place / coming out” of something, and Heidegger uses the word here in this very meaning for the coming out of destiny (see my section 5). In addition, he identifies Geschick and Gemeinschaft and in the second step—pace Sheehan, who in his obsession for dictionaries (Sheehan 2016: 487 n. 10 [“到时”,”“使”], 490 n. 20 [“对答”], 505 n. 65 [“无根基状态”]) seems to be unterbelichtet (underdeveloped) when it comes to grammar, precisely through the “apposition” (Sheehan 2016: 517) of the respective words—Gemeinschaft and the Volk. Both steps are his answer to the main question every rightist had to answer, namely, which community it is that should be repeated. In the first step, he most probably implicitly fends off theologically, or otherwise in a transcendent manner, grounded concepts of history, such as in Scheler, and in the second he declares the Volk, the Volksgemeinschaft, to be the relevant community: Geschick is the coming out of the (primary or only) community, (namely / i.e.) the Volk (and neither Scheler’s Catholic love-community nor any other of those

\(^{11}\) Replacement of “a people” with “{the} people” is mine, J. F.; see my footnote 3.
that have been suggested by other communitarians) (Fritsche 1999: 97-100, 136-140; Fritsche 2016: 430-31; Fritsche 2016a: 527-8, 590-1) (see also my section 5).\footnote{See my footnote 2.}

Sheehan accuses me of turning Heidegger’s concept of \textit{Geschick} on its head (Sheehan 2016: 493). For, according to him, Heidegger shows in §74 how an individual freely chooses its own individual destiny, its fate, (Sheehan 2015a: 182-84; Sheehan 2015: 382 n. 49) and “how we can also forge a \textit{common} destiny, a \textit{Geschick}” (Sheehan 2015: 381):

Far from meaning “destiny” as Fritsche would have it, [the term \textit{Geschick}] refers to the common future, the \textit{Geschick}, that a community freely choses for itself (for example, in ratifying the U.S. Constitution of 1789). (Sheehan 2016: 493)

According to Sheehan, it is in the three quoted sentences on destiny (BTS: 352.5-10 = SZ: 384.31-38) that Heidegger develops how several individuals forge a common destiny (Sheehan 2016: 528). There are ten problems with his interpretation.

1) The supposed actors, the authentic individuals forging their destiny, don’t occur at all, neither in the heading (“the coming out of the community, the people”) nor in these three sentences themselves, since Heidegger uses the notion of the subject for the modern individual and modern philosophy of subjectivity and not for authentic Daseins; or, if indeed they are meant by “subjects,” they occur not as agents and actors, but only to avoid a possible misunderstanding regarding their status in relation to destiny and being-with-one-another. By contrast, the supposed product of the activities of the individuals, \textit{Geschick}, is the only subject of the heading, and is in these three sentences twice the subject of the sentence, and obviously has power.

2) According to Sheehan, Heidegger shows in §74 also how an individual produces its own individual destiny, its fate (Sheehan 2015: 382 n. 49; Sheehan 2015a: 182-84). However, in the quote fate occurs as something guided by what is certainly not the individual whose fate it is.

3) How is Heidegger reasoning here? In his “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” (Sheehan 2016: 525-31) of §74 Sheehan paraphrases the three sentences thus:

\begin{quote}
A \textit{Geschick} isn’t the sum total of individual \textit{Schicksals} (just as social existence isn’t the gluing together of individual subjects). Rather, individual \textit{Schicksals} are already guided by our social existence: our living together in the same world of meaning and choosing certain possibilities together. The \textit{Geschick} of a community gets freed up only as we communicate with one another and struggle together. (Sheehan 2016: 528)
\end{quote}

It is only here that Sheehan substantiates his claim concerning \textit{Geschick}, and he obviously regards his paraphrase as a sufficient validation, since he leaves it without any comment. Thus, he does not say whether an individual fate is here the one that an individual frees up for itself or whether an individual has a fate already before it frees up its individual fate. In both cases he would have to explain why Heidegger, when supposedly talking about individuals forging a common destiny, does not address this issue explicitly but rather talks explicitly about something different, namely the individual fates. In addition, he says of them something that is difficult to square with Sheehan’s claim that, according to Heidegger in the very same §74, an individual forges its own fate. Furthermore, Sheehan does not explain either what this guidance in the second sentence
means, and who, or what, is guiding the individual fates. The only candidate in the context of the second sentence is destiny. However, according to Sheehan this is not possible since, according to him, destiny is produced freely by the individuals and as such cannot guide them, at least not without further explications on Heidegger's part. In addition, Sheehan obviously assumes (“Rather”) that the fact that the individual fates are already guided rules out that destiny is composed of individual fates, but he doesn’t explain either this composition and what its absence means for destiny and the individual fates. Finally, he does not explain what “[to] struggle together” might mean, neither in general nor regarding his example of the American constitution. He seems to emphasize the cooperation of those who conduct the Kampf, but the primary aspect of a Kampf is that it is directed against someone, against the foe.

4) Sheehan does not notice these unclear points and inconsistencies or is willing to pay them as the price for his introduction of “us” as the only actors, an introduction that requires a grave manipulation of the text. Even though none of the three sentences contains Überlieferung, neither as a noun nor as a verb or participle, even though none of them contains “us” let alone “us” as actors and as the only actors, even though the subject of the first and the third sentence is destiny and its power, and even though, in the second sentence, individual fates and, by implication, the individuals themselves are not producing anything but are said to be guided by something, Sheehan smuggles into the third sentence his false translation of überliefern and liefern—his pet-word, “to free up”—to turn the passage grammatically on its head and present “us” as the exclusive initiators and agents in the communication and struggle in which we freely forge a common destiny. However, this move is for six further reasons improbable or impossible.

5) Since “communication” obviously makes most, if not all, American interpreters, including Sheehan, think of the back and forth of suggestions and arguments that individuals exchange, it is a false translation of Heidegger’s word Mitteilung. For, if Heidegger had meant such exchanges, he could have easily chosen something from a rich list of words, each of which clearly and unambiguously conveys such interactions, namely Auseinandersetzung, Beredung, Besprechung, Debatte, Dialog, Diskussion, Erörterung, Gespräch, Meinungsaustausch, Rede und Gegenrede, Unterredung, Verhandlung, or even Beratung. However, he uses the word Mitteilung, and a Mitteilung in general and also in Heidegger (SZ: 162, 168 = BTS: 151f., 157) is primarily a one-way communication in which person A informs B about something or makes B share—or, as Heidegger says at some point, “co-share”—something that A already has. Especially superior, people with power, administrations and bureaucracies deliver Mitteilungen (in Mitteilungsblättern), or bosses when they fire someone (“Herewith, I teile Ihnen mit [inform you] that you are fired.”), cases in which the recipient is not supposed to start a discussion (see Fritsche 1999: 347-51 [endn. 24]). Otherwise, atmospheres, moods, or other things that are not human thoughts teilen sich mit (communicate themselves, spread themselves out) to humans as, for instance, the solemn atmosphere of this memorial to every visitor, or God to the humans through his miracles and other deeds.

6) In addition, frei werden is normally not used for something that has been created in the process of becoming free but rather for something that has already existed before. When one says that, through the burst of a nuclear reactor, radioactivity, in this tumultuous meeting a lot of aggression or disagreement, the animal that had been captivated, through the fall of the wall in 1989 the citizens of the former GDR wird / werden frei or freigesetzt, everyone self-evidently understands that the respective subjects were not produced in this event but pre-existed it and just change their status—and now are acted out or can act according to what they are (see Fritsche 1999: 47-65).
7) Sheehan will perhaps say that, since the constitution “gets freed up” (Sheehan 2016: 528) by the individuals, it has already existed in a certain way before its ratification. Even if this might be the case, for his interpretation to work Sheehan has to assume that Heidegger, without indicating this in any way, uses the notions of Schicksal and Geschick to mean the precise opposite of their usual meanings. For, both those who “believe” in fate and destiny and those who don’t do so assume that individuals don’t produce their Schicksal or Geschick. Rather, Geschick and Schicksal precede them, and make themselves at some point in time in one way or another known to the individuals. According to rightists, the individual shall accept his or her Schicksal, since doing so is demanded by it and is in no way fatalistic but, to the contrary, redeems and ennobles the individual (Fritsche 1999: 322–23 [endn. 57], Fritsche 2015: 433), while others say that accepting it is a matter of prudence, since, if it is really fate, one will not be able to escape it. Or, in a broader sense, anything “inescapable” is, as Scheler put it, “fate—not choice [Schicksal—nicht Wahl]” (Fritsche 1999: 143). Anything Scheler, Hitler, and Heidegger say in sentences with Geschick and Schicksal can easily be understood on the assumption that they use these words in their everyday meaning and the related ones (see Fritsche 1999: 71–87, 89–92, 131–36, 140–41, 143, 289–92 [endn. 66] et passim). In the case of Schicksal, Sheehan explicitly acknowledges that in order for his interpretation to work he has to assume that Heidegger uses Schicksal in this perverted way (Sheehan 2015a: 183; see Fritsche 2015: 432f.). When emphasizing that Geschick in §74 does not mean “destiny” (Sheehan 2016: 493), he obviously acknowledges the same regarding Geschick, since in his list of twelve terms allegedly mistranslated in both English translations he has said that “Geschick is not ‘Destiny’ (supervening, necessary, and inevitable)” (Sheehan 2016: 487).

8) Those who are, according to Sheehan, the exclusive actors in these three short sentences on destiny, namely the resolute Daseins, don’t occur at all in them. Heidegger uses the notion of Geschick in a private language in which it means the precise opposite of its meaning in everyday parlance without indicating this fact in any way, and he uses the vocabulary of a one-way communication and fight against a foe that is the opposite of the to-and-fro of the discussions in which several Daseins freely forge the common ground on which to live together. How could Heidegger assume anyone would understand what he was saying? Or, for that matter, how could he himself be sure that, when rereading the text at a later point, he would know what he had said? Did he write the text intentionally in such a way that only US-American postmodernists in the 1990s and, twenty years later, Sheehan would get his point?

9) While the role of facing one’s mortality is pretty obvious in the case of an individual Dasein forging its fate, it is less so regarding several Daseins forging their common destiny. Sheehan does not offer any comment on this issue either. However, no matter what he would come up with—his interpretation of fate along the lines of a midlife crisis is as a whole utterly

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13 According to rightists, submitting to destiny and the Volksgemeinschaft relieves one from the burden of autonomy (see, e.g., Tillich’s observation [Fritsche 1999: 174f.]) and opens up a being-with-one-another in trust, love, etc. for the other Daseins and the Volksgemeinschaft. Heidegger’s logic is “a logic not of reconciliation or of dialectical mediation but rather one of transfiguration” (Fritsche 1999: 323 [endn. 57]; see also Fritsche 2016c), a characteristic of Sein und Zeit to which the promoters of the American interpretation of §74 and even the professor at a department for religious studies are deaf. The sentence with erweitern (see the end of my Section 2) is one of Heidegger’s formulations for such redeeming submission, and so is his formula, “Die […] sich überliefernde Entschlossenheit” (SZ. 385.23-24 = BTS: 352.29-30 “‘Resoluteness that […] hands itself down’”). Pace Sheehan (Sheehan 2016: 489), in the context in which it appears everyone understands this formula (see Fritsche 1999: 15-19, 46-65) while no one would understand Heidegger, if he meant, as Sheehan claims, that the resolute Dasein frees up, this time around not a possibility for itself, but rather itself for choosing an authentic possibility (Sheehan 2016: 489). From the early 1930s on, Heidegger’s pet word for that type of submission will be sich fügen in (the call of the Anfang [beginning], Being, etc.).
trivial, and so is at least the first half of his interpretation of destiny. Why does Heidegger, if Sheehan is right, not just say something like: “As we all know, the citizens of a state can give themselves a new constitution and the founders of a rabbit breeders association statutes. I say of them that they ‘freely forge their Gesicht,’ since, in my opinion, the Germanic notion of Gesicht has to be perverted because […] Note, however, dear reader, that, despite these reservations regarding this Germanic understanding of Gesicht, I will for reasons that I will never explain use in my history of Being, which I will start to develop in about five years, again the Germanic notion of destiny and fate, which one must not, of course, mix up with the Asian one [see Fritsche 1999: 140-42, J. F.]). In the meantime let me add that I am sure that such formations of a common destiny will, just as the creation of an individual fate, finally work out only if, say, all the rabbit breeders or a sufficiently large number of them, at any rate, has authentically faced their mortality.”?

10) Finally, after Hitler’s “seizure of power” Heidegger himself claimed that he had anticipated in Sein und Zeit this “new reality” (see Fritsche 2014: 207-11), and he said in 1936 in Rome to Karl Löwith that his notion of historicity was the basis of his engagement with National Socialism (see Fritsche 1999: 216-18). 14 Anyone who claims that Sein und Zeit has nothing to do with

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14 According to Löwith’s thesis of empty decisionism from 1939, the absence of criteria for resoluteness and decision in Sein und Zeit made Heidegger a conformist and as such collapse into National Socialism. In 1940, he wrote that his critique of Heidegger was also a self-critique. As a matter of fact, his interpretation is a projection of the very idiosyncratic right-wing radicalism of his youth onto Heidegger. His superficial texts on the issue of Heidegger and National Socialism, paradigmatic examples of guilt by association, would have certainly gone unnoticed without his reputation as one of Heidegger’s very distinguished students. In 1948, he called his critique from 1939 in a private letter a “defence of Heidegger.” It was a defence inasmuch as Löwith had argued that empty decisionism was the logical outcome of Western philosophy and hence Heidegger (and he himself) its legitimate vanguard. In addition, in that year he published in the United States of America a paper in which he presented the template of the “American” interpretation of Sein und Zeit and its §74. This interpretation shares with the empty-decisionism interpretation the assumptions of the absence of criteria in Being and Time and that the existential nihilism is the vanguard of philosophy. However, this nihilism no longer collapses into National Socialism, but is the only logically coherent philosophical position that lives up to the condition of modernity, namely sheer contingency. As one sees, the step from the empty-decisionism interpretation to the “American” and postmodern interpretation is very easy: one just has to regard the absence of criteria as the successful result of Heidegger’s heroic effort to lead thinking out of metaphysics and the rule of universals, an interpretative move that one could very nicely observe in the 1990s in the American literature, when, say, Charles Guignon explicitly took the empty-decisionism interpretation as the starting point for his postmodern interpretation, and others did so implicitly (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207-15, 216-18). In this way, Löwith (who had taught for some years in the United States and whose works were published there but who was also very influential in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s where he taught at the university of Heidelberg) became the “founding father” of the most influential line of critique of Heidegger and, at the same time, of the most influential line of celebrating Heidegger as the hero of postmodernity. Both lines rest on the same false (“individualistic”) premises; both ignore the radical version of a communitarian ethics that is operative in Sein und Zeit and that, Heidegger assumed, would be realized in National Socialism (see also Fritsche 2014). Throughout his life, Löwith was, politically and philosophically, a right-wing reactionary or conservative. The mature Löwith sported a philosophy of history that had the same structure as Heidegger’s history of Being and was based on the astounding claim that there are, in addition to Heidegger’s existential nihilism, only two coherent philosophical positions, namely the (premodern) pre-Socratic cosmos thinking and the (premodern) Judeo-Christian belief in creation. As Löwith himself said in 1939, during the Weimar Republic he was completely disinterested in concrete politics, didn’t even read any newspaper, and couldn’t imagine before around 1935 that Heidegger’s philosophy could have anything to do with Nazism. Through his reading, the convinced National Socialist Heidegger became the conformist National Socialist Heidegger and from there the hero of postmodernity and singularization—a compelling example of the power of prejudice in Gadamer’s sense, on both sides of the Atlantic. By contrast, another student of Heidegger’s who was to become a philosopher, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, got in the 1950s the basics of §74 and probably also its details right (Fritsche 1999: 326). It might have helped him that he had been, like Heidegger, a convinced National Socialist. Given the wording of Löwith’s report about their conversation in Rome, Heidegger and Löwith most probably did not discuss the notion of historicity. Thus, they did not notice that they had very different ideas about it. For all this, see Fritsche 2009 = Fritsche 2014: 270-300; see also Fritsche 2014: 301-29.
National Socialism would have to show why one is entitled to dismiss Heidegger’s own assessment, which Sheehan does not do.

Sheehan assumes his paraphrase doesn’t need any additional explication, justification, or argument. This is in line with his general dogmatic and authoritarian procedure. However, in this case there might be a further reason for his sparseness. For, in his book, Making Sense of Heidegger, he talks only about Schicksal and not about destiny (see Sheehan 2015a: 178-83). Thus, it is possible that the difference between Schicksal and Geschick has escaped him throughout the fifty-four years he has been reading Heidegger (see Sheehan 2015a: XI) and that it needed the “canard” (Sheehan 2016: 486) of the Frenchman Faye’s book to open his eyes. Overwhelmed by his discovery, ashamed about his ignorance, as his default-reaction, or just for the fun of it he then denies his shortcoming and projects it onto someone else, for he blames me for ignoring the difference between Schicksal and Geschick (Sheehan 2016: 485 n. 6, 494)—even though he himself quotes a sentence of mine in which I distinguish between these two notions (and do so, in this respect and in this respect only, in the same way as he does, namely that Schicksal pertains to the individual and Geschick to the community) (Sheehan 2016: 501) and even though I do so at other places as well and never mix them up.

5. Geschick (Destiny) in §74 of Sein und Zeit

In my view, Sheehan’s American reading of the three sentences on destiny and of §74 as a whole is ruled out by these ten problems, especially since there is a different interpretation that not only is not afflicted by any of them but even naturally and without any effort honors the criteria for interpretation implied in them. In the note 7 at the end of the first of the three sentences on destiny, Heidegger refers to §26, and he certainly does so to indicate that now he delivers on the rightist revolution he has anticipated in §26. He presents in the three sentences a key element of the rightist notion of history, uses in this context the vocabulary of the literature on community and society, and can keep all this so short because he is aware that he just summarizes two commonplaces among rightists. As I have shown with Hitler and Scheler (before he turned to the center15) as examples, rightists at Heidegger’s time assumed that modern society was a downward plunge away from community but that at some point in this fall, the main player in history—some call it God, others fate, destiny, or providence, and still others use several of these names—having been silent until then and covered up by society, would raise its head and voice, enter the stage of history, establish itself as its ruler, and demand that society be demolished and community repeated (Fritsche 1999: 68-124). For instance, the Roman Catholic Scheler published shortly after the beginning of World War I a book of almost 500 pages, Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (The Genius of War and the German War), an enthusiastic hymn on the war which God had sent to cancel society and re-realize through the Germans the Catholic love-community (see Fritsche 1999: 87-92). Using Schicksal where Heidegger has Geschick, the first sentence of this book runs thus:

When, at the beginning of the month of August, our German fate [unser deutsches Schicksa] took its stand before us [vor uns hintra] like a single immense dark question and shook each individual to the core—the same fate that only a few weeks ago lay before us like a

15 See my footnote 2.
straight and well-built path and that simply embraced us without being noticed and with the insouciance and self-evidence of the space around us—it was just one single answer that echoed from all German souls [nur eine Antwort, die aus allen deutschen Seelen zurücktönte], one raised arm: Forward to sword and to victory! (see Fritsche 1999: 91)\textsuperscript{16}

This sentence, too, clearly shows that fate or destiny is not produced by those whose fate it is; that it rather precedes them; that without being noticed it embraces or guides them; and that at some point it makes itself known to them and raises demands that shall be obeyed, in this case to launch a war in order to re-realize the Catholic love-community (see also the context of the quote [Fritsche 1999: 90-92]). It was a commonplace among rightists that being-with-one-another in general or “authentic” being-with-one-another in particular was not a matter of subjects, of individuals as persons, of society (e.g., Tönnies 1957: 37-40, 64-67 = Tönnies 1979: 7-10, 34-36).

Fully in this vein, Heidegger says, for instance, in a speech in May 1934, “community [is produced through] allegiance, the binding of oneself to the will of the leader [i.e., Hitler, J. F.]” and not through “society as a unit reckoned together out of singulars [die aus Einzeln zusammengerechnete Einheit der Gesellschaft]” (Heidegger 2000a: 284; see Fritsche 2014: 314).\textsuperscript{17} In addition, it was a commonplace that destiny, the main player in history, is certainly not dependent on individuals and their fates. Heidegger makes these two points by using this time around a variation of Tönnies’ formula for community (“does not put itself together out of [its parts]”; Tönnies: “is not put together by the parts”; see my section 3 and the beginning of my section 4). Destiny (or, as Scheler says in the quoted passage, fate) is not dependent on the individuals; to the contrary it guides their fates—just as in Scheler, before and after it makes itself known to the individuals—as

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\textsuperscript{16} Sheehan makes fun of Fritsche’s language of the “call of destiny / fate” (Sheehan 2016: 501; see 485, 490; “call for help” is in no way my main formula). It has obviously evaded him that, according to rightists, to call is what God and destiny have been doing in German language and history—so much so that one need not say it explicitly. For instance, the assumption that fate, when it tell itself mit, calls is presupposed in the above quote from Scheler by the phrase, “that simply embraced us without being noticed and […]”, (because this sentence implies that, before the beginning of August, fate was silent and did not talk) and by the phrase, “just one single answer that echoed from all German souls,” for an answer presupposes an utterance to which it answers.

In his list of the members of “the chorus of callers” (Sheehan 2016: 501) in §74, Sheehan ignores my analysis of the different steps in §74 (Fritsche 1999: 1-28, 37-68; see the summary 124-142). He maintains that §74 follows the same trajectory as the call of conscience in the section on conscience (§§54-60) does and is its last step (Sheehan 2016: 494-98, Sheehan 2015a: 158-188). However, as he himself notes, the word “call” does not occur at all in §74 (Sheehan 2016: 494). Thus, it is possible that the call of destiny in §74 (which need not be explicitly mentioned but which is acknowledged in Heidegger’s sentence with “erwidert” [see the end of my section 2]) is wholly different from the call of conscience. However, as I pointed out, §74 is indeed the last step within one and the same narrative and therefore the call of conscience and the one of destiny will not be unrelated to each other and might even be the same at different stages of the narrative. Sheehan’s authentic Dasein is concerned only about itself (“Dasein is being loyal to nothing other than itself, its own ex-sistence” [Sheehan 2016: 496]). In his utterly naïve, because exclusively Christian-Augustian (with a dash of Sartre, of course), interpretation of anxiety, running forward into (and not anticipation of) death (see Fritsche 1999: 1-7 and often; Fritsche 2014: 301-29), and the call of conscience in Sein und Zeit (Sheehan 2015a: 158-78), Sheehan completely misses all those features by means of which Heidegger makes clear that running forward into death and the authentic understanding of the call of conscience open up not only Dasein’s own authentic possibilities but also those of the other Daseins and are indeed a first step, but a step into the community of the people. In the 1930s, Heidegger adduced as examples of his notion of running forward into death the German soldiers in World War I who, in his view, fought for National Socialism. This is the non-trivial side of his theory of death, a right-wing call for solidarity, against the “jealous agreements / arrangements / settlements / stipulations [eifersichtigen Verabredungen]” of the liberals and the “talkative fraternizing [redeligen Verbröderungen]” on the left (BTS: 274 = SZ: 298; addition of the three words before “stipulations” is mine, J. F.) (see Fritsche 1999: 236f. [endn. 17], Fritsche 2012: 262-66, 272-74, Fritsche 2014: 57-70, 301-29).

\textsuperscript{17} For the life-long foe of democracy, liberalism, and “Americanism,” Heidegger, the ratification of the U.S. Constitution of 1789 was most probably an example of the constitution of a society and not of a community.
Heidegger says in the second of the three sentences on destiny, another commonplace among rightists (see the beginning of my section 4). Finally, at some point in time destiny teilt sich mit, communicates itself to Dasein, and enters openly the stage of history to call the individuals into the Kampf. Thus, it and its power are appropriately the grammatical subjects of the first and the third sentence (and it is for many right-wingers self-evidently the actor in the second sentence) and not “we” as in Sheehan’s perversion of the whole passage. In this case, too, one sentence is enough because Heidegger can rely on that at least those who know the relevant literature know what he is talking about, especially since in the next step of the narrative he elaborates on this Kampf: it is an Erwiderung in the sense of compliance with the command of the Volksgemeinschaft to re-realize it by a destruction, a Widerruf, of society—or, more precisely, to re-realize the “spirit” of community (or, in Tönnies’ Aristotelean vocabulary, its “form”) and the destruction of the “spirit” (or of the “form”) of society (SZ: 386.4-6 = BTM: 438.1-4; see the end of my section 2); in other words, Heidegger was, like Hitler and Scheler a revolutionary rightist, one who claimed that the repeated community could, and should, integrate parts that, historically, had emerged along with society, in the first place modern technology as opposed to nostalgic rightists who wanted to repeat the community in the way it had been when it was real (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 124-142; for “spirit” see Fritsche 1999: XII, 18-21, 70, 127-29, 134f).

In brief, Heidegger summarizes here what rightists perceived as the kairos-situation of World War I and the Weimar Republic. It fits into the picture that, during his tenure as rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger frequently used the word Kampf for his activities (see, e.g., Fritsche 1999: 189 with 308 [endn. 1], Heidegger 2000a: 96, 98, 99, 114, 772) and said, for instance, in a speech in May 1934—almost exactly one year after the so-called Bücherverbrennung, the burning of the books written by Jews and of other “un-German” literature on May 10, 1933, in twenty-two German university-cities or -towns—that everything related to the pseudo-world of the Weimar Republic “must be burned all the way down to the last and most hidden branches [bis in seine letzten und verstecktesten Äste ausgebrannt]” (Heidegger 2000a: 282). In addition, πόλεμος (war, battle, contest) in Heraclitus’ fragment B 53 is, as Heidegger claims in 1933/34, not about “friendly opponents” but about the “foe [Feind]”; the foe within a people is much more dangerous than a foe outside of the people, and the Germans have “to launch the attack on a long-term basis with the goal of the total annihilation [völligen Vernichtung] of the foe,”20 this foe being most probably the Jews, for Heidegger the incarnation of society (see Fritsche 2016b).

In the lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics in summer 1935, he formulates the same idea of a revolution thus:

As the breach [Breche] for the opening up [Eröffnung] of Being in beings—a Being that has been set to work—the Dasein of historical humanity is an in-eident, the incident in which

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18 Sheehan finds my talk of heritage, destiny, or the Volksgemeinschaft providing “slots” for the individuals weird (Sheehan 2016: 501). It goes without saying that I don’t mean that Heidegger assumes that destiny guides, or determines, every single step of an individual. Rather, it is a matter of, say, that one becomes aware whether one belongs to the two or three philosophy professors that alone, according to Heidegger, shall be kept in Nazi-Germany (Fritsche 1999: 142) or to which of the three services that Heidegger distinguishes in his rectorate address one belongs. Since destiny is not at the mercy of individuals and their fates, pace Sheehan (Sheehan 2013: 383, Sheehan 2016: 508 n. 76) Faye is right when he says as a paraphrase of the first of the three sentences on destiny that it does not reposer on the individual fates.

19 See my footnote 9.

the violent powers of the released [losgebundenen] excessive violence of Being suddenly emerge [aufgehen] and go to work as history [ins Werk als Geschichte eingeht]. (Heidegger 2000: 174 = Heidegger 1983: 172)

Dasein as historical humanity has not freely forged this Being. Rather, in *Introduction to Metaphysics* and in Heidegger’s entire history of Being from its beginning around 1932 until the end of his career, it is Being itself or *Geschick* that delivers a revolution and a new epoch, and it does so, as the passage on *Geschick* and the entire §74 show, already in *Sein und Zeit*. That’s why Heidegger can shortly after Hitler’s “seizure of power” say that now, as he had “anticipated” it in *Sein und Zeit*, “our understanding of Being is thoroughly changing from the ground up” (Heidegger 2001: 255) or that now “our Dasein has begun to ground itself in a different way of Being,” namely in “care” (Heidegger 2000a: 205) (see Fritsche 1999: 207-10). It is “Being itself” (Heidegger 2000: 174 = Heidegger 1983: 171) that *aufgeht, sich mitteilt, sich eröffnet, or ins Werk als Geschichte eingeht*, all these phrases being variations of the noun *Geschehen* that he uses in *Sein und Zeit* for the happening of the revolution. The word “losgebunden” (literally, “unbound [from the shackles by which it had been bound until then]”) implies, just like the expression *wird frei*, that Being and its excessive violence already exist before the moment in which they are released. In *Sein und Zeit* as well as in *Introduction to Metaphysics* and Heidegger’s history of Being in general, it is *Schein* (seeming) that in a “forgetting of a forgetting” (Fritsche 1999: 204 and often) keeps Being bound. In *Sein und Zeit*, in particular, Heidegger emphasizes—just as Scheler had done (Fritsche 1999: 106-8)—that *Geschick* or the community of the people already announces itself in some scattered phenomena and silent calls under the surface which the They, seeming, or society tries to neutralize and render insignificant (see in the summary Fritsche 1999: 130-32) before it finally “constitutes itself / puts itself together” (SZ: 383; Staumbaugh’s “is […] constituted” [BTS: 351] turns in the spirit of the American interpretation of §74 the sentence upside down [see Fritsche 1999: 263 {endn. 2}]) out of these phenomena and establishes itself as the main player in history, with “constitutes itself” as another name for the *Geschehen* of the revolution (see Fritsche 1999: 43-67).

Being *eröffnet sich* and makes Dasein its agent and executor, as Heidegger elaborates upon in *Introduction to Metaphysics* after the citation with the breach in an interpretation of ψόσις (apprehension) and λόγος (logos) in Parmenides and Heraclitus. If one replaces in his summary of this line of thought and of his interpretation of Parmenides and Heraclitus (Heidegger 2000: 185 = Heidegger 1983: 182) “λόγος” with “heritage [Erbe],” “the gatheredness of Being [Gesammelheit des Seins]” with “authentic historizing of the German people,” “Selective ‘gleaning’ [auslesende ‘Lesen’]” with “Erwiderung and Widerruf,” “Being [Sein]” with “the German Volksgemeinschaft,” and “seeming [Schein]” with “liberal and democratic Gesellschaft,” the summary is an excellent abstract of §74 of *Sein und Zeit* (see Fritsche 1999: 199-203)—stand at attention, Sheehan, Pégny’s Being as Deckname is looking at you (or läßt grüssen [sends its regards]) (see also Fritsche 2014: 207-210 and Fritsche 2016c).

6. Sheehan’s “Coda” and “Notes” on Fritsche

Sheehan does not discuss anything in these two sections either. Rather, as though he were an automatic puppet or a shooting-machine, he just says, “wrong” (Sheehan 2016: 517f.) followed by a negation of my claim or a repetition of his own opinion. One of these repetitions, however, is very longwinded and comes in several steps, the one on the translation of the word *Boden-"
losigkeit (absence of soil, groundlessness), which Heidegger uses in Sein und Zeit eight times. In my first paper on Sheehan, I have shown that he is wrong in his claim that Heidegger always means the groundlessness of a philosophical position. Rather, one just has to look up the respective sentences to realize at first sight and without any thought that in five or even seven cases Heidegger uses it as the label for what he regards to be the uprootedness of the (modern) They and that he uses it only once for the groundlessness of a philosophical position, at which point, in addition, he qualifies the word ("lack of ontological foundation [ontologische Bodenlosigkeit]" [BT 412 n. 19 = SZ: 320 n. 19), quite obviously to indicate that this is a special usage (Fritsche 2016: 434-40). In addition, I argue that, as it evades Sheehan, the occurrences of Bodenlosigkeit, Entwurzelung (uprootedness), and Bodenständigkeit (the having-of-a-firm-stand-on-the-Boden, the opposite of Bodenlosigkeit) in Sein und Zeit mark the intrusion of right-wing parlance into the philosophical vocabulary (Fritsche 2016: 434-40). Finally, I support Faye’s French translation of Bodenlosigkeit as absence de sol (absence of soil) when the word occurs, as it does in Heidegger, in politically right-wing texts (Fritsche 2016: 440-42). Sheehan does not present any of these three points, let alone discuss them. Rather, he continues, like a cornered child, his senseless tirade, begun in his paper on Faye (Sheehan 2015: 384-86), about an instance of Bodenlosigkeit in a citation from Count Yorck (SZ: 401.2 = BTS: 366.3)—as though this sentence of that Count would be of any relevance to what according to Sheehan himself (Sheehan 2016: 482) is at stake, namely the relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and his National Socialism and anti-Semitism.

Sheehan deals in the paper from 2016 with Bodenlosigkeit for the first time in the part on Pégny where he repeats his charges against Faye (Sheehan 2016: 505f.) and ascribes to me the opinion that, in the two occurrences of Boden in volumes 17 and 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, the word means “the earth as arable soil” (Sheehan 2016: 506), even though I have at no point in my paper from 2016 or anywhere else talked about these two instances. He refers as proof of his claim to Fritsche 2016: 438.39 (Sheehan 2016: 506 n. 69) where, however, I refer to usages of Boden in which the word definitely means “the earth as arable soil” in a speech of Heidegger’s from 1925 and in a passage in his Black Notebooks from shortly after Hitler’s “seizure of power” both of which I had quoted earlier (Fritsche 2016: 435). In addition, he says with reference to Fritsche 2016: 437.28-37 that “[e]ven Fritsche accepts ‘groundlessness’” (Sheehan 2016: 505 n. 65) as the appropriate English translation of Bodenlosigkeit in Sein und Zeit. The strategic aspect of this remark becomes obvious in his second treatment of Bodenlosigkeit, in “2.1.2 Coda: On Fritsche’s Mistranslation of Bodenlosigkeit” (Sheehan 2016: 507).

Here he says that I am “irredeemably wrong” (Sheehan 2016: 507) about the citation from Count Yorck in SZ: 401.2 (= BTS: 366.3), and this on four accounts, for there is “absolutely no evidence” 1) that “Heidegger used Bodenlosigkeit at all in §§77”; 2) that he “used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ to mean ‘absence of soil’”; 3) that he “used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ as a slur against Jews”; and 4) that “Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg […] used either Bodenlosigkeit or bodenlos in §§77 as a racial slur directed at Jews for their alleged lack of ‘rootedness in the soil’” (Sheehan 2016: 507). Thus, if “[e]ven” the native speaker of German, Fritsche, accepts “groundlessness” as the appropriate English translation of Bodenlosigkeit in Sein und Zeit, the Frenchman Pégny should do so, too; and if Pégny and Fritsche have to recognize that Bodenlosigkeit in the quote from Count Yorck does not mean “absence of soil,” Pégny and Fritsche have to admit that they are wrong and that, rather, Sheehan is right with his claim that Bodenlosigkeit means everywhere in Sein und Zeit “groundlessness,” the groundlessness, in addition, of a philosophical position. Sheehan does not give any reference to any text of mine except in a note at the end of 4):
“Fritsche goes so far as to say ‘the soil [!] of Being and Time is völkisch’: Fritsche 1999: XV.29.” (Sheehan 2016: 507 n. 74) This sentence of eight words is his proof that I entertain 1), 2), 3), and 4) and not only that but even go further. Readers of pages XVf. in the Preface of Fritsche 1999 will see that I don’t make there any claim regarding Heidegger’s usage of Bodenlosigkeit and that I compare the decontextualizing Heidegger interpretations after World War II and in Deconstructionism with gardeners who arbitrarily relocate plants in order, for my part, to plea for a philology of humility that studies the plants in their native habitat.

Sheehan cannot give any reference because I have never said any of these things. First, I mention in Fritsche 2016 Sheehan’s obsession with the quotation from Count Yorck (Fritsche 2016: 434), but I don’t discuss at any point, neither in Fritsche 2016 nor anywhere else, this quote or any other aspect of §77. Thus, it is impossible that I say that 1) Heidegger uses Bodenlosigkeit in §77 or 4) that Count Yorck uses it in §77 as a racial slur (Sheehan 2016: 507). Second, in Fritsche 2016: 437.28-37 and its context I quote in Macquarrie’s and Robinson’s translation the passages containing Bodenlosigkeit to probe Sheehan’ claim that Heidegger uses it always in the sense of the groundlessness of a philosophical position. As I already mentioned, one sees at first sight and without any thought that Sheehan is wrong. In addition, one sees this without being in any way in need to decide what Boden in Bodenlosigkeit in these instances means. For the several reasons that I adduce, I say that it is probable that, when Heidegger uses Bodenlosigkeit for the They, he privately—or “esoterically” (Fritsche 2016: 439)—thinks also or even mainly of not-being-rooted-in-the-soil, but I don’t say anywhere 2) that Heidegger “used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ to mean ‘absence of soil’” (Sheehan 2016: 507). In addition, I quote in Fritsche 2016 a remark of Heidegger in his Black Notebooks on the Bodenlosigkeit of the Jews (Fritsche 2016: 435f.), but I don’t say at any point, neither in Fritsche 2016 nor anywhere else, that 3) he uses “Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ as a slur against Jews” (Sheehan 2016: 507). It speaks, by the way, neither against authors nor against interpreters if, in such cases, they don’t want to, or cannot, fully specify the meaning of a word. Everyone knows that, in everyday life, the humanities, and in politics, a word that is used polemically often gets ridiculous if its meaning is highly specified.

As though these two rounds were not enough, Sheehan returns to the issue in his “Notes” on me, recycles four times the Yorck quote (Sheehan 2016: 517, 517, 518, 518), and cites me: “Sheehan does not tell us what Harries said about the meaning of Bodenlosigkeit.” (Sheehan 2016: 517; I have “readers,” not “us” [Fritsche 2016: 440]) My sentence refers to Sheehan’s remark in his paper on Faye that, in a private conversation in the context of a conference on the Black Notebooks in New York in September 2014, “Professor Karsten Harries, who is a native speaker of German [...] pointed out the meaning of Bodenlosigkeit to Faye” and thus “demolished Faye’s claim about ‘absence of soil’ on elementary philological grounds” (Sheehan 2015: 383). Sheehan manages (even without saying anything about the weather on that remarkable evening in Midtown Manhattan) to spend a quarter of a page informing readers about inessential aspects of that conversation (“dinner at ‘Stella 34 Trattoria’ (151 W 34th St.)” [Sheehan 2016: 517]) to conclude: “For further details Fritsche might want to contact Karsten Harries” (Sheehan 2016: 518), followed by Harries’ postal address in Connecticut. Indeed, it would be interesting to hear Professor Harries, not the least because—to engage on my part once in that sort of nitpicking that Sheehan seems to love and in which he gets so much wrong—Sheehan seems to have misunderstood him. While in Sheehan’s paper on Faye, Harries explained “the meaning of Bodenlosigkeit” (Sheehan 2015: 383), in the paper on Pégny, Rastier, and me he just pointed out that the “correct translation” of “Bodenlosigkeit (SZ: 401.2 [the Count Yorck quote, J. F.])” is “groundlessness” and
not “absence of soil” (Sheehan 2016: 517). Anyway, scholarship à la Sheehan means obviously to pervert Heidegger’s German vocabulary and text, to pervert secondary literature through omissions, manipulations, and absurd allegations, and to insult and ridicule authors who—in contrast to his authoritarian procedure, with the support of arguments—offer something that lies beyond his horizon.

7. Conclusion

As I explained in the preceding section, in my first paper on Sheehan I have shown that all his claims regarding Heidegger’s usage of Bodenlosigkeit and related issues in Sein und Zeit in his paper on Faye are false (Fritsche 2016: 434-42). As to §74 of Sein und Zeit, Sheehan misquotes Heidegger and has a backfiring apparition of Goethe. In addition, like almost all American interpreters since Richardson’s book from 1963, he claims, in the “spirit” of the American self-made man, that Heidegger says that Dasein creates its own Schicksal (fate). Sheehan is aware that such usage flies flatly in the face of its normal one, for in everyday parlance Schicksal is used for something that one better accepts since it is inescapable (and, for rightists, to accept one’s fate relieves Dasein from the burden of liberal autonomy and opens up a world of trust, love, etc., the world of the Volksgemeinschaft [community of the people]). Sheehan tries to smooth away this oddity by claiming that Heidegger used Schicksal with the word schicklich in view. However, he obviously does not understand this word (Fritsche 2016: 430-34). In sum, since each of the points Sheehan adduces speaks against him and for Faye, his critique of Faye’s interpretation of Sein und Zeit and therefore—according to his own assessment (Sheehan 2015: 383; see Fritsche 2016: 443 n. 2)—of Faye’s book as a whole lacks any foundation.

Heidegger uses in §74 Schicksal with regard to the individual and Geschick (destiny) for the community. Geschick is the coming out of the Volksgemeinschaft as the main player in history, and it demands that the Daseins cancel society and repeat, re-realize, the Volksgemeinschaft. In my current paper, it turns out that, according to Sheehan (who might have been alerted to the notion of destiny only through Faye’s book), Heidegger also says that the Daseins freely forge their destiny, their common fate. In this case, too, Sheehan is aware that such usage is the opposite of its usual one, in which Geschick means, just as fate, something inescapable, but this time around he does not make any effort to soften this peculiarity. What is more, as in the case of Schicksal and Geschick based on a consistently “subjectivist” misreading of Heidegger’s vocabulary that turns it upside down, he claims that Heidegger employs not just Schicksal and Geschick but also all the other key terms in §74 (Überlieferung, Gewesen, and Wiederholung) in ways that are the direct opposite of their everyday meanings or otherwise highly unfamiliar—even though Heidegger uses all these terms in Sein und Zeit outside of §74 in their everyday understanding and even though, in §74, he indicates at no point that he would use any of them in an extraordinary fashion. This is extremely improbable or simply impossible. In addition, even if one grants Sheehan Heidegger’s private language, his interpretation is, as I showed with reference to the three sentences on Geschick in §74, also for other reasons highly unlikely or impossible. By contrast, my interpretation of §74 does not require any private language on Heidegger’s part and fulfills all the other criteria regarding which Sheehan fails. (In addition, I pointed out some of Sheehan’s numerous absurd insinuations regarding my interpretations and his [most probably, deliberate mishandlings of quotes.] Hence, being wrong about all the issues he adduces, his critique of my book is entirely void as well.

42
As to the issue of translation, Macquarrie, Robinson, and Stambaugh have, *pace* Sheehan, properly translated the terms on his (in part, incorrect) list (Sheehan 2016: 486f.). In fact, they have mistranslated in the spirit of the self-made man some sentences in §74 and thereby paved the way for its “American” interpretation. However, in these cases Sheehan did not interfere but adopted their mistranslations. Has Sheehan through his own translations and interpretation guided scholars out of the dark into which, in his view, Macquarrie, Robinson, and Stambaugh “have misled [them] for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487)? In no way, to the contrary—unless one says that, with his interpretations of fate along the lines of a midlife crisis and of destiny as pertaining to issues, such as the founding of a rabbit breeders association, readers have reached the end of the wood-path of triviality where one can no longer avoid the thought that this cannot have been what the epochal thinker had reserved for, as Sheehan says, the “emphatic climax” (Sheehan 2015: 381) of his most influential work.

As Sheehan informs readers in the Foreword of *Making Sense of Heidegger*, his three sons suggested that it is about time that I move on beyond the narrow confines of Heidegger scholarship into the wider world of philosophical discourse and into the arguably more pressing issues—economic, social, and political—that call for one’s attention. (Sheehan 2015a: XIII)

Having finished his chef-d’œuvre, seventy-five years old Sheehan feels up to the task:

I agree. But I want to be sure that when I move beyond Heidegger, it is *Heidegger* that I am moving beyond, and not a caricature of his philosophy. (Sheehan 2015a: XIII)

To honor the impact of William J. Richardson, S. J., on him Sheehan adapts Alexander Pope (“Nature and Nature’s Laws lay hid in Night / God said, ‘Let Newton be!’ and all was light.”):

Heidegger and all his works lay hid in night.
God said “Let Richardson be!” and all was light. (Sheehan 2015a: XI)

Here is another adaptation:

Heidegger and all the world lay deep in sorrow.
God said “Let Sheehan come,
and things will be fine by tomorrow!”

Sheehan contributes, with the full force of italics, an insight to the theory of interpretation:

Having German as one’s native tongue is not always an advantage with Heidegger’s philosophy, and it can even be a disadvantage. Over and above a command of German, one must also have a *philosophical understanding* of what Heidegger’s technical terms denote when they diverge from their ordinary German meanings. And that understanding is precisely what Fritsche lacks. (Sheehan 2016: 487)²¹

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²¹ Sheehan makes no effort to explain how he recognizes when Heidegger’s usage of a word differs from common parance. Given his blessed hermeneutical incompetence and arrogance, he would probably not be able to say anything reasonable on this issue.
As one sees, his three sons have, hermeneutically, something more substantial to offer: when one knows only one thing, one knows nothing—not the self nor the They in which one is living, nor the author to whom one has dedicated one’s professional life and of whose work one has produced a trivial “caricature” (Sheehan 2015a: XIII), a strawman of one’s own prejudgments.

Being, as though he were the most naïve analytic philosopher imaginable, completely deaf to the problems that in particular the internationally well-known philosopher and Heidegger student Hans-Georg Gadamer has developed in his writings none of which occurs in the bibliography of Making Sense of Heidegger, Sheehan makes fun of Fritsche for allegedly assuming that, again with italics, “it would take over seventy years before the true meaning of SZ would finally [...] spring fully from the forehead of Professor Fritsche” (Sheehan 2016: 503). As to the political aspects of Sein und Zeit, I have addressed this issue in an article on Karl Löwith and suggested some more aspects in Geschichtlichkeit und Nationalsozialismus in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Fritsche 2014: 299–300). I don’t mention there the main reason regarding the “many diligent scholars” (Sheehan 2016: 503) in the United States of America, namely their limited horizon comprising only authors, such as Derrida and Nietzsche (or, for that matter, Jesus Christ and St. Augustine), but without the type of literature one needs to know to discuss the political implications of Heidegger’s texts. Sheehan is a case in point. The aggressive self-complacency that each page of his papers breathes, his cheating in the cheapest and silliest ways, and the other features that I mentioned at the beginning of my paper certainly don’t help—it is sad to see an old man close to the end of his career ruin whatever reputation he has.

Hopefully, Sheehan is deliberately lying with all his false accusations against Faye et al. (To vary that French bon mot [Sheehan 2016: 516], better a scoundrel than an idiot.) Streetwalking (“faire le trottoir” [Sheehan 2016: 514 n. 90] as, according to Sheehan, Rastier does for Faye) for the Nazi and anti-Semitic Heidegger and cynically relying on that hardly anyone checks citations, he simply wants to discredit Faye et al. and administer two heavy-duty feel-well shots for all those of his fellow Heideggerians who are distressed by the political conviction and racism of their hero.

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22 It has apparently evaded Sheehan (see Sheehan 2016: 519) that the idea of the self-made man is ingrained in the They of the United States of America. He rather seems to assume that Heidegger was the first to articulate it—from the viewpoint of a theology well established in some areas of the American They, in theologically correct fashion, namely with special emphasis on the finitude and mortality of Dasein—and that he, Sheehan, is (with some help from Richardson [Richardson 2003: 90–93], to whom he also owes the perversion of the notion of Schicksal [see Sheehan 2016: 493]), the first to recognize this brilliant thought of the thinker. Sheehan is most certainly not aware either that the idea of the “ugly American”—of which, judged according to his papers on Faye et al., he is certainly an excellent example—is widespread in many Theys outside the United States. For instance, here in Istanbul my wife and I are most often the only ones to defend them and say good things about their citizens.

23 Being a professor of philosophy only by courtesy, Sheehan checks the professional pedigree of “The Twenty-One” (Sheehan 2016: 524) who signed Rastier’s “An Open Letter” (Rastier 2016): there are professors of semiotics etc. but only four professors of philosophy (Sheehan 2016: 525) Two of them, Fritsche and Quesada, have written a book on Heidegger, but are incompetent (Sheehan 2016: 525), and “neither Ferraris nor Azzarà has a book on Heidegger” (Sheehan 2016: 525). Thus, in Sheehan’s beloved italics, “none of them has published a philosophical monograph on Heidegger, i.e., a book that would pass muster as philosophy.” (Sheehan 2016: 525) To work on Heidegger one has to have written a book on him, a philosophical one, and have read him throughout one’s professional life. Obviously, Sheehan is incapable of acknowledging the advice of his sons. In German, one would call him a Fachidioten, an expert-idiot, an idiot of an expert, or something like that. More importantly, it has completely evaded the letter that was in the first place about something else, namely about academic conduct or civilized behaviour in general. Sheehan will declare that one has to have written a philosophical book on Heidegger to say something on this issue.

24 See my footnote 14.

25 In a paper from 1995, I showed that Heidegger was by no means silent about the Holocaust but rather tried in “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954) to “silence Auschwitz silently” (Fritsche 1995: 155). The Black Note-
For any impartial observer, Sheehan’s two boorish and fraudulent papers are, ethically and scholarly, certainly *unter aller Sau* (extremely bad; literally, below each and any sow), a disgrace to any serious journal. Nevertheless, the editor of *Philosophy Today*, Peg Birmingham, published them, the second already in the same issue as my paper to which it responds; she initially refused to publish a response of mine to his second paper, and if Sheehan wishes so, readers of *Philosophy Today* will have to endure a further paper of his. I, for my part, will most probably not respond to any future text of Sheehan on Faye et al. unless he honors proper academic conduct. Sheehan labels “this important debate” (Birmingham 2016: 427) “L’affaire Faye” (Sheehan 2016: 481). It should better be called “The affaire Sheehan / Birmingham”—Thomas Sheehan, the toothless pit bull and Donald Trump of American Heideggerianism? Or, for the professor of religious studies and expert at theologians in the Heideggerian cast, as one more Pope knockoff and in vindication of his propagation of his idea about Fritsche’s scatological humor:

Heidegger’s NS and anti-Semitism
lay deeply hid
until FF and others
removed the lid.
God said: “S***!
I’ll send my gorgeous pit-bull team
and Heidegger’s fans will happily beam.”

To end on a pleasant note, Reiner Schürmann was, along with Derrida, the only truly creative amongst the Heideggerians, and he had, as he told me once, his opinion about Sheehan: Shanne Marks is producing a documentary on Schürmann (working title: “Traces of Reiner Schürmann”). Anyone who thinks they could contribute something might contact her at kylemore38@hotmail.com.

**Postscript**

After the publication of Sheehan’s paper on Faye (Sheehan 2015) in *Philosophy Today* 59(3) (2015), the editor, Peg Birmingham, published in *Philosophy Today* 59(4) an open letter by François Rastier et al. (Rastier 2015) and in *Philosophy Today* 60(2) (2016) Gaëtan Pégny’s response to Sheehan 2015 (Pégny 2016) and Fritsche’s response to Sheehan 2015 (Fritsche 2016). In the same issue, she already published a paper of Sheehan (Sheehan 2016) with his attack on Fritsche 1999 (Fritsche’s book on Heidegger from 1999) and his response to Fritsche 2016, Pégny 2016, and Rastier 2016. Since Faye’s response to Sheehan 2015 was also scheduled for *Philosophy Today* 60(2) (see Birmingham 2016: 427), Sheehan and Birmingham most probably thought that, in Sheehan 2016, Sheehan would respond not only to Rastier et al., Pégny, and Fritsche but also to Faye and, in this

books confirm my argument (see Fritsche 2016b). According to my experience, Heideggerians and deconstructionists are incomparably more prone to (consciously) mishandle and even pervert quotes. The latest confirmation of this impression one owes to Peter Trawny, the editor of the *Blak Notebooks* and, just like Sheehan, a “silent listener[s]” (Sheehan 2016: 517) to the conversation in which Harries “demolished […] on elementary philological grounds” (Sheehan 2015: 383) Faye’s claim regarding *Bodenlosigkeit*. Heidegger writes in the *Black Notebooks* around 1938/9 that his insight into his deception about the essence and historical role of the empirical National Socialism of his days has led him to the recognition of the “true,” timeless, National Socialism. In other words, in 1938/9 he discovered the “true” National Socialism and became the true National Socialist. Trawny presents this passage as Heidegger’s abandonment of each and any National Socialism (see Fritsche 2016a: 593-94).

20 See my footnote 3.
way, have the last word. However, this plan did not work out since Faye’s rejoinder to Sheehan 2015 was not ready in time (see Birmingham 2016: 427) and will be published only in Philosophy Today 60(4). In July 2016 Birmingham refused Fritsche’s request to publish a response of his to Sheehan 2016, about which he informed the members of the editorial board of Philosophy Today and her colleagues at the Department of Philosophy at DePaul University, the official publisher of Philosophy Today. In August, she allowed Fritsche a rejoinder of 14 pages. When he sent her the current paper cut down to 10,700 words (and without “Birmingham” in the title), she refused to publish it unless he shortens it by 2,000 words and—in light of her editorial note (Birmingham 2016: 427), a clear case of censorship—completely deletes its last paragraph (“Hopefully […] at kylemore38@hotmail.com.”); with “leaning” and “to endure a third paper of his on what he labels” in the place of “conviction” and of “to endure a further paper of his. I, for […] (Birmingham 2016: 427)” and the notes and the phrases “as, according […] Faye,” “literally, […] sow,” “Or, for […] beam,” and “as he […] once” as later additions). Subsequently, she rejected as well his suggestion to publish the 10,700-word paper without that last paragraph. At the end of “this important debate” (Birmingham 2016: 427), Pégny, Rastier, and Fritsche will each have one paper only (Pégny 2016, Rastier 2016, Fritsche 2016), without the opportunity to respond to Sheehan’s response to them, Faye will have one paper only as well (namely his response to Sheehan’s 2015 to be published in Philosophy Today 60[4]), Sheehan has already two, namely his attack on Faye (Sheehan 2015) and his response to Pégny, Rastier, and Fritsche (Sheehan 2016), and Philosophy Today will, if he wishes so, publish a third paper of his, his response to Faye’s response to Sheehan 2015 (and to whomever else he wants to respond once more).

Bibliography

Note the abbreviations I use for Heidegger 1962, 1972, and 1996.


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September 10, 2017

Abstract: Philosophy Today published in 2016 my reply to Thomas Sheehan’s polemic against Emmanuel Faye’s book on Heidegger’s National Socialism (2009; French Original 2005) and—already in the same issue—Sheehan’s response to my paper and his polemic against my book Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1999; German edition 2014). He claims that I get everything wrong regarding §74 of Being and Time. Since Philosophy Today refused to publish my response to this paper, I have uploaded a much longer version of it on my account with academia.edu (see also the webpage of my department), “The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham: Fritsche’s Rülpser on Heidegger’s Being and Time” (~ 22,000 words), in which I show that, relying on an interpretation of §74 that is as banal as it is philologically and hermeneutically wholly arbitrary and false, Sheehan gets everything wrong. In addition, I point out a few of Sheehan’s numerous, in part utterly bizarre allegations and manipulations which are, hopefully, consciously fraudulent. In the current paper (~ 5,000 words), I summarize the paper of 22,000 words, and add some new points.

Keywords: Being and Time, community, historicity, Johannes Fritsche, Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, Rülpser, Thomas Sheehan, society

Sheehan and I agree in that §74 forms the “emphatic climax” (Sheehan 2015: 381) of Being and Time. However, our interpretations could not be more different. Being and Time consists of two divisions. I argue in Fritsche 1999, 2014, and various papers (e.g., Fritsche 2012) that, in each of the existentialia in Division One, Heidegger presents modernity as a decay, and that, in §26, he summarizes the theories of community and society of his time, including the normative claim that the replacement of community with society in modernity is a downward plunge (and he adds an anticipation of a rightist revolution). One of the two dominating themes of Division Two is, How to get out of this decay? In §74, Heidegger summarizes the rightist theories on revolution: at some point in the downward plunge Geschick (destiny) raises its voice and demands the destruction of society and the revitalization of community, for National Socialists the Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people). The individuals have to accept Geschick and act accordingly, and an individual has to accept its individual destiny as well, its Schicksal (fate), for rightists the promise to be released from the burden of bourgeois autonomy, egotism, and loneliness. Heidegger uses Geschick and Schicksal in its conventional meaning in German language: only foolish people try to evade destiny and fate. As Scheler put it, “fate—not choice” (see Fritsche 1999: 143). Heidegger makes clear that he belongs to the revolutionary Rightists, those who, in contrast to nostalgic Rightists, maintain that the revitalized community can incorporate achievements that have emerged simultaneously with society. In addition, he inserts a vote for the community of the people.

As most of the other American commentators, Sheehan sees no specific theory of history in Being and Time. According to him, Heidegger develops in Division One, among other issues,
the theory of the They, and in §74 he shows how, stepping out of the They, an individual freely chooses his or her individual Schicksal and several individuals their Geschick, their common fate. Thus, for Sheehan the individuals are the only actors while, for me, destiny and the community turn out to be the main players. In addition, for him the past occurs only as a pool out of which authentic individuals freely choose one or the other of the possibilities while, for me, as the main player it claims to be re-realized (see Fritsche 2016a: 10-12, 14-17).

In this paper, I summarize in Part 1 my first paper on Sheehan (Fritsche 2016), in Parts 2 and 3 my second (Fritsche 2016a), and in Part 4 Sheehan’s methods in Sheehan 2016.

1. Summary of Fritsche 2016: Sheehan’s critique of Faye

In his paper on Faye, Sheehan displays a truly disturbing unfamiliarity with Heidegger’s text and a frightening inability of understanding even simple phrases. He claims that Heidegger means by the word Bodenlosigkeit (absence/lack of ground/soil) in Being and Time always the groundlessness of a philosophical position. However, everyone sees at first sight that Heidegger means in at least five of the eight occurrences what he regards to be the uprootedness of the (modern) They and in only one case a groundlessness of a philosophical theory, where, in addition, he indicates that this is a special usage of Bodenlosigkeit. Moreover, such blindness in the face of the text can obviously happen because Sheehan seems to be ignorant of the basics of the political vocabulary at Heidegger’s time. It has evaded him that the words Bodenlosigkeit, Entwurzelung (uprootedness), and Bodenständigkeit (the opposite of Bodenlosigkeit; thus, having a firm stand on/being firmly rooted in that part of the surface of the earth where one is living) in Being and Time and elsewhere in Heidegger mark the intrusion of right-wing parlance into the philosophical vocabulary. Finally, since he is clueless regarding the political vocabulary, it is beyond his comprehension that Faye has a point when he translates Bodenlosigkeit in Heidegger as absence de sol (absence of soil).

As to §74 of Being and Time, Sheehan has learned some fifty years ago from William Richardson that Heidegger says that, after stepping out of the They in which it had been living up to that point, an authentic Dasein “freely and resolutely” (Sheehan 2015: 493) produces its own fate, and perhaps also that this usage of Schicksal flies flatly in the face of everyday German. At some point, Sheehan has come up with a device to smooth away this oddity, or already Richardson had told him: Heidegger uses Schicksal with the word schicklich (as Sheehan assumes, “fitting” in the sense of that authentic Dasein chooses a possibility that fits him or her) in view. Sheehan gives no example of this usage of schicklich. He cannot, because schicklich means in everyday language and in Heidegger as well in the first place precisely the opposite of what Sheehan suggests, namely that it is schicklich/in accordance with custom/with the respective They to do a certain thing. Other than that, to refute Faye Sheehan misquotes Heidegger’s formula for the Volksgemeinschaft, has a backfiring apparition of Goethe, and makes a false statement about a passage on Geschick which I discuss in Part 3.

2. Summary of Fritsche 2016a, pp. 4-13 [here 19-28] Sheehan on Fritsche’s alleged mistranslations

Sheehan’s interpretation is in no way new. He just reiterates what one finds in most of the American literature since Richardson’s book from 1963. Sheehan’s only innovation is his claim that Macquarrie and Robinson (whose translation I had used), Stambaugh, and I “have misled schol-
ars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487) by mistranslating every key term in §74. For, according to Sheehan Heidegger uses at the decisive steps in §74 not only Schicksal but every other key term as well in a way that “diverge[s] from [its] ordinary German meaning[]” (Sheehan 2016: 487). However, Sheehan can make this claim only because he severely misreads or manipulates Heidegger’s texts.

The translators render Überlieferung as “tradition” or “handing down” since, in everyday language, it is in the first place a tradition that überliefert something, from one generation to the next. According to Sheehan, however, in §74 überliefert refers exclusively to the act in which an authentic individual chooses its own fate or, as Sheehan also says, “frees up” or “liberates” a possibility it takes out of the past. Sheehan adduces a quote from a text of Heidegger’s from 1955. However, he takes this quote out of its context, omits a part in it, and mistranslates a word. Once one reads the full quote in its context, one sees immediately that Heidegger talks about traditions and distinguishes two kinds, one that rigidifies the past that it hands down and one that does not do so. Sheehan’s three mishandlings of the quote are necessary as well as sufficient to claim it for his thesis. He does not mention that Heidegger uses in Being and Time outside of §74 Überlieferung in the usual everyday meaning, distinguishes already at that point the two kinds of traditions, and does not indicate in §74 any unusual usage of the word in §74.

Gewesenheit, das Gewesene, gewesen refer in everyday German—just as Vergangenheit, das Vergangene, vergangen—to a past or something in the past. Hence, the translators render these words with expressions containing “having-been” (e.g., BTS: 299) or “been” (BTM: 373). According to Sheehan, however, these words refer “not to Dasein’s past” but exclusively to its “futurity” (Sheehan 2016: 491; see Sheehan 2015a: 171-173). He takes this meaning from a short comment of Heidegger in the “pivotal” (Sheehan 2016: 491) §65—even though Heidegger himself uses in this comment the imperfect tense to explicate Gewesen; even though, as Sheehan acknowledges in one case explicitly and in the other ones implicitly, in all occurrences of Gewesenheit in §74 it refers to something in the past or the past itself; even though, as Sheehan does not mention, in the short paragraph with the comment in §65, in that entire section, and everywhere else in Being and Time outside of §74, Heidegger uses Gewesenheit unambiguously as technical term for that ecstasy of the primordial temporality which corresponds to what traditionally has been called the past, or—as he will do until the end of his career—as the name for a past that, as opposed to a Vergangenheit, claims to be repeated and shall be repeated; and even though he does not indicate in any way any unusual usage of the word in §74.

Finally, Macquarrie and Robinson render Wiederholung and wiederholen as “repetition” and “to repeat” (e.g., BTM: 437.13-438.21 [§74]), and Stambaugh as “repetition” or “retrieve” (BTS: 465f. [index]). For, in German the noun Wiederholung is most of the time, if not always, used in the sense of “repetition.” According to Sheehan, however, Heidegger means exclusively something like “to fetch.” It evades him that, even in that case, one would still have to translate the word as “repetition/to repeat.”

In Heidegger, a tradition überliefert, and a Gewesenheit claims to be re-realized in the future, and only because of that can an individual make an authentic decision for the future. Sheehan removes the tradition and Gewesenheit in order to establish the individuals as the only actors. This subjectivist misreading of Heidegger’s basic vocabulary culminates in his interpretation of the passage on Geschick in §74.
3. Summary of Fritsche 2016a, pp. 17-29 [here 31-38] Sheehan and Fritsche on Geschick (destiny)

In a very important passage in §74, Heidegger determines Geschick as

das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes. Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen, sowenig als das Miteinandersein als ein Zusammen-vorkommen mehrerer Subjekte begriffen werden kann. Im Miteinandersein in derselben Welt und in der Entschlossenheit für bestimmte Möglichkeiten sind die Schicksale schon im vorhinein geleitet. In der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschickes erst frei. (SZ: 384.31-38)

The note refers to §26, the section in which, as I mentioned, he summarizes the theories on community and society and anticipates the rightist revolution. Stambaugh translates thus: Destiny is

the occurrence of the community, of a people. Destiny is not composed of individual fates nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects. These fates are already guided beforehand in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness for definite possibilities. In communication and in battle the power of destiny first becomes free. (BTS: 352.5-10)

Her translation contains, as I will discuss below, the same two mistakes as already Macquarrie and Robinson’s makes, but is otherwise as faithful to the original as theirs.

Sheehan believes that he is the first of all the readers of Heidegger, including the native German speakers, to realize that Heidegger uses all the key terms in §74 in a private language, private even within Being and Time itself. In addition, he is convinced that, through our mistranslations, the translators and I have “misled scholars for over fifty years.” All the same, he reproduces neither in his book nor in the papers on Faye and me the German original of the decisive passage on destiny. He does not even give an English translation. As will become clear, he takes over both mistakes in the existing translations, and just declares, as always without any further comment, that Geschick is not destiny; that is, it is not, what I argue it to be (see my introduction). Rather, Geschick “refers to the common future, the Ge-schick, that a community freely choses for itself (for example, in ratifying the U.S. Constitution of 1789)” (Sheehan 2016: 493).

As a matter of fact, Sheehan does offer something. For, close to the end of the paper in an appendix containing “A Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” of §74, he renders the three sentences on destiny thus:

A Ge-schick isn’t the sum total of individual Schicksals (just as social existence isn’t the gluing together of individual subjects). Rather, individual Schicksals are already guided by our social existence: our living together in the same world of meaning and choosing certain possibilities together. The Ge-schick of a community gets freed up only as we communicate with one another and struggle together. (Sheehan 2016: 528)
No comment, no explication. Hence, he does not explain, for instance, what the first sentence is supposed to mean, and why, if Heidegger wants to show how individuals freely produce their destiny, these actors occur only in the last sentence. I don’t find Sheehan’s own interpretation of his paraphrase convincing. In any case, as to Heidegger’s text he definitely turns it upside down, in two steps.

Sheehan’s paraphrase of Heidegger’s second sentence contains a fuzzy phrase and a wholly inconspicuous one. What does “social existence” mean? As one can see in the translations, Heidegger uses here one of his technical terms for the existentiale of being-with-other-Dasein, and where Sheehan has “choosing certain possibilities” Heidegger employs another of his technical terms, namely Entschlossenheit (resoluteness). Resoluteness, however, is in the first place a state of being open, and ready, for decisions but not the activity of deciding itself. More importantly, it is Heidegger’s technical term for authentic existence. Sheehan’s paraphrase looks as though Heidegger were talking here about the They or, at any rate, not about authentic individuals. However, Heidegger talks exclusively about authentic individuals or about them and inauthentic ones as well, and he says that their fates are “guided beforehand”—most probably, by that which the entire passage is about, namely Geschick. Thus Heidegger says the precise opposite of what Sheehan makes him say. (Since Sheehan’s two maneuvers are only briefly touched upon in point 3 of my list of ten objections against his interpretation of the passage on destiny, they should be added as two further objections [Fritsche 2016: 17-23]).

Hence, one can dismiss Sheehan’s case already here in the second of Heidegger’s sentences. Still, Sheehan maintains that Heidegger speaks in §74 a private language. Thus, let it be assumed that Heidegger uses Entschlossenheit here for inauthentic individuals whose fates, it might be said, are guided by the They while the authentic individuals, through communication, break with this guidance and produce their own fates and their own destiny, as Heidegger says in the third sentence—in Sheehan’s paraphrastic translation.

Sheehan labels my book Fritsche’s “Magic Theatre (‘For Madmen Only. Price of Admission Your Mind’)” (Sheehan 2016: 504), and it has led him to the insight that “[h]aving German as one’s native tongue is not always an advantage with Heidegger’s philosophy, and it can even be a disadvantage” (Sheehan 2016: 487). While one cannot deny that his two maneuvers regarding the second sentence have a certain elegance to them, for the interpretation of the third sentence Sheehan enters the stage with a butcher’s knife in his hands and executes a massacre that leaves no word alive.

In Heidegger’s three sentences on destiny, the authentic individuals don’t occur as major actors, let alone as the only actors. For in Heidegger’s second sentence they are guided by something, most probably by Geschick, and in the third one they are completely absent, as the translators rightly translate in both cases. All the same, turning the entire passage upside down Sheehan removes the authentic individuals from Heidegger’s second sentence in order to lead them in Heidegger’s third sentence—despite their complete absence in that sentence—for the first time.

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1 Sheehan could have learned already from the American literature in the 1990s that there is no need to claim that authentic individuals produce their fates and their destiny in the passage on destiny. They can do this later in the text (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207-215).

2 Bombarding readers with untranslated foreign-language phrases and even lining up Chinese characters as proofs that the translators and Fritsche are wrong (Sheehan 2016: 487 n. 10, 490 n. 20, 505 n. 65), Sheehan would say here: in absentia (Latin). As a matter of fact, anxious that readers might miss what seems to be (along with the quote, from Count Yorck, containing Bodenlosigkeit [see my Part 4]) his obsession in his career down here on earth (“radical mor-
onto the stage where, in the clearing of Sheehan’s stage management, they go on rampage, castrate Geschick, and enthrone themselves both as the major grammatical subject of the third sentence and as the only actors.

As the translators rightly translate, the grammatical subject of the third sentence is “the power of Destiny,” it is the only grammatical subject, and it is not determined by anything else. Rather, as the only agent it is, as one can expect from something with power, an active agent since, as will become more clear in what follows, the verb is in the active voice. In addition, as one can see in the translations, “we” don’t occur at all in any of Heidegger’s sentences. Never mind, Sheehan cuts out the “power” of destiny, renders the active voice as a passive voice, brings in “us,” and brings “us” in as the only grammatical subject with a verb in the active voice: we freely create our Geschick. We “struggle together”: quite obviously a common endeavor guided by our common goal to produce our destiny. However, as Stambaugh’s “battle” conveys, a Kampf (“Whose Kampf?” “Mein Kampf!”) is for every native German speaker, including all those who might have never heard of Hitler’s book, in the first place a fight against a foe; a foe, who, at least according to Heidegger after 1933, has to be completely annihilated. The Geschick “gets freed up” by us: Sheehan’s false translation of Überliefern, here in the passive voice because the authentic Daseins free it up. However, Heidegger does not use here überliefern. Rather, he says that the power of destiny wird frei; that is, as the translators rightly translate, “becomes free.”

How can one pervert a text that way? Probably, the two mistakes of the translators have gone overboard with Sheehan. “Communication” makes American interpreters, including Sheehan, apparently exclusively think of the back and forth in discussions and conversations. However, this is a false translation of Mitteilung. If Heidegger had meant something like “discussion,” he could have chosen from a long list a different word. A Mitteilung, by contrast, is in general and also in Heidegger primarily a one-way communication. Superiors send Mitteilungen to their subordinates, and the latter are not supposed to argue (“Herewith, I teile Ihnen mit [inform you] that you are dismissed from your position.”). In other cases, there is just nothing to argue (“I have to Ihnen mitteilen that your son is dead.”). Other than that, atmospheres, moods, or other powers that are not human thoughts teilen sich mit (communicate themselves, spread themselves out) to humans as, for instance, the solemn atmosphere of this memorial to every visitor or God to the humans through his miracles and other deeds.

Thus, what does Heidegger say? Having identified Geschick, Gemeinschaft, and the Volk, and, in doing so, having cast his ballot for the Volksgemeinschaft (and not, say, for the Catholic Scheler’s Liebesgemeinschaft [community of love]) Heidegger reiterates in the first sentence the standard formula of the communitarians: Geschick or a Gemeinschaft is more than the sum of its parts, for it has a life of its own over and above its parts. The basic flaw of modern philosophers of subjectivity is, as Heidegger has already claimed in §26, to try to reduce being-with-other-Dasein to relations between autonomous subjects or persons. In the second sentence, Heidegger
reiterates as well what every communitarian says: “we” are not autonomous; rather, Geschick or Gemeinschaft embraces us and guides us, and this is precisely what the individual recognizes when he or she becomes authentic. In the third sentence, Heidegger lays out what every rather radical rightist had hoped for: at some point in the downward plunge that modernity is (for instance, with the beginning of World War I), Geschick or Gemeinschaft, having been silent up to that moment, wird frei, breaks all the barriers that society has erected to prevent the past from reoccurring, enters the stage and goes openly to work as what it has always already been: the main player in history.

After 1933, Heidegger will say that Geschick/Schicksal is a specifically Germanic notion and must not be mixed up with the Asian notion of fate. According to the latter, one cannot, and need not, do anything by oneself, for what fate has ordained will happen anyway. Not so the Germanic fate. First, when it becomes active, it does not do so without Mitteilung, without communicating itself and its message to the ones concerned. Second, it demands our active work for its realization; that is, it calls us into the Kampf, into the Kampf for the destruction of Gesellschaft and the re-realization of Volksgemeinschaft.

At this point, the second mistake of the translators comes in, which Sheehan has taken over as well (Sheehan 2015: 381). They have replaced Heidegger’s definite article in front of Volk (“des Volkes”) with an indefinite one (“a people”). Virtually all American interpreters, including Sheehan, take this as a sign that Heidegger’s notion of community has no polemical or exclusive aspect. However, Heidegger’s definite article indicates that this wrong. Before 1989, the rallying cry of the opposition in the former GDR was, “We are ein Volk.” If one does not know the context, one would translate this as, “We are a people.” In its context, it was understood by everyone as, “We—you in West-Germany and we in East-Germany—are (not two, but) ein einziges Volk, a numerically one Volk.” Today, populists and other rightists in Germany say neither, “We are ein Volk” nor, “We are ein einziges Volk.” Rather, they shout: “We are das (the) Volk!,” meaning, of course, as already during Weimar Republic: “We are the people, and not you liberals, Jews, etc.—get out of here.”

Heidegger can keep this passage so short, because he can be sure that those interested in these matters know what he is talking about, and because it is already the fourth step in the choreography of §74. In the fifth and final one—the passage with Erwidern and Widerruf, which I discuss with even more than the proverbial German thoroughness—Heidegger presents the answer of an authentic individual to the demand of Geschick: authentic Dasein obeys (erwidert) and engages into the fight against Gesellschaft (Widerruf) (see the summary in Fritsche 1999: 124-141).

Sheehan ignores my arguments regarding the structure of the whole of Being and Time and the contribution of different sections to the drama of historicity, ignores as well my analyses of the first three steps in §74, messes up, as I have shown here, the fourth, and declares, as always without any argument, my interpretation of the fifth step to be “utterly bizarre” (Sheehan 2016: 484). He does not mention that, in a handbook on Heidegger (i.e., a genre in which one is supposed to provide solid information), one of the few major authorities on Heidegger in current Germany, Dieter Thomä, refers precisely to my interpretation of this fifth step to reject, as I had done, the “American” interpretation of §74, the proverbial self-made man who takes his fate into his own hands.3

3 While several of the other interpretations along the line of the self-made man have a certain wit (see the summary in Fritsche 1999: 207-215), Sheehan reduces the issue to a midlife-crisis. Here is another example of the power of
In sum, being completely wrong about *Being and Time* Sheehan’s critique of my book and, according to his own criteria (see Fritsche 2016: 443 n. 2), of virtually all of Faye’s entire book, and not just of Faye’s ten pages on *Being and Time*, is void.

4. Sheehan’s methods (here and there addressed in Fritsche 2016a)

According to Sheehan, Heidegger uses at the decisive steps in §74 all the key terms in a private language in which all but one even mean the precise opposite of their everyday meaning, even though, as Sheehan in part admits, Heidegger uses these terms in *Being and Time* outside of §74 and even within §74 itself in their everyday meanings, and even though he gives in §74 no indication of any unusual use. In addition, Sheehan’s interpretations and translations of these key terms require massive manipulations of the texts. I have never encountered such hermeneutics anywhere else.

In addition, as Sheehan does not mention, I argue at length with other interpretations, and give reasons for my own ones (and compare Heidegger with Hitler, the Scheler of the 1910s, the late Scheler, Lukács, and Tillich). By contrast, Sheehan nowhere gives reasons for his claims, neither in his paper nor in the respective passages in his book.4

Furthermore, his paper is full of impudent and boorish remarks. To give just two examples, he calls my book a “philosophical Rülpsen” (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 61), i.e., a powerful belch. Or, with a homo-sexist Altherrenmutz (the kind of jokes some old males make): “What would motivate any self-respecting scholar to faire le trottoir for M. Faye?” (Sheehan 2016: 514 n. 90).

What is worst, his paper contains numerous, in part utterly bizarre, false allegations and denials of the obvious. For instance, according to him I maintain that, as to §74, Heidegger copied volume 2 of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*. (Sheehan 2016: 485; for a list of a few of his misinterpretations, see Fritsche 2016a: 2f., n. 3). Or, the evidence of the quotes from *Being and Time* with Bodenlosigkeit (see my part 1) every fifth-grader would immediately accept. Not so the Professor for pre-judgment in Gadamer’s sense: Simon Critchley writes: “To my mind, the systematic connection between fundamental ontology and national socialism was convincingly established by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in his ‘Transcendence Ends in Politics’ (1989) in *Typography*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and also at greater length in his (1990) Heidegger, *Art and Politics*, trans. C. Turner, Oxford: Blackwell. The same argument has been stated much more polemically and in extraordinary scholarly detail by Johannes Fritsche in (1999) *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Berkeley: University of California Press. About the discussion of historicity, Fritsche claims: ‘... Section 74 of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is as brilliant a summary of revolutionary rightist politics as one could wish for’ (p. xii).” (Critchley and Schürmann 2008: 150 n. 8) Anyone with just one leg outside of the postmodern orbit recognizes at first sight that my argument has nothing to do with Lacoue-Labarthe’s. In addition, any such reader would (rightly) guess that the author of Fritsche 1999 belongs to those for whom Lacoue-Labarthe’s book is an instance of the effort of so many Heideggerians to stylize the National Socialist Heidegger as the tragic hero of the West to whom alone we owe the liberation from metaphysics.

4 Sheehan’s paper is unique in the philosophical literature. In its tone and organization, it looks like the report of a megalomaniac subaltern accountant incapable of any discursive reasoning or like the list of a furious pope nailing the heresies down to their last letters. As though one had opened a critical edition of a medieval text, the long list of content goes, in the part on Fritsche, down to level 1.3.2.2.1 – 1.3.2.2.4 (my edition of Thomas Aquinas’ complete *Summa theologiae* in one single volume has 2849 pages including the seventy pages of the list of content, a ratio of the latter to the former smaller than the one in Sheehan’s little paper [it goes without saying that, in contrast to Sheehan, Thomas Aquinas always gives arguments pro and contra the thesis he supports, and discursively approves the latter]). The introduction, the bibliography, and the appendix with Sheehan’s paraphrastic translation of the entire §74 take 17 pages. In addition, a list of alleged mistakes in Johannes Fritsche, Hassan Givsan, Gaëtan Pégny, Livia Profeti, Julio Quesada, François Rastier, and Ernst Tugendhat is 9 pages long. (In the course of his paper, Sheehan repeats the same points up to four times.) Thus, there are only 2 pages left for Rastier, 9 for Pégny, and 21 for Fritsche. No space for any argument, just statements of Sheehan’s own opinions and machine-gun-salvo declarations of the other opinions as false.
Religious Studies. He reacts like the current President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, facing photos from two inauguration ceremonies (“Muddled-headed at best” [Sheehan 2016: 517]) to launch the fourth and particularly impudent round regarding the occurrence of Bodenlosigkeit in a quote from Count Yorck in §77. In the second round, he had lengthily claimed that Fritsche and Faye are on four accounts “irrede
demably wrong” (Sheehan 2016: 507) about that quote (see Fritsche 2016a: 26–29)—even though I have at no point in any of my publications talked about it.

While I am just incompetent, Faye is, Sheehan suggests, fraudulent. However, unless he had a fulminant mental blackout, it is rather Sheehan himself who is fraudulent, obviously relying on that hardly anyone checks references and quotes. Two ethnically and scholarly utterly disgraceful and outrageous papers. Nonetheless, the editor of Philosophy Today, Peg Birmingham, published them in her journal—and refused to publish a response of mine.

Bibliography


5 “The personal tone Sheehan opted to use in his letter [= Sheehan 2015, J.F.] is somewhat regrettable, but that his arguments are well researched” (obviously, one has to add something like, “is beyond any doubt”) (http://enowning.blogspot.com.tr/2015/09/theses-response-to-thomas-sheehans.html, last accessed 01/24/2017).

6 See Fritsche 2016a: 33. On top of his frauds and insults, Sheehan gets personal: “(4) Does Fritsche have a problem with Americans?” (Sheehan 2016: 519; see on the same page his list of symptoms of Fritsche’s alleged problem; Sheehan has obviously never heard of the American ideal of the self-made man). I have already commented on that point (Fritsche 2016a: 3 n. 3, 31 n. 23). But who would not “have a problem” with the American Thomas Sheehan, the self-proclaimed savior of Heidegger and the world at large (see Fritsche 2016a: 30) and “Donald Trump of American Heideggerianism” (Fritsche 2016a: 32)? To be honest, I do “have a problem” with many American academic papers and, by implication, their authors: the sentences are, syntactically, short, boring, and tiresome. This paper has not been edited by a native English speaker. If it contains what one might label long sentences, they are not unintended.
IV. Heidegger’s National Socialism:
A note on Emmanuel Faye and Thomas Sheehan

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Abstract: Readers interested in Heidegger might remember Faye’s book on Heidegger and National Socialism from 2005 (English translation 2009), Sheehan’s polemic against this book, an Open Letter by Rastier et al., and three papers by Fritsche, Pégny, and Sheehan respectively, published in Philosophy Today in 2015 and 2016. Here is a brief chronology of the events with some comments on Faye and Sheehan. Since Philosophy Today did not want to publish (a slightly shorter version of) this note, I have uploaded it on academia.edu.

Key words: Being and Time, Emmanuel Faye, Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, Thomas Sheehan


Sheehan has nothing to say on chapters 2-8, the topic of Faye’s book, other than that he “had learned some notable things from” Faye (Sheehan 2015: 370). Rather, he claims, without any comment or justification, that, since Faye is wrong in his interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of historicity and his usage of Bodenlosigkeit, “much of [Faye’s] book collapses and, along with it, his recent edited collection Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race” (2015: 383; see 369, 385). Since, around 2010, I had just skimmed some of the chapters 2-8, I did not have anything to say on them in 2015 either. However, since Sheehan is wrong regarding Heidegger’s notion of historicity and all the occurrences of Bodenlosigkeit in Being and Time, I wrote a paper on these two issues, published in summer 2016 in Philosophy Today 60:2 (Fritsche 2016a), along with a paper by Pégny on Sheehan (Pégny 2016). Notably, in the very same issue, in Philosophy Today 60:2, Peg Birmingham, the editor of Philosophy Today, published a paper of Sheehan in which he responds to these two papers and to an Open Letter (Rastier et al. 2015) and, in the first place, attacks my book on Being and Time and National Socialism from 1999 (Fritsche 1999), since, as he puts it, with “Fritsche’s elaborate narrative [in Fritsche 1999] we are at last upstream at the pristine source of the rushing torrent that is sweeping Heidegger’s books off library shelves the world over” (Sheehan 2016: 504). Birmingham refused to publish a rejoinder of mine to Sheehan’ paper from 2016 (see
In Fritsche 2016a, 2016b, and 2017, I show that it is not, as Sheehan claims, me but rather he himself who (in the most banal version of what one has been reading in the American literature since a paper of Löwith from 1949 and Richardson’s famous book from 1963) gets everything wrong regarding Heidegger’s notion of historicity (in particular the passage on Gesick [destiny] in §74 of Being and Time) and related texts (for instance, §65 of Being and Time). In addition, I present other aspects of Sheehan’s paper on me, which ruthlessly violates every criterion of academic conduct and even indulges in what, hopefully, is conscious fraud.

Faye’s planned response to Sheehan in Philosophy Today 60:2 was not finished in time (see Birmingham and Moore 2016: 427), and has not been published thereafter either. More or less many readers will probably assume that reacting to a polemic only three years later or even not at all just proves that the author of the polemic was right. Especially since Sheehan has nothing to say on Faye’s treatment of Faye’s topic, it would be, or would have been, very easy for Faye to respond to Sheehan’s paper from 2015, since I had already done much of the necessary work, so to speak, in my first paper and, later on, in the other two papers on Sheehan. In addition, it would, or would have, further corroborated his case to respond not only to Sheehan’s paper from 2015 but to the one from 2016 as well. As a matter of fact, after Sheehan’s paper from 2016 Faye is, or was, obliged to respond to Sheehan, since not only Faye himself but rather three other individuals as well had been attacked by Sheehan, individuals who had intervened in support of Faye. In addition, without a response by Faye, readers of Philosophy Today do not know that the editors of Philosophy Today refused to publish a response of one (or perhaps even more) of these three individuals to Sheehan’s paper from 2016.

Bibliography


V. National Socialism in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and thereafter: on Heidegger, Sheehan and other Heideggerians

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This part contains the list of content of a short book in progress and drafts of sections 2, 3, 4.1, 6.1-6.4, and Appendix 5, and a preliminary bibliography.

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2 Sheehan’s paper, its features and strategy
2.1 Sheehan the originator of four new paradigms

Heidegger has kept Sheehan busy from early on in his academic career. For, the later professor of religious studies had begun reading Heidegger already in 1961 (Sheehan 2015: xi). His colleagues as well as his three sons are sure that he has spent way too much time on this German philosopher (Sheehan 2015: XIII). Still, it took him 54 years to publish a book on Heidegger, a book with a very ambitious subtitle: *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (Sheehan 2015). Sheehan labels my book from 1999 (Fritsche 1999) a “Rülpser” (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 61), i.e., a belch. A *Rülpser* is a matter of two seconds or, if one adds the time of the dinner, an hour. Indeed, given that I had not spent that much time on Heidegger before, the four years I worked on my book (and other things, while fully teaching at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York City, one semester sabbatical) are just a *Rülpser* compared to Sheehan’s 54 years. 54 years, but the bibliography of his book contains only one “philosophical monograph on Heidegger, i.e., a book” (Sheehan 2016: 525) published less than fifty years ago, Daniel Dahl-
strom’s monograph from 2001 (Sheehan 2015: 331) to which Sheehan refers just once in a note (Sheehan 2015: 62 n. 143).

In his paper on Fritsche 1999, he quotes, in each case only one or two words, fourteen translations of Sein und Zeit, including Chen-Wang’s Chinese one (e.g., Sheehan 2016: 487 n. 10). As to secondary literature on Heidegger, however, he refers only to texts by, as he often says, “Faye et Cie.” (Sheehan 2016: 486) and the famous book by Richardson (Richardson 1963) to whom he has dedicated Making Sense of Heidegger (Sheehan 2015: no page [vi]). Still, in this case, too, he seems to believe with his interpretation of §74 to have brought about a paradigm shift. For, he claims that, by mistranslating every key term in §74, the translators of the two English translations of Being and Time—Macquarrie, Robinson (BTM) and Stambaugh (BTS)—and I have “have misled scholars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487).

As to Making Sense of Heidegger, I had read the chapter on Heidegger’s concept of historicity in §74 of Being and Time (“Chapter 6. Becoming Our Openness” [Sheehan 2015: 155-185]) and, most recently, the last chapter (“Chapter 10. Critical Reflections“ [Sheehan 2015: 271-294]). Other than that, I have only skimmed a few pages here and there. It would not come as a surprise to me if Sheehan’s “paradigm shift” just consisted in boiling Heidegger down to the most common and trivial denominator. No one has ever doubted that both Being and Time and Heidegger’s history of being are about meaning; meaning that, in Being and Time, the existentials and, in the history of Being, Being or Geschick (destiny) give. It is similar with §74. For, as I have pointed out, what I labelled the “American interpretation” of §74 has been established by Richardson in his book from 1963, this interpretation turns this section upside down, and Sheehan’s interpretation of §74 is the most banal version of it. In Appendix 3, I will address the phenomenon that Sheehan says the translators and I “have misled scholars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487) even though his interpretation is not different from those of these scholars.

Sheehan gives Faye and me credit, Faye for being “the unchallenged world-expert” on some “minor Renaissance figures” (Sheehan 2016: 514), me for being “an expert in Aristotle,” an expert, though, who has missed what “should have been a piece of cake” for him (Sheehan 2016: 490f). Sheehan, for his part, is the author of a book on a figure not minor than which only God-Father and the Holy Spirit are, a book on Jesus Christ (Sheehan 1986). Given the content of this book (see here, p. 77) and given his ignorance even of literature on Heidegger, Sheehan most likely thought already in 1986 to have established a paradigm shift. In any case, if other academicians will adopt the style of Sheehan’s paper, he can truly claim to have established a new paradigm, a new paradigm of academic writing. For, Sheehan’s paper abounds of bullet-lists, other lists, tables, insults, obscenities, errors, and frauds regarding me as well as Heidegger, and it does not contain a single argument.

2.2 The outer appearance of Sheehan’s paper and its agenda

Sheehan’s paper takes fifty-five pages (Sheehan 2016: 481-535), and consists of three parts, namely a part on my book from 1999 (Sheehan 2016: 481-504), a part on the employees of Faye & Co., including me, (Sheehan 2016: 504-525) and an appendix with a “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” of §74 of Being and Time (Sheehan 2016: 525-531) followed by the bibliography (Sheehan 2016: 532-535). Of the fifty-five pages only fourteen are ‘real’ pages, pages without bullet- or other lists, tables, analytic outlines or paraphrastic translations of texts by Heidegger or myself (Sheehan 2016: 484, 485, 491, 493, 496, 499, 502, 503, 508, 512-516).
the second part, Sheehan treats Pégny (Sheehan 2016: 504-506), Lee (2016: 506-507), Fritsche (2016: 507-508), Pégny (2016: 508-513), the 21 signatories of Rastier 2015 (2016: 513-514), Fritsche (2016: 517-519), Pégny (2016: 519-520), and Tugendhat, Rastier, Profeti, Quesada, Givsan, and the 21 signatories of Rastier 2015 (2016: 521-525). All these sections are just lists of quotes from the respective individuals, or Sheehan’s paraphrases, introduced by the word “wrong” and followed by Sheehan’s opinion, a rhetorical question, and/or something more wordily; lists on which he repeats the same points again and again, up to four times. The third part does not contain any argument either.

The list of content is very detailed (“1.3.2.2.4 Regeneration: Repetition of a Nazi Volksge- meinschaft”) and has 35 headlines 5 of which begin with “Fritsche Mistranslates / Misinterprets” (Sheehan 2016: 481-482). The introduction is a bullet-list with eight bullets (Sheehan 2016: 482-483). The next three pages are ‘real’ pages and introduce the part on my book. Page 484 sets the tone: Fritsche’s interpretation of §74 of Being and Time in his “wacky book” is “utterly bizarre,” in his notes Fritsche “lets his hair down and rambles on about this and that,” and he displays a peculiar “humor” (Sheehan 2016: 484). Page 485 consists of two passages which I will address in my section 7. On page 486, he announces his aim: “In demolishing Fritsche’s mistranslations and misinterpretations of SZ §74 I destroy one of the foundational pillars holding up the canard that is Faye’s Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy.” (Sheehan 2016: 486) As pointed out above, one has to wait several pages to encounter the next ‘real’ page.

2.3 The absence of any argument in Sheehan’s paper

Sheehan’s paper does not contain any argument, which is, needless to say, unusual for a paper in a philosophy journal, especially since its author argues against someone who, in his view, “literally gets nothing right” (Sheehan 2016: 492) in the interpretation of the text at stake. Other than in his tables and translations, Sheehan uses expressions indicating a reason or an inference only eight times, in none of these cases to mark a step within his own reasoning. In five instances, he uses “since” or “therefore” in order, for instance, to infer from his own opinion, presented without any argument, that Fritsche is wrong (Sheehan 2016: 484, 485 n. 6, 491, 497, 498). In two of the three occurrences of “thus,” Sheehan duplicates a reasoning of Richardson which he adopts (Sheehan 2016: 489, 493). The third “thus” introduces what should have been a “piece of cake” (Sheehan 2016: 490f.) for me, namely to recognize a supposed reference of Heidegger to Aristotle’s notion of τὸ τὰ ἔννοια (Sheehan 2016: 491). I have shown that Sheehan is utterly misguided in all three cases, and will come back to them at later points. A further absence in Sheehan’s paper I present in the next session.

2.4 The absence of any comment by Sheehan on his (false) translations

As was said, according to Sheehan, through our mistranslations of all the key terms in §74 and elsewhere in Being and Time, Macquarrie, Robinson, Stambaugh, and I “have misled scholars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487). Probably, all four of us have taken as a rule of thumb that, whenever Heidegger does not indicate otherwise, he uses an ordinary word in its ordinary everyday meaning (and explicitly adds specifications if, he thinks, they don’t become obvious in the context). However, this is precisely our mistake, because Sheehan claims that, along with several other key terms in Being and Time, none of those in §74 “keeps the conventional meaning it has in
ordinary German” (Sheehan 2015a: 486). Rather, they all “diverge from their ordinary German meanings” (Sheehan 2016: 487) as he says in the context of a hermeneutical insight about the possible or, as allegedly in my case, actual disadvantages of “[h]aving German as one’s native tongue” (Sheehan 2016: 487) when reading Heidegger.

One would expect someone claiming such divergences to explain a little bit how he recognizes them. Sheehan makes no effort in that direction. In addition, when one believes a phrase has been mistranslated, one should explain and argue for one’s own translation. Sheehan never does this either. He just gives as the only justification of his claim his supposedly correct translation of a quote from Heidegger, a quote whose context he never addresses.

Sheehan does not deny that Heidegger does not indicate in §74 in any way any usage of private language. In my view, this fact alone renders Sheehan’s interpretation implausible. As, for instance, the elaborations on the notions of Schuld (guilt) (BTS 261 = SZ 283) and Sorge (care) (BTS 179ff., 183ff. = SZ 192ff., 196ff.) or similar passages in other texts show, Heidegger normally comments on words which he uses in an unusual way. None of the terms at stake in §74 is in any way unusual, and several of them even belong to the ‘core’ of the ‘Germanic word power,’ if there is such thing. Ironically, it is precisely the other way around than Sheehan assumes. For, the translators have translated all the terms Sheehan adduces properly, with the exception of one. In addition, they have translated falsely, or in too vague a way, other phrases. These flaws have strongly contributed to what I labelled the “American interpretation” of §74. Sheehan has not noticed any of them.

2.5 Sheehan’s circular-sandwich strategy

Sheehan offers no argument for any of his claims, and he does not comment in any way on his allegedly correct translations. How can he fill 55 pages? Three means I have already mentioned, the bullet-lists of alleged mistakes, his repetitions of the same points, and his insertions of lengthy passages with, he assumes, acid wit and irony. In addition, there are several tables taking quite some space.

Still, he has to make his point, and he does so in five steps. He presents, along with my alleged mistranslations, his opinions about Heidegger’s usage of terms; in step 1) the terms Überlieferung, Wiederholen, and Gewesenheit (Sheehan 2016: 486-492) and in step 2) regarding Geschehen, Geschichtlichkeit, Schicksal, Geschied, and Gemeinschaft (Sheehan 2016: 492-493). Thereafter, he offers 3) his account of §74 using the meanings of the notions presented in steps 1) and 2) (Sheehan 2016: 494-497). In step 4), he presents different steps of my interpretation, repeating in each case his own opinion, and declaring my interpretation to be wrong (Sheehan 2016: 498-504). As one sees, separating steps 3) and 4) enables him to fill pages by repeating in 4) what he has already said in 3). More importantly, to preface his critique of my interpretation in 4) by steps 1), 2), and 3) enables him in 4) to present his critique without any argument. In addition, to preface step 3) by steps 1) and 2) enables him to present his interpretation without any argument either.

For this reason, steps 1) and 2) are the crucial ones in his entire paper. He has outsourced a justification for his claims in 2) to a separate step 5). For, as he says at the beginning of 2): “Note: At this point please refer to the sentence-by-sentence outline and paraphrastic translation of SZ §74 in Appendix 2 below, p. 525” (Sheehan 2016: 492). Being about as long as the original text this paraphrastic translation does not contain any argument. As I will show, it is based on Sheehan’s opinion about the meaning of the terms presented in 1) and 2). In other words, he justifies his render-
ing of the relevant terms by referring to his paraphrastic translation which he has produced on the basis of his opinion of the terms. As will become clear, step 1) is supposed to justify the crucial claim in step 2), and step 1) does not contain any argument either but only a list of quotes introduced by Sheehan’s opinion about their meaning. Thus, sandwiching his presentation of my interpretation between two layers that support each other in a circular way, he manages to fill many pages without any argument.

3 Überlieferung in the lecture course The Principle of Reason (1955/6)

3.1 Überlieferung: tradition/handling down or “to free up“?

As I will discuss in Section 4, Heidegger uses the noun Überlieferung and the corresponding verb überliefern not only in §74 but elsewhere in Sein und Zeit as well, notably in the prominent §6. In everyday language, Überlieferung is used in the sense of Tradition (traditio/tradere [Latin], tradition). Every tradition or Überlieferung tradiert, überliefert (transmits, hands down) something from one generation to the next. Heidegger does not indicate anywhere in Sein und Zeit that he would use Überlieferung and überliefern in an unusual way. Thus, Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh render them as “tradition,” “handing down,” and “to hand down,” and there is probably no alternative English translation. Still, according to Sheehan none of the key terms in §74 “keeps the conventional meaning it has in ordinary German” (Sheehan 2015a: 486). Rather, they all “diverge from their ordinary German meanings” (Sheehan 2016: 487). As the very first point in his paper (the first part of step 1); see above, my Section 2.5) Sheehan claims that the translation of the translators “betrays [the] philosophical meaning” of Überlieferung / überliefern (Sheehan 2016: 487) in Heidegger, for Überlieferung / überliefern “does not mean ‘to hand down’ but ‘to free up, to liberate’” (Sheehan 2016: 487; see Sheehan 2015: 181-182); i.e., “to free up, to liberate” is the only meaning in which Heidegger uses the noun and the verb.

After presenting our opposite translations of Überlieferung / überliefern (Sheehan 2016: 487.19-22), Sheehan offers a bullet-list with three Heidegger quotes containing Überlieferung and, without any comment, his English translations (Sheehan 2016: 487.23-488.12). I begin with the second of these quotes, taken from Heidegger’s lecture course in the winter semester 1955/6, The Principle of Reason. As I already said, Sheehan claims that, in §74, authentic Dasein chooses its own fate and several Daseines chose their common fate, their Geschick (destiny). As will become clear in the following sections, Sheehan’s claim regarding Heidegger’s usage of Überlieferung in The Principle of Reason is the key for his interpretation of the passage on Geschick in Sein und Zeit. For this reason, I talk about destiny already in this section to show that, most probably knowingly, he turns upside down Heidegger’s usage of überliefern in the Principle of Reason.

3.2 Überlieferung and Geschick (destiny) in The Principle of Reason (1955/6)

Heidegger began to work on what he called the history of Being around 1931/2. In the lecture course The Principle of Reason in the Winter semester 1955/6, he treats Leibniz’ principle of sufficient Grund (reason) in the context of the history of the Greek word λόγος, its translation into Latin as ratio, and the German translation of ratio as Grund, three words from three different languages in which three different meanings of Being are encapsulated. For, the term “Geschick of being” characterizes “the history of Western thinking up till now insofar as we look back on it” (Heidegger 1991: 61 = Heidegger 1978: 108), and it means that “being proffers itself to us in that
it withdraws“ (Heidegger 1991: 61 = Heidegger 1978: 108).\(^1\) By “history,” Heidegger means a sequence, not of theories of different philosophers, but of different epochs each of which is characterized by a specific truth or Being that has been established by a sending of Being: “being proffers itself to us, as such furnishes itself to us and is an offering [Schickung],” from which “it follows that ‘being’ means [sagt] something different from ‘being’ as it occurs in the various epochs of its Geschick” (Heidegger 1991: 62 = Heidegger 1978: 110; a Schickung sends a Geschick and many Schicksale).

As I pointed out, in line with the ‘Germanic’ notion of destiny and fate Heidegger emphasizes in §74 of Sein und Zeit that destiny calls upon the Dasein to take over their destiny and realize it. Geschick needs the active work of Dasein for its realization. In a lecture course in 1934/5, Heidegger calls this understanding of destiny and fate “an essentially German notion” and distinguishes it from the “traditional” or “Asian notion of fate” according to which one need not, and cannot, do anything since destiny realizes itself anyway, irrespective of the activities of the humans (Fritsche 1999: 140f.).

Around 1937/8, Heidegger believed to recognize that the empirical National Socialism was not the overcoming of society but rather its fulfillment, at which point he, at the same time, recognized the timeless true National Socialism (see Fritsche 2016b). These insights led him finally to his theory of the quietist and bucolic Geviert (Four-fold) (see Fritsche 2019). Thus, in the lecture course The Principle of Reason Heidegger comments on the notion of Geschick no longer in a fighting mode. As he says, “We usually understand Geschick [destiny] as being that which has been determined and imposed through fate: a sorrowful, an evil, a fortunate Geschick.” (Heidegger 1978: 108) However, “this meaning is a derivative one. For schicken [‘sending’] originally denotes: ‘preparing; ‘ordering; ‘bringing each thing to that place where it belongs’; consequently it also means to ‘furnish’ and ‘admit’; ‘to appoint’ [beschicken] a house, a room” (Heidegger 1991: 61 = Heidegger 1978: 108). Or, Geschick means that “being [Sein] hails us and clears and lights itself, and in clearing it furnishes the temporal play-space [den Zeit-Spiel-Raum einräumen] wherein being [Seiendes] can appear“ (Heidegger 1991: 62 = 1978: 109; replace the second “being” with “beings”)

Neither in 1934/35 nor in 1955/6 does he say that individuals produce fate or destiny. Rather, it is destiny and fate that gives something. His point is to defend the notions of destiny and fate against those who have no sense for them, don’t believe in them, and, in his view, misunderstand them.

### 3.3 Sheehan on Überlieferung in The Principle of Reason

At the beginning of the thirteenth and last session of the lecture course, Heidegger summarizes the issue of the beginning of a new epoch in eleven sentences several of which have subordinated clauses. One of these subordinated clauses and the following main clause Sheehan quotes, without any comment, as proof of his claim regarding Überlieferung/überliefern:

> . . . weil die Überlieferung eigentlich, was ihr Name sagt, ein Liefern im Sinne des liefern, der Befreiung ist. Als ein Befreien hebt die Überlieferung verborgene Schätze des Gewesenen ans Licht. . . . (Heidegger 1978: 1971.7-10 = GA 10: 153.7–9 = 102.6–7) (Sheehan 2016: 488)

\(^1\) Lilly has left “Geschick” untranslated (see his comment Heidegger 1991: xivf.) and sometimes inserts the usual translation, “destiny.”
He translates this quote thus:

… because Überlieferung is a freeing-up in the sense of liberare, to set something free. As such a freeing-up, Überlieferung brings to light the hidden treasure of das Gewesen…. (Sheehan 2016: 488)

In his presentation of his interpretation of §74 (step 3 of the five steps [see my section 2.5]), Sheehan says that, in a double return, authentic Dasein returns “from [its] falleness […] back to the mortal aheadness that [it] already is” and “from that aheadness back to […] its present moment.” In that moment, “from among its ‘inherited legacy’ (Erbe) of possibilities, Dasein chooses one or another of them that it will endeavor to live out authentically in the light of its radical mortality.” (Sheehan 2016: 496) These two sentences refer to the passage on Erbe (SZ 383.31-384.1 = BTM 435.15-22), in which Überlieferung / überliefern occurs for the first time in §74. In his paraphrastic translation (step 5), Sheehan renders this passage thus: “I return to my mortal aheadness, open up an authentic possibility of ex-sistence from my legacy, and take it over. […] freeing up of authentic possibilities. […] Resolve is what frees up that legacy” (Sheehan 2016: 527). As his translation shows and as everyone else (rightly) does, he regards the Erbe as something that has come from the past or has been handed down—or has handed itself down—from the past into the present. According to Sheehan, it is not this Erbe but rather Dasein that überliefert something. Dasein does so by taking one of the possibilities contained in the Erbe and making it its own. It draws this possibility toward itself, so to speak, and keeps it. However, Sheehan turns the text upside down. For, in 1955/6 “to free up” is not the only meaning but just one of the two meanings of Überlieferung. Überlieferung means “to hand down,” the activity of überliefern is performed by the Überlieferung (and not by something, or someone, analogous to authentic Dasein in 1927), as I show in what follows.

One might wonder why Heidegger explicates “freeing-up” by “in the sense of liberare, to set something free.” After all, what can “to free up” mean other than “to set something free”? In addition, referring to a German etymological dictionary note 13 reads: “13. Cf. Kluge, Etymologisches Wörterbuch, 440, s.v. ‘liefern’: ‘liefern Ztw. Lat. liberare “befreien.”’ (Sheehan 2016: 488 n. 13) However, Kluge has not only “befreien” but also “entledigen” (“liefern Ztw Lat. liberare “befreien, entledigen” [Kluge 1960: 440]). Entledigen is to get rid of something, to release something, to give something away, to let it go out of one’s hands, so to speak, each of which is the precise opposite of the activity of grasping something and keeping it that Sheehan assumes. Furthermore, Sheehan has left out Heidegger’s “eigentlich, was ihr Name sagt.” Lilly translates the two sentences that Sheehan has only partially translated thus:

It can become this [Sie kann es] because a legacy [Überlieferung] is genuinely, as its name says, a delivering [Liefern] in the sense of liberare, of liberating. As a liberating, a legacy raises concealed riches of what has been [des Gewesenen] into the light of day, even if this light is at first only that of a hesitant dawn [sei dies Licht auch erst das einer zögernden Morgenämmern]. (Heidegger 1991: 102 = Heidegger 1978: 171 = GA 10: 153; the first and the last insertion of the German phrases is mine, J.F.)

As one sees, for Heidegger “to liberate” is the genuine mode of Überlieferung and thus only one of two, or more, modes. Sheehan creates the opposite impression by two omissions. He leaves out a
phrase in his translation of the Heidegger quote, and he leaves out “entledigen” in his Kluge quote, in this way preventing readers from speculating about several meanings of liefern.

However, two further measures are necessary for Sheehan. For, as one can see in the Heidegger quote and in Lilly’s correct translation, Heidegger explicates here one meaning of Überlieferung by pointing to a meaning of Liefern. Sheehan’s rendering of Liefern as “freeing-up” is wholly arbitrary and false (and does not require the specification “in the sense of liberare, of liberating / to set something free”). Rather, Lilly is right in rendering it as “delivering.” Sheehan refers only to the very short entry of just ten lines in Kluge’s dictionary, and he leaves out the general meaning of liefern that Kluge gives, namely to deliver, as a trader and merchant, a good to the one who has ordered it (Kluge 1960: 440), which is the precise opposite of what Sheehan finds in Heidegger and Kluge. Grimm’s Wörterbuch contains over several columns many entries for “liefern” all of which have in common that that which liefert, already has what it liefert and brings it to somewhere, or someone, else, to the effect that, in most cases, it loses what it liefert as, for instance, in the case of trading or of paying one’s tribute to the state or the church.2 Thus, the Überlieferung is a Liefern, the carrying of something from somewhere to somewhere else, and this Liefern can take place in two modes. In light of the main clause of the first sentence which Sheehan did not include in his quote, one can already surmise that in the preceding sentence Heidegger has talked about another mode of Überlieferung, one in which an Überlieferung does not liberate but does something different.

In addition, in the subordinated clause of the second sentence which Sheehan has not included in his quote, Heidegger says that it is possible that that which an Überlieferung has überliefert becomes perceivable only later. What can the Überlieferung be? Sheehan has most certainly not included the subordinated clause because he is aware that such sentence does not make sense in the context of the “freeing up” performed by authentic Dasein in 1927 in his understanding, no matter who, or what, it is that is in 1955/6 the analogue to this Dasein. If the Überlieferung cannot be the activity of someone, or something, that takes something out of an Überlieferung or an Erbe, it can only be this Überlieferung or tradition itself, that hands itself down or is handed down. Thus, Lilly is right in translating “Überlieferung” with “legacy” while Sheehan has left the word untranslated to prevent readers from recognizing that legacy is that which überliefert.

The fact that Lilly is right becomes even more obvious when one looks at the whole passage. It reads in Lilly’s translation thus:

1) The principle of reason reads: Nothing is without reason. Nihil est sine ratione. “Reason” [Grund] is the translation [Übersetzung] of ratio. 2) A translation becomes a legacy [Überlieferung] when the speaking of basic words translates one historical language into another one [das Sprechen der Grundworte von einer geschichtlichen Sprache in die andere übersetzt]. 3) If it rigidifies, a legacy [Überlieferung] can degenerate into a burden and a handicap. 4) It can become this because a legacy [Überlieferung] is genuinely, as its name says, a delivering [Liefern] in the sense of liberare, of liberating. 5) As a liberating, a legacy [Überlieferung] raises concealed riches of what has-been [des Gewesenen] into the light of day, even if this light is at first only that of a hesitant dawn. 6) That Grund is the translation of ratio means to say that ratio has passed over into Grund [hat sich in den Grund überliefert], a legacy [Überlieferung] which already early on speaks with a double sense. 7) Of course [freilich], the passing over [Überlieferung] of the two senses of ratio into ‘grounds’ and ‘Reason’ first [erst]

2 In current vocabulary, a Lieferungsdienst, a company that liefert, delivers, the book, piece of furniture, or whatever else one has ordered somewhere. Pizza joints liefern the pizza one has ordered to one’s apartment.
reaches its decisive configuration where [dort] the Geschick of being determines that
epoch which, according to historiographical periodization, is called ‘modernity.’ 8) Pro-
vided being and ground/reason ‘are’ the same, then the modern Geschick of being must
also transform the ancient Roman double sense of ratio.” (Heidegger 1991: 102 =
Heidegger 1978: 171 = GA 10: 153; insertion of the numbers and of several of the inser-
tions of the German original is mine, J.F.)

Lilly’s translation is basically correct except that, at two places, the German original is more
pronounced. For, the subordinate clause in 2) reads, literally translated, thus: when “the speaking of
the basic words steps from one historical language over into another historical language” (see my
comments on übersetzen [Fritsche 1999: vii]). In addition, “has passed over” in 3) would probably
be a good translation of “ist übergegangen”, “hat sich […] überliefert,” however, is stronger: “has
passed itself / handed down itself.” Furthermore, one might translate in 7): “However, the pass-
ing over … reaches its decisive configuration only at the point where the Geschick …” Überlieferung
can be used for a legacy, a tradition, for the activities in which the tradition hands itself down,
and for the result of these activities; say, for the body of Hessian fairy tales, for their being orally
narrated by Hessian Grandmothers, and for their presence in the minds of the next generation of
Hessians. After the Brothers Grimm, reading can replace the oral Überlieferung of the Überlieferung
that the body of Hessian fairy tales is.

To be sure, the subject in 2) is “translation.” Thus, Heidegger might think of the transla-
tor. However, the word translator does not occur at all in the entire passage. Instead, in 2) the
“speaking of basic words” and in 5) the word ratio do the Überlieferung. In addition, already in 2) it
is obvious that in no way every Überlieferung is a translation. Furthermore, as everyone who has
followed the whole lecture course will expect, it is Geschick that determines the translation. Thus,
Heidegger means by “Überlieferung” a tradition, a body of texts that is handed down from one
generation to the next, or this body of texts in the process of being translated into a different
language, a translation determined by Geschick if it takes place at the beginning of a new epoch. It
is an Überlieferung in this sense, a tradition, a body of texts handed down to future generations, and
not an act of taking something out of a tradition, that can take two modes, a rigidifying one and a
mode in which it liberates. In addition, even if Heidegger mainly or exclusively meant the transla-
tors and their translating, to translate, in whichever way, a body of texts and hand it down to fu-
ture generations and picking out of a pool of possibilities contained in a tradition a possibility for
one’s own usage are two very different and opposed activities.

Sheehan turns the reference as well as the meaning of Überlieferung upside down. He can
claim his quote for his thesis only because of four maneuvers: he 1) takes it out of its context, 2)
leaves out in the quote itself the phrase, “genuinely, as its name says,” and 3), in contrast to Lilly
(“a delivering”), mistranslates “liefern,” namely as “freeing-up.” 4) He ignores Geschick. In the
next section, I show that in §6 and in other sections of Being and Time Überlieferung means, just as
in 1955, a tradition or a body of texts handed down from one generation to the next, and that
already in Sein und Zeit Heidegger distinguishes different modes in which a tradition hands down
what it transmits.

3.5 Interim summary: Sheehan the fraud

At the beginning of the last session of his lecture course in 1955/6, The Principle of Reason, in his
summary of the issue of translation Heidegger uses Überlieferung in its everyday meaning, namely
as Tradition (tradition), and says that an Überlieferung can hand down something to later generations
in two ways. Sheehan turns the meaning and the reference of Überlieferung upside down by claiming that Heidegger means here the same activity Sheehan finds in §74 of Being and Time, namely an activity in which someone takes something out of a tradition and appropriates it for himself by ignoring everything else handed down by the tradition. As I have shown, Sheehan can do so only by isolating his quote from its context and, in several ways, heavily manipulating it as well as a quote from Kluge that he adduces in support of his claim.

In addition, in 2015 Sheehan acknowledges that the later Heidegger used the term Geschick not in the sense Sheehan finds in §74 but in its everyday meaning, namely designating a super-human power, in Sheehan’s words, “supervening, necessary, and inevitable” for humans (Sheehan 2016: 487) (see Sheehan 2015: 281ff.). In this meaning Heidegger uses Geschick from the beginning of The Principle of Reason on and also in the immediate context of Sheehan’s quote from this lecture course. All this shows that, in 2016, Sheehan was most certainly aware that when one reads his quote in its context, one sees at first sight that he turns it upside down. In other words, his manipulations are most probably not coincidental but rather conscious fraud.

This is the first step of Sheehan’s entire paper. Obviously, he had not found any other way to make his case for his interpretation of Sein und Zeit than heavily manipulating a text of Heidegger’s from almost thirty years later. As I will show, all the following steps are fraud, utter ignorance, or a mixture of both. In Appendix 2, I will show what Heidegger means when, in 1955/6, he says that an Überlieferung can raise “concealed riches of what has-been into the light of day, even if this light is at first only that of a hesitant dawn.”

4 Überlieferung and Erbe (legacy, heritage) in Being and Time

4.1 Überlieferung in §6 of Being and Time

Outside of the chapter on historicity Heidegger employs überliefern and Überlieferung in Sein und Zeit exclusively in the usual meaning of “handing down” or “tradition,” most notably in the famous §6, where he talks about the stock of categories and concepts developed in antique ontology. This body of concepts and categories has been handed down to Heidegger’s time by the “tradition” (BTS 19 = SZ 21), the same tradition he is talking about in the lecture course from 1955/6. Heidegger describes the acting of the tradition as an example of what I called “double forgetting”:

The tradition that hereby gains dominance makes what it “transmits [übergibt]” so little accessible that initially and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been handed down [das Überkommene] it hands over to obviousness; it bars access to those original “wellsprings” out of which the traditional [überlieferen] categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. (BTS 19 = SZ 21)

Übergeben is just another word for Überliefern since every Überlieferung gibt (gives), or übergibt (transmits, delivers), something to the future generations. Das Überkommene is another word for das Überlieferete (that which has been handed down), and the categories and concepts have been überliefernt (handed down, transmitted) by the tradition. The tradition not only covers up what it hands down, it even makes its activity and the possibility, or need, to revisit the tradition invisible: “The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance altogether. Indeed, it makes us wholly incapable of even understanding that such a return is necessary.” (BTS 19 = SZ 21)
Precisely because the tradition has acted that way, a "destruction [Destrucktion] of the traditional [überlieferen] content of ancient ontology [has to] be carried out" (BTS: 20 = SZ: 22; replacement of "destructuring" with "destruction" is mine, J. F.) Thus, it is here as in the Heidegger quote from 1955 and, therefore, precisely the opposite of what Sheehan maintains. The Überlieferung is the tradition that hands down. If one wants to talk of a freeing-up in this context, it is indeed Dasein or the philosopher that does so, but precisely by destroying the Überlieferung in order to ‘free up’ “the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of being were gained” (BTS: 20 = SZ: 22).

6. The passage on Geschick (destiny) (SZ 384.31-38 = BTS 352.4-10)

6.1 Its German original, its English renderings, and Sheehan’s thesis

As was said, the second of the three decisive passages in §74 is the one on Geschick. Heidegger determines “Geschick” as follows:

1) Damit bezeichnen wir das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes. 2) Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen, sowenig als das Miteinandersein als ein Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte begriffen werden kann. 3) Im Miteinandersein in derselben Welt und in der Entschlossenheit für bestimmte Möglichkeiten sind die Schicksale schon im vorhinein geleitet. 4) In der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschickes erst frei. (SZ: 384.31-38, as in the following quotes, insertion of numbers mine, J.F.)

In the note, he refers back to his discussion of the existential of Being-with-other-Dasein in §26: “Vgl. §26, S. 117ff.” (SZ 384, n. 1). Macquarrie and Robinson translate:

1) This is how we designate the historigizing of the community, a people. 2) Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. 3) Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. 4) Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. (BTM 436.17-23)

The note reads: “vii. (H 384) Cf. Section 26, H 117ff.” (BTM 498). Stambaugh has:

1) With this term we designate the occurrence of the community, of a people. 2) Destiny is not composed of individual fates nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects. 3) These fates are already guided beforehand in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness for definite possibilities. 4) In communication and in battle the power of destiny first becomes free. (BTS 352.4-10)
The note reads: “7. Cf. section 26.” (BTS 414). As I will point out, both translations contain the same two mistakes, but are otherwise faithful to the original.

In my view, Heidegger uses here the notion of *Geschick* in its everyday meaning of an all-embracing power that determines the lives of individuals and people. Sheehan accuses me of turning Heidegger’s concept of *Geschick* on its head. In step 2) of his paper (see above, Section 2.5), he presents his opinion about the meaning of *Geschick* in §74, and gives at the same time an example of what Heidegger has in mind:

Far from meaning “destiny” as Fritsche would have it, [the term *Geschick*] refers to the common future, the *Geschick*, that a community freely choses for itself (for example, in rati-fying the U.S. Constitution of 1789). (Sheehan 2016: 493; see already Sheehan 2015: 381)

According to Sheehan, Heidegger shows in §74 also how an individual freely chooses its own individual destiny, its fate (Sheehan 2015: 182-84; Sheehan 2015a: 382 n. 49).

In his list of twelve terms allegedly mistranslated in both English translations, Sheehan says that “*Geschick* is not ‘Destiny’ (supervening, necessary, and inevitable)” (Sheehan 2016: 487). In addition, as I quoted in section 3.4, he acknowledges that the later Heidegger uses *Geschick* as an epochal power that determines the individuals. Thus, he obviously maintains that *Geschick* as inevitable destiny is the everyday meaning of this term (both for those who believe in destiny and those who don’t), that the later Heidegger used it that way, and that it is only in §74 that Heidegger used it in a way that is not only different from the common usage but even its precise opposite.

In light of this, one would expect Sheehan to elaborate on his claim. However, neither in his book nor in the papers on Faye and me does he quote the German original of the passage on destiny, he does not quote the English translations, he does not discuss any detail of these three texts, and he does not comment on his claim in one single sentence either. Rather, in line with his circular-sandwich strategy his only justification is step 5), his paraphrastic translation in the respective appendix. It reads thus:

1) A *Geschick* is the living of a common history by a community, a people. 2) A *Geschick* isn’t the sum total of individual *Schicksals* (just as social existence isn’t the gluing together of individual subjects). 3) Rather, individual *Schicksals* are already guided by our social existence: our living together in the same world of meaning and choosing certain possibilities together. 4) The *Geschick* of a community gets freed up only as we communicate with one another and struggle together. (Sheehan 2016: 528)

Most probably, it is not a mistake that there is not, as in Heidegger and the English translations, a note after the second sentence. For, in Sheehan’s step 2), Heidegger is a spiritual Founding Father of the constitution of the USA, here in the paraphrastic translation Heidegger is even a Founding Fathers of Massachusetts nine years earlier, in a note that Sheehan has added:
97. See John Adams: ‘... a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.’ Preamble to the Constitution of Massachusetts (1780): http://www.nhin.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm.” (Sheehan 2016: 528. n. 97).

As I will show, adopting the two mistakes of the translators Sheehan’s rendering turns Heidegger’s text completely upside down, from the first sentence to the last. Since one can fully appreciate his perversion of the first sentence only in light of his handling of the fourth one, I begin with the third and the fourth sentence. In Fritsche (2016a: 17-23 [in this document pp. 31ff]), I have listed ten and in Fritsche (2017: 5-9 [51ff.]) two further mistakes, frauds, or discrepancies in Sheehan’s rendering of the passage on destiny (in addition to the two mistakes of the translators). Here, I present his rendering differently, and without a count.

6.2 “These fates are already guided [...] in the resoluteness for definite possibilities” (SZ 384.35-37 = BTS 352.7-9)

As to my knowledge, all interpreters maintain that, according to Heidegger, ordinary Daseine as well as authentic Daseine live in a set of possibilities. In addition, all interpreters maintain that ordinary Daseine have not chosen these possibilities. Rather, the They has provided them. In other words, the They determines the possibilities in which ordinary Daseine are living. According to the American interpretation, an authentic Dasein breaks with them and produces its own possibility, and several authentic Daseine produce the set of possibilities in which they decide to live from now on. They don’t create fate and destiny. Rather, they produce them, they lead them out of the past into the present. For, as Sheehan puts it, “in a double return” authentic Dasein returns to the “present moment,” realizes that its ‘inherited legacy’ (Erbe)’ contains many possibilities, and “chooses one or another of them that it will endeavor to live out authentically in the light of its radical mortality” (Sheehan 2016: 496), whatever “radical mortality” meant for the Founding Fathers of the State of Massachusetts or those of the United States of America. Most probably, such production requires some communication amongst these Daseine. Thus, before this communication each of them was an ordinary Dasein, and it is only this communication that enables them to step out of the They and produce the set of possibilities with which they replace the They in which they have been living up to that point. Two pet words of conservative and rightist Germans enable one to formulate this event in the shortest way possible:

3) Rather, individual Schicksals are already guided by our social existence: our living together in the same world of meaning and choosing certain possibilities together. 4) The Ge-schick of a community gets freed up only as we communicate with one another and struggle together. (Sheehan 2016: 528)

According to Sheehan, an authentic Dasein produces its own fate. Thus, sentence 3) is about the way in which the They determines the possibilities of the ordinary Daseine, and sentence 4) tells readers both what authentic Daseine do and the necessary condition for their activity: it is only through turning to each other and communicating with each other that Dasein can step out of
the They and produce a new set of possibilities, a new They, if one wishes so, a They that fits the individual fates they chose or have chosen.

Readers of Sheehan’s article will probably find this convincing, and will attribute any oddities to Heidegger’s idiosyncratic language. Readers familiar with Heidegger’s German, however, will know that, in *Sein und Zeit*, there is no term that can reasonably be translated, literally or paraphrastically, as “social existence.” (As a matter of fact, Heidegger would have used the expression *soziale Existenz* at most for the mode of existence of the recipients of social welfare.) Even English readers without knowledge of German but familiar with the English translations will notice that both of them have at the place of “social existence” Heidegger’s technical term for the existential that enables Daseine to relate to other Daseine. In addition, both groups will notice that Sheehan has left out Heidegger’s note at the end of sentence 3) in which Heidegger precisely refers back to the section in which he has presented this existential, to §26. Furthermore, some readers will remember that, right at the end of that section, Heidegger says that being-with-other-Dasein cannot be conceived of as “a summative result of the occurrence of several ‘subjects’” (BTS 118 = SZ 125). Finally, some readers might know that, with this formula, he says that society is not a proper but doubly rather fallen form of being-with-other-Dasein, of community.

Moreover, as one can see in the original and in both English translations, where Sheehan has “choosing certain possibilities” Heidegger employs another of his technical terms, namely *Entschlossenheit* (resoluteness). Resoluteness, however, is in the first place a state of being open for a decision (“Entschlossenheit für,” “resoluteness for”) but not the activity of deciding made possible by resoluteness (see, e.g., Fritsche 1999: 4-6). More importantly, it is Heidegger’s technical term for authentic existence. Thus, Heidegger talks about authentic Daseine (or about them and ordinary ones as well), and he says that their fates are “guided beforehand.” Hence, he says the precise opposite of what Sheehan makes him say. Authentic Daseine do not chose their fates. Rather, each of them has a fate, and these fates are “guided beforehand”—most certainly, by that which the entire passage is about, namely *Geschick*.

Hence, one can dismiss Sheehan’s case already here. Still, he maintains that Heidegger speaks in §74 a private language. Thus, let it be assumed that Heidegger uses the name of the existential of being-with-other-Dasein for the mode of being of ordinary Dasein’s living in the They and the notion of *Entschlossenheit für* for ordinary Dasein whose fates, it might be said, are guided beforehand. Authentic Daseine, however, through communication break with this guidance and produce their own fates and their own destiny, as Heidegger says in the sentence 4)—in Sheehan’s paraphrastic translation.

6.3 “In communication and in battle the power of destiny first becomes free” (SZ 384.37-38 = BTS 352.9-10)

Sheehan labels my book Fritsche’s “Magic Theatre (‘For Madmen Only. Price of Admission Your Mind’)” (Sheehan 2016: 504). While one cannot deny that his maneuvers regarding sentence 3) have a certain shrewdness and crooked elegance, for the interpretation of sentence 4) Sheehan enters the stage with a butcher’s knife in his hands and executes a massacre that leaves no word alive.

As one sees, both English translations follow the syntax of Heidegger’s original, and so do Sheehan’s paraphrastic translations of sentences 2) and 3), not, however, his rendering of sen-
tence 4). In addition, the entire passage on destiny contains no “we” or “authentic Dasein” as a possible actor on the stage, whether in a leading role or in a minor one. To the contrary, they are absent in sentences 1), 2), and 4), and in sentence 3) it is said that their fates are guided beforehand, most probably by Geschick. All this notwithstanding, perverting the entire passage Sheehan replaces the authentic Dasein in Heidegger’s sentence 3) with inauthentic Dasein in order in Heidegger’s sentence 4) to lead the authentic ones—despite their complete absence in the entire passage—onto the stage where, in the clearing of Sheehan’s stage management, they go on rampage, castrate Geschick, and enthrone themselves both as the major grammatical subject of sentence 4) and as the only actor.

As the translators rightly translate, the grammatical subject of sentence 4) is “the power of destiny,” it is the only grammatical subject, and it is not determined by anything else. Thus, destiny is the only agent and—as every German who believes in it, assumes and as will become clear—as such highly active, having by definition “power.” “Never mind” (Sheehan 2016: 385), Sheehan cuts out the “power” of destiny (“The Geschick of a community”), renders “wird frei” falsely, brings in “us,” and brings “us” in as the only grammatical subject with a verb in the active voice; nay, with even two verbs in the active voice (“only as we communicate with one another and struggle together”). In brief: we freely produce our Geschick.

We “struggle together”: this is quite obviously a common endeavor guided by our common goal to produce our common destiny. We do not fight against each or other anyone else but “struggle together,” because we struggle for an expression of our unity and its consolidation for our common future, as Sheehan suggests by his two examples. However, in that case Heidegger would not have used the word Kampf. As, not Macquarrie and Robinson’s “struggling,” but Stambaugh’s literal translation “battle” conveys, a Kampf (“Whose Kampf?” “Mein Kampf!”) is for every native German speaker, including all those who, before or after 1925, have never heard of Hitler’s book, in the first place a fight against a foe, a foe who has to be defeated or even annihilated. During his tenure as rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger frequently used the word Kampf for his activities (see, e.g., Fritsche 1999: 189 with 308 [endn. 1], Heidegger 2000: 96, 98, 99, 114, 772). In addition, in the 1930s Heidegger translated πόλεμος (war, battle, contest) in Heraclitus’ fragment B 53 as “Kampf” (e.g., Heidegger 2000: 283), and claimed in 1933/34 that this Kampf was not about “friendly opponents” but about the “foe [Feind]”; the foe within a people is much more dangerous than a foe outside of the people, and the Germans have “to launch the attack on a long-term basis with the goal of the total annihilation [völligen Vernichtung] of the foe,” (Heidegger 2001: 90f); this foe most probably included the Jews and the Jewish, for Heidegger the incarnation of society (see Fritsche 2016b).

The Geschick “gets freed up,” by us: Sheehan claims that Heidegger uses überliefern for the activity in which authentic Dasein choses its authentic possibility or, as he likes to say, “frees it up.” Thus, here it would be used in the passive voice because Geschick is freed up by authentic Dasein. However, Überlieferung, überliefern is used in everyday language as well as in Heidegger for traditions, traditions which, or in which, things are handed down from one generation to the next (see above, my sections 3 and 4). In addition, Heidegger does not use überliefern. Rather, he says that the power of destiny “wird frei”; that is, as the translators rightly translate, “becomes free.” Sheehan might be prepared to acknowledge that one cannot equate “wird überliefert” and “wird frei.” For, right after his bullet-list with the occurrences of Überlieferung he offers a second bullet-list, with six Heidegger quotes containing the noun or verb Befreiung / befreien (liberation, to liberate) and claims that these words mean the same as Überlieferung / überliefern (Sheehan 2016: 488.13-
Thus, he will say that “wird frei” is the passive voice of befreien. However, frei werden is an intransitive expression consisting of the auxiliary verb werden and the adjective frei. By contrast, befreien is a transitive verb, and its passive voice is befreit werden. Every native German speaker is aware of the difference between “X wird frei” and “X wird befreit (von Y).”

When one uses in German without further addition and comment wird frei, one usually does indeed imply that that which wird frei already exists before the moment in which it wird frei, and without this implication the phrase would not work. However, it does not get liberated by something different but rather liberates itself, comes out, and gets active as what it is with all the power it has. This happens often against the will of the involved humans as, for instance, when in a tumultuous meeting a lot of latent aggression or in an explosion of a nuclear plant radioactivity wird frei or freigesetzt. In such cases, one knows that one’s measures to keep the powers at work contained have failed (see Fritsche 2016a, 1999: 47–65). In contrast to aggressions and radioactivity, destiny has never been under the control of the humans, and it decides by itself when it comes out. Still, Heidegger, like the Scheler before his turn and like Hitler, makes the point that the They tries to ignore and suppress the coming out of destiny, and it is, of course, against the They and those Daseine that become inauthentic that the authentic Daseine have to launch the Kampf to realize destiny (see Fritsche 1999, 2014). Thus, “wird frei” is neither “wird überliefert” nor “wird befreit.” Rather, as in the case of Überlieferung it is the opposite of what Sheehan makes Heidegger say. The tradition does the Überlieferung and not the recipient of a tradition or someone who takes a possibility out of it. Similarly, destiny liberates itself and is not liberated by Daseine.

Probably, part of the reasons for Sheehan’s perversion is that he felt victim to the two mistakes of the translators. “Communication” makes American interpreters apparently exclusively think of the back and forth in discussions and conversations. However, this is a false translation of Mitteilung. If Heidegger had meant something like “discussion,” he could have easily chosen a word from a long list of words each of which clearly and unambiguously conveys such interactions, namely Auseinandersetzung, Besprechung, Debatte, Dialog, Diskussion, Erörterung, Gespräch, Meinungs austausch, Rede und Gegenrede, Unterredung, Verhandlung, or even Beratung. However, he uses the word Mitteilung, and a Mitteilung in general and also in Heidegger (SZ: 162, 168 = BTS: 151f., 157) is primarily a one-way communication in which person A informs B about something, or makes B share something that A already has. Superiors, people with power, administrations and bureaucracies deliver Mitteilungen (in Mitteilungsblättern), or bosses when they fire someone (“Herewith, I teile Ihnen mit [inform you] that you are fired.”), cases in which the recipient is not supposed to start a discussion. In other cases, there is just simply nothing to argue as when someone says: “I have to mitteilen to you / inform you that your child is dead.” (see Fritsche 1999: 347–51 [endn. 24]). Other than that, atmospheres, moods, or other things that are not human thoughts teilen sich mit (communicate themselves, spread themselves out) to humans as, for instance, the solemn atmosphere of this memorial to every visitor, or God to the humans through his miracles and other deeds.

Heidegger’s sentence 3) is about authentic Daseine. To make his case Sheehan renders it as a sentence about ordinary or inauthentic Dasein. To do so he already has to perform the same maneuver in sentence 2).

6.4 “Destiny is not composed of individual fates […] together of several Subjects” (SZ 384.32-34 = BTS 352.5–7)
Heidegger’s sentence 2) runs: “2) Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen, sowenig als das Miteinandersein als ein Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte begriffen werden kann.” (SZ 384) Macquarrie and Robinson have: “2) Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects.” Stambaugh translates: “Destiny is not composed of individual fates nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects.” Sheehan renders it thus: “2) A Geschick isn’t the sum total of individual Schicksals (just as social existence isn’t the gluing together of individual subjects).” (Sheehan 2016: 528) According to Sheehan, Martineau’s translation of Heidegger’s German phrase sich zusammensetzen aus as se composer de is right while Faye’s paraphrase of it as reposer sur is wrong (Sheehan 2015a: 383). Quite obviously, Sheehan’s knowledge of Heidegger and French is so poor that he cannot recognize that, in that context, the negation of reposer sur is, as I will show, wholly appropriate as a paraphrase of the negation of se composer de as a translation of Heidegger’s negation of sich zusammensetzen aus.

It is Sheehan whose paraphrases are simply false or not much better than that. As in sentence 3), he replaces Heidegger’s term for the existential of being-with-other-Dasein with the fuzzy term “social existence.” Since, in Sheehan’s rendering of sentence 3), this term refers to the They, it will be meant to do so in sentence 2) as well. Since Heidegger’s note does not refer to §27 (the one on the They), but to §26 (the one on the existential of being-with-other-Dasein) Sheehan has cut it out. In addition, what does “gluing together” might mean in this context? Zusammenvorkommen is most of the time, if not always, the opposite of something like being glued together. The fact that A and B zusammen vorkommen (happen to be there both at the same time) on a square in a city, in a statistics, or somewhere else, does not say anything about any connection between A and B. In fact, the phrase is often used to emphasize that there is no connection between A and B whether by being glued together or in some other way. Furthermore, do “sum total” and “gluing together” mean the same thing or not? Finally, why does Heidegger at that point compare Geschick and the They by negating x of the former and y of the latter, whether or not x and y are the same? Sheehan does not comment on any of these questions. Most certainly, he would not have been able to come up with something reasonable if he had tried.

Appendix 5: Heidegger and other mortal scholars on Aristotle and “the Greeks”

“Who could have guessed it would take over seventy years before the true meaning of SZ would finally be conjured out of the shadows by the magic wand of Johannes Fritsche?” (Sheehan 2016: 503). What are seventy years? After all, the professor of religious studies operates on a market almost thirty times older. In his book on Jesus Christ (Sheehan 1986), Sheehan maintains “that Jesus thought of himself not as God or Christ,” and “the resurrection had nothing to do with Jesus coming back to life” (Anonymous 2000). Forcing even the Son of God under the yoke of finitude and mortality Sheehan probably thought already in 1986 to have scored a paradigm shift.

As he acknowledges, I operate on a market that is even a few hundred years older. In his “demoli[tion]” (Sheehan 2016: 486) of my 1999 book, he feels the need to introduce me: “Johannes Fritsche received his doctorate with a dissertation on Book I of Aristotle’s Physics, which he published first in 1982 and again in 1986.” (Sheehan 2016: 483). As Sheehan might have noticed, in the lecture course The Principle of Reason from 1955 Heidegger characterizes Aristotle’s Physics as
“the fundamental book of what later is called metaphysics” determining “the warp and woof [Ge-
füge] of the whole of Western thinking” (Heidegger 1991: 63 = Heidegger 1978: 111). In fact, the
very beginning of the entire Physics, the first chapter of its first book, “is the classic introduction
to philosophy. Even today it still makes entire libraries of philosophical literature superfluous.
Whoever has understood this chapter can venture the first steps in thinking” (Heidegger 1991: 64
= Heidegger 1978: 112).

Heidegger has obviously never interpreted this chapter. I, for my part, spent 122 pages of
the 362 pages of my dissertation on its 22 lines. Since 526 and 537 CE, since Philoponus and
Simplicius, the authors of the first extant commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, it has been main-
tained that, in Physics I, 1, presupposing their existence Aristotle proves only the number and
character of the principles of natural beings. By contrast, I argue that the main purpose of the
chapter is to show the need of a proof of the existence of such principles, with all what follows
from this for the status and arguments of the following chapters and books (see Fritsche 1986:
11-92, 171-212).

Sheehan carefully keeps track: “A monograph entitled ‘On Aristotle’s Physics, Books II
and VIII,’ announced in 1999 as forthcoming (Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 21[2] [1999]: 265),
has not appeared.” (Sheehan 2016: 483f. n. 2) He is right. There are, though, the 72 pages of
Fritsche (2018). Since Philoponus and Simplicius, it has been taken for granted that, in the 38
lines of the first half of Chapter I of Book II of the Physics, Aristotle presents the core of his the-
ory of nature, implicitly or explicitly directed against any other actual or possible theory of na-
ture. However, this is wrong. Rather, he just sets the stage for developing such a theory. In addi-
tion, I show how, despite its high improbability, Philoponus and Simplicius could come up with
their thesis (even though otherwise interpreting the chapter in opposite ways), how the Latin phi-
losophers, from a different perspective, and how the modern interpreters, from a still different
perspective, reinforced it. (Fritsche 2018: 276-279).

Sheehan has an American soulmate in Aristotle scholarship. Aristotle uses as the first
definition of nature in Physics II, 1 the phrase ἀρχὴ κινήσεως (principle of motion). In a paper
published in 2005 in, as one says, a very prestigious journal, acknowledging that, in all the other
occurrences of this phrase, Aristotle means a mover, an author claims that, in Physics II, 1, the
phrase has a different meaning, one that one finds neither at any other place in Aristotle’s entire
oeuvre nor in everyday parlance. In a book chapter in, again, a very prestigious volume published
in 2013, without even once mentioning the paper from 2005, the same author argues that Aristo-
tle means by the phrase the final cause. For this purpose, he has to isolate phrases or sentences
from their contexts and assume that a technical term frequently used in Book II means the pre-
cise opposite of its normal everyday and philosophical meaning (see Fritsche 2018: 217, 225-227,
264-267, 279-281).

Already in 1939, in a 63 pages long essay on the 90 lines of Physics II, 1, Heidegger has charac-
terized Aristotle’s Physics as “the concealed and, therefore, never sufficiently thought-
through foundational book of all Occidental philosophy” (Heidegger 1967: 312; as the following
two quotes my translation). Aristotle offers an “interpretation of phusis that has been the founda-
tion of, and guiding thread for, all characterizations of ‘nature’ after him.” (Heidegger 1967: 313).
Heidegger follows here Philoponus and Simplicius, for Aristotle has done so “in the first chapter
of the second of the eight books of ‘the Physics’ (Physik B, 1, 192b8-193b21)” (Heidegger 1967:
312). Other than that, however, his interpretations of Aristotle and the Greeks have been unique.
In the 1920s, Heidegger assumed that, philosophically, Plato and Aristotle had to be repeated
because they aimed at phenomenological analyses of the everyday comportment of Dasein. Around 1931, Plato and Aristotle became the type of revolutionaries that Heidegger had anticipated in Sein und Zeit. When Heidegger repacked his philosophical and political agenda as the history of Being, the pre-Socratics took over that role. After the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/3, at the latest, the pre-Socratics became the philosophers of the Geviert. In other words, in each of the three phases of Heidegger’s philosophical development his Greeks did what he himself did (see Fritsche 2019). I am not aware of any Heideggerian showing that this is not an example of the power of prejudice in Gadamer’s sense. In addition, Heideggerians seem not to mention, let alone discuss, that Heidegger acknowledged in 1964, probably in reaction to works by Boeder and Tugendhat, that the two assumptions of all of his three interpretations of the Greeks are false. For, already in pre-metaphysical Greek truth was conceived exclusively as the truth of statements, and one cannot call world-disclosure truth (see Fritsche 2019).

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